

국외훈련결과보고서

예술의 자생력 제고를 위한 거버넌스 정립방안 연구

: 문화예술위원회로의 정책이전에 대한 고찰을 바탕으로

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문화체육관광부

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차 례

1. 국외훈련 개요

2. 훈련기관 개요

3. 연구결과 보고서 (학위논문)

Ⅴ 훈련결과보고 요약본 : 별도 첨부

국외훈련 개요

1. 훈련국 : 영 국

2. 훈련기관명 : 요크대학교(University of York)

3. 훈련분야 : 행정학 (문화행정)

4. 훈련기간 : 2018. 7. 3 ~ 2020. 6. 22

훈련기관 개요

I. 기관 개요

- 훈련기관명 : 요크대학교 (University of York)
- 훈련과정명 : MPA with Professional Placement
- 인터넷 웹주소 : <http://www.york.ac.uk>
- 기타(주소 등) : University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD,
United Kingdom

II. 기관 소개

- 연 혁
 - 1617년 제임스 1세때 대학 설립을 청원한 후 몇 번의 청원을 거쳐,
1963년 230명의 학생과 28명의 직원으로 개교
 - 설립 당시 경제학, 교육학, 영문학, 역사학, 수학, 정치학 등 6개 학부가 있었으며, 첫 해에는 King's Manor, Heslington Hall 등 세 개의 빌딩으로 시작하였으나, 이듬해 Heslington을 중심으로 본격적으로 캠퍼스를 조성

○ 주요 특징

- Derwent College, Langwith College, Alcuin College, Vanbrugh College, Goodricke College, Wentworth College, James College, Halifax College 이외에 2014년 로마 황제 콘스탄틴의 이름을 딴 Constantine College가 추가되어 총 9개 College로 구성
- 2018년 기준 Times Higher Education 세계대학 순위에서 전체 980개 대학 중 137위를 차지하였으며, arts and humanities 분야 31위, Social sciences 분야 77위, Life sciences 분야 79위를 기록
- 2009년부터 2015년까지 5번 Times Higher Education Awards
- 2018년 The Times and Sunday Times UK 대학 순위 16위, The Guardian 17위이며 Politics는 16위임.
- 영국 Russel Group의 일원으로 우수한 성과를 보이는 대학에게 수여하는 Queen's Anniversary Prize를 5번이나 받은 대학임
- 30개의 학부와 리서치 센터가 있으며 약16,000명의 학생이 있음

○ 주요 시설

- 메인 캠퍼스는 요크 중심부에서 남동쪽으로 약 2.5km 떨어진 Heslington에 위치해 있고, 면적은 200 에이커에 달함

- 요크 시내에 위치한 King's Manor 캠퍼스는 세인트메리 수도원의 수도원장 사택이 있던 곳으로 Heslington 캠퍼스와 5km 떨어져 있음
- York Science Park와 National Science Learning Centre를 운영
- 부속시설로는 도서관, 컴퓨터실, 각종 실험실, 특히 EXEC(Centre for Experimental Economics)로 알려진 유명한 실험경제학 연구소가 관련 분야 유명 교수에 의해 설립되었음

○ 훈련과정 소개

- 학위과정(1년차)과 직무훈련 과정(2년차)으로 구성
- 1년차 과정은 가을학기(9월~12월), 봄학기(1월~3월), 여름학기(4월~6월) 등 3학기로 구성되며, 총 8과목 180학점을 이수해야 함
- 2년차 직무훈련과정은 학교와 협의하여 정부기관, 지방정부 등에서 직무훈련 수행

Ⅲ. 과정 소개

- MPA 프로그램 리더는 Dr. Davidescu Simona
- 약 200명의 학생(65명의 research 학생 포함)이 입학
- 1년차는 3번의 term으로 구성되어 있음

구 분	수 강 과 목	학점수
학위과정	● Theories of the Policy Process	20
	● Leading & Managing Change	20
	● Optional Module(선택)	20
	● Strategic Planning	20
	● Managing Public Finances	20
	● Public Management & Delivery	20
	● Policy Report Research Workshop	-
	● Policy Project Report	60

※ 총 이수학점 : 180학점 (6과목 120, 논문 60)

○ 2년차 : 직무훈련

**Exploring for the balanced distance between government
and artists to strengthen the resilience in the arts**

*: What can be learned from the policy transfer of the arts council
model between South Korea and the United Kingdom?*

MPA

2018/2020

Department of Politics

Abstract

South Korea's adoption of the UK Arts Council model attempted to transform government-led arts policy into artist-centred policy based on arm's length principle. This policy transfer, however, failed to accomplish its intended purpose since it was not able to accommodate elements and conditions for successful policy transfer. The hard aspect of policy transfer was impeded due to few similarities in the legislative or institutional adoption, limited information of the UK Arts Council and the asymmetrical relationship between the government and the arts sector. The different understandings between policy actors and top-down communication of South Korean government led to the distortion of the soft aspect of policy transfer. Also, insufficient capacities of implementation, such as the lack of resources and incompetent officials, caused a failure of the transfer. This study highlights that three variables for successful policy transfer, which are the 'hard', 'soft' aspect of policy transfer and policy implementation, affect each other in complex ways, and this interaction does not end with a one-time

borrowing of formal elements. Therefore, Policy transfer requires continuous transformation based on a long-term strategy. In particular, the findings reveal that the role of local communication process is essential for the successful transfer in Asian countries with historical legacies of the authoritarian regime because formally borrowed elements are unlikely to elicit the desired effect due to different understandings between policy actors.

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1. Introduction

During the 1990s and 2000s, in South Korea, the political democratisation and economic liberalisation acted as a pressure for change in the government-led arts policy. In particular, it was considered that the UK Arts Council model could maximise the artistic development as well as minimise political interventions through assistance to cultural practitioners and organisations, based on the perceived success of arts councils in Australia, Canada and the UK. The Arts Council Korea (ARKO hereafter) was established in 2005 as an independent and consensus-based organisation to support and implement the arts policy in South Korea.

South Korea's adoption of the UK Arts Council model was considered as one of the representative cultural policies of the newly elected government (2003~2008), which attempted to break down the interventions of the government on the art and transform government-led policy into artist-centred policy. However, the ambitious policy transfer to establish a horizontal relationship between government and artists and to enhance the credibility of arts policy failed to achieve its intended purpose (Lee, 2012).

The ARKO has even worsened political conflicts among artists rather than solving them about the way of arts support policy and the allocation of public funding since the establishment of the organisation in 2005, and as a result, it lost the trust from the public and the artists (Sung, 2015). In particular, it got involved in the impeachment of former President Park (2013~2017) due to misuse of official authority. The ARKO implemented blacklisting a number of artists, who were proposed by the Presidential Office, through excluding them from the government funding for the arts (The Guardian, 2017).

For these reasons, in South Korea, it is an urgent issue to find out a way that the ARKO could operate successfully as well as restore trust from artists and the public as it was intended. In order to find alternatives, it is essential to analyse why this policy transfer, South Korea's adoption of the UK Arts Council model, did not get the desired result as in the UK. It should include considering that policy transfer done in completely different historical, political and social contexts often lead to unintended negative consequences.

In addition, even though South Korea imported the formal requirements of the UK Arts Council, it did not bring the same effect as

in the UK due to scarce resources, unskilful staffs, and complex dependent relationships which are crucial variables of the successful policy implementation. Therefore, to find out the causes of policy transfer failure, it is significant to look at implementation issues.

The main research questions of this report are: In the process of policy transfer, how come the Korean government did not achieve the intended outcomes? Why did this failure occur? In the course of looking for answers to these questions, attention will be paid to two approaches which are hard and soft forms of transfer, for a broader understanding of the policy transfer. Also, analysing the conditions of effective policy implementation will be done separately from policy transfer.

Policy transfer has now become a common framework to illustrate the policy changes of many countries. When a government has problems to deal, it is natural that policymakers seek alternatives from other countries' institutions or experiences in the global society (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). So, the policy transfer concept has drawn attention from the academic field and has been analysed by many scholars in terms of the achievement of the

policy transfer.

However, some criticise that the previous study and analysis on the policy transfer lack the detailed approach and consideration about elements of success or failure (Fawcett and Marsh, 2012). Furthermore, some point out that most of the previous studies of policy transfer focus on transfer between developed countries that are geographically and historically close, for example, the United States and the European Union (Evans, 2009). As they demonstrate, it is not easy for us to find literature about how policy transfer took place in countries with entirely different political and social contexts and insufficient policy implementation capacity. Even though there are such studies about transfer between countries with different contexts, most studies characterise those kinds of transfer as a selective adoption or deviation due to the unique political, economic and social history such as an 'Asian Way' (Beeson and Stone, 2013).

Nevertheless, policy transfer has become more sophisticated, for example, taking into account processes of indigenisation (Stone, 2012) and communication (Park, Wilding and Chung, 2014). This point of view attempts to complement and advance understanding of the movement

of policies through investigating how and why policy transfer could not achieve the intended outcome. While learning about original policy contexts and receiving feedbacks from stakeholders occur in some cases of policy transfer, these learning and feedbacks may be minimised for some reasons in other cases (Marsh and Evans, 2012; Park et al., 2014). Thus, with respect to policy transfer, considering 'soft' aspect such as learning, communication of norms among the stakeholders, as well as 'hard' aspect of transfer such as the legislative, enables a broad understanding of the policy transfer (Stone, 2017).

This policy report starts with an analysis of the literature on the arts council and policy transfer to understand what factors affected a failure of policy transfer of South Korea's adoption of the UK Arts Council (collectively referring the Arts Council England, the Scottish Arts Council and the Arts Council of Wales) model. The next section discusses the case of South Korea modelled on the UK Arts Council in terms of the favourable conditions of the 'hard' and 'soft' aspect of policy transfer as well as policy implementation. In the end, the paper will suggest alternatives to overcome the difficulties and hurdles of the policy transfer and ways to achieve the intended goals.

2. Empirical Literature Review

Cultural policy refers to various governmental activities that encourage “the production, dissemination, marketing, and consumption of the arts” (Rentschler, 2002). Thus, the relationships between the cultural field and political system have greatly influenced the way of formulating cultural policies of most countries. Also, such relationships are directly linked to ideology, norms, economy, and policy delivery organisations of each country (Vestheim, 2012).

Illustration 1. The uniqueness of cultural policy

Distinctiveness	Complexity	Cultural Policy in NPM
<p>The decisions of public officials are implemented by the production of goods and services, produce discernable societal outcomes</p> <p>However, as a policy, public culture are often markedly atypical and the societal impacts difficult to assess</p>	<p>Many more agencies involved in cultural policy</p> <p>Much of cultural policy is the result of actions and decisions taken without expressed policy intention</p> <p>Much of cultural policy is not just the result of direct financial support, but a wide variety of interventions</p>	<p>Public investment in the arts is advocated on the basis of concrete and measurable economic and social impacts</p> <p>Increasing pressure to gather data on its impacts on society and on the national economy</p> <p>Policy evaluation and issues of quality become the fundamental issues for state involvement</p>
[Bennett, 2004]	[Schuster, 2003]	[Belfiore, 2004]

Thus, the unique characteristics of cultural policy should be taken into account to properly analyse a reason of the failure of policy transfer. In general, the decisions of public officials are implemented by the production of goods and services that produce discernable societal outcomes. However, as a policy, public culture differs substantially from these criteria, if only because the programs funded are often markedly atypical and the societal impacts difficult to assess (Bennett, 2004). In particular, many more agencies involved in cultural policy than is conventionally understood. It is uncommon that one would think of the aggregation of these agencies and their activities as constituting a conceptual whole. Much of cultural policy is the result of actions and decisions taken without expressed policy intention, and it is not just the result of direct financial support, but a wide variety of interventions (Schuster, 2003).

Based on these characteristics, Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey (1989) introduced four different types of cultural policies over the world, which are (1) the facilitator, (2) the patron, (3) the architect, and (4) the engineer model. (1) The facilitator model leaves the arts to the market and private charity, while the government indirectly supports and

encourages these voluntary activities through tax relief or other benefits. (2) In the patron model, the government offers direct support to the arts, mainly through the arts council. It is considered that the government takes over the role of patron of the arts that were handled by aristocrats and wealthy merchants in a class-divided society. (3) The architect model considers the arts as social welfare; thus, the government intervenes and supports the arts through more direct and active policy programs. (4) In the engineer model, the government only support the arts which reflect favourably on the dominant political interests, so the arts are extremely politicised.

An arts council can be understood a non-governmental organisation which is designed to distribute public funding to the arts sector, based on artistic and professional expertise on behalf of the government (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989). As noted before, an arts council means a symbolic organisation to implement arts policy in the patron model. This model can be traced from the Western liberal democracy that the idea of individual and the freedom of expression should be free from superstition and religious norm (Blomgren, 2012).

In this sense, the patron model emphasises on 'institutional autonomy',

which means that it is possible for allocating organisations of public subsidies 'to make decisions based on their own rules, immune from the arbitrary exercise of authority by external power holders' (Vestheim, 2009). This belief led to 'arm's length principle', which became a common framework for arts policy today. At first, this standpoint appeared to defend the arts in the face of politics in fascism and communism.

Nowadays, the idea largely means that politicians should not intervene in the decision on arts funding through their expressive judgement about the arts (Hutchinson, 1982). Additionally, this principle involves allocating arts funding indirectly, through 'arm's length mechanism' such as the arts council that depends on independent artistic practitioners (Blomgren, 2012).

Therefore, arts council, as 'arm's length body', is operated by the principle of having a council structure consisting of artists or artistic professionals formally as well as of making decisions on the distribution of public funding according to the criteria and process that are established by them. In the UK, the first form of an arts council, the Arts Council of Great Britain, was introduced in 1946 and is divided into

Arts Council England, Arts Council of Wales and Scottish Arts Council in 1994 following a restructuring of the Arts Council of Great Britain.

Illustration 2. The meaning of Arts Council in the United Kingdom



Rueschemeyer (1983) demonstrated that the UK Arts Council reflects the established social consensus on the state's laissez-faire approach to the arts in the UK, which was accumulated through liberal political tradition. This thought brought about a firm consensus that arts funding through the arts council as an intermediary could minimise political threats on the arts, rather than direct governmental interventions.

In particular, the middle class played an important role in shaping this belief (Lee, 2008). Since the middle class tried to distinguish themselves from other classes through arts consumption, they emphasised on the social values of the arts to the public and thus contributed to firming the legitimacy of why the state should support arts. The strong linkage of arts patronage with the middle class prohibited the arts council from engaging in the political sector where struggles between various social classes influenced the characteristics of arts funding (Hutchison, 1982)

With respect to the arts council's decision-making, the UK Arts Council was considerably dependent on the informal networks and consensus among individual council members, the government and arts practitioners with similar social backgrounds (Hutchison, 1982). Although some express concerns about the oligarchic characteristic of this informal networks (Gray, 2012; Vestheim, 2012), they were expected to pursue common interests for the entire arts sector without standing for specific art genres. This is based on the belief that the lack of political, social and cultural representativeness of the arts council organisation does not significantly affect the outcomes of cultural policies.

Instead, it is argued that a limited group of individuals sharing similar backgrounds could be helpful for a coherent set of policies for the arts since this encourages the council to reach a consensus on the direction of the arts policy (Gray, 2012). Also, the decision of the arts council based on this consensus was considered to contribute to defending the arts sector from political interventions to a great extent.

However, since the 1980s, the arts council began to be influenced by the political turmoil such as the advent of New Public Management (NPM), which emphasised reducing public expenditure and improving efficiency (Belfiore, 2004; Hood, 1995). Public spending on the arts was required to be accountable for concrete and measurable indicators. This new movement caused the issues of policy evaluation and performance measurement to become the fundamental issues for state involvement in the cultural sector (Bennett, 1995). Thus, the subsidised arts sector faced increasing pressure to lay out data on its social and economic impacts.

More importantly, such expansion of NPM around the world, combined with the distinctiveness of cultural policy, has been triggering diverse discussions in the perspective of essence and effectiveness of public

resource allocation related to the arts. In general, public decisions are implemented by the production of goods and services that lead to clear outcomes for society. However, the arts policy differs inherently from these criteria since funded programs are usually atypical, and their public impacts are difficult to evaluate (Bennett, 2004).

Besides, most artistic outcomes are not from just the direct result of public funding support, but various interventions (Schuster, 2003). Therefore, this change was referred to as a “turning point for the arts”, since “it is during this time that the basis of funding to the arts changed significantly and governmental relationship with, and interest in, the arts would change accordingly” (Quinn, 1998). With such pressure, the Arts Council established new procedures and rules, including a funding agreement and quality assessment about the allocation of public funding.

In spite of these changes, however, its essential features remained unchanged: the strong consensus on the arm’s length principle, the minimisation of governmental intervention, the prohibition of wide-ranging stakeholder involvement, and an arts council organisation as the main body to decide on arts funding (Lee, 2012).

As mentioned before, the arts council organisation is understood as one of the key features in the patron model among four types of cultural policies. Since the establishment of the arts council in the UK, many countries such as Australia (1967), Canada (1957), and the Nordic countries have set up their version of the arts council. It is argued that the arts council could be established and operated effectively in these countries since they have a long tradition of cultural patronage or similar political backgrounds with the UK (Craik, 2007). However, as the UK has experienced, the arts council in these countries have faced immense pressures for 'value for money' due to changing political and economic circumstances such as NPM (Daniel, 2017; Vestheim, 2012).


3. Theoretical Literature Review

Many theoretical discussions about policy transfer have been done since Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) introduced the concept. In spite of various definitions, policy transfer is widely known as 'a process by which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system' (Dolowitz, 2000). The focal points of the discussion are as follows: 'actors involved in transfer; the cause of transfer including if it is voluntary or coercive; the contents and extent of borrowing; factors which affect the success of transfer' (Cairney, 2011).

3.1. Who and Why transfers policy?

With regard to actors involved in policy transfer, it is critical to define not only who leads the transfer in the importing country but also the policy is borrowed from which country. Both aspects affect the process of policy transfer, even though the leader of the transfer in the importer is particularly crucial at the stage of introducing the policy of the exporting country, the latter is essential to understand concerning

the historical, political and social contexts at the implementation of the transferred policy. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) classified six types of actors which are: 'elected officials; political parties; bureaucrats; interest groups; policy entrepreneurs; and supra-national institutions'.



It is important to look at the nature of the introduction of policy transfer in terms of whether it was voluntary or coercive because it is connected with the cause of the transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) argued a policy transfer continuum in terms of its voluntary and coercive traits, as seen in Figure 1. In respect to the voluntary transfer, which means there is no pressure to import policy, they assert that transfer happens when policymakers look for policy examples overseas in the process of finding alternatives to solve a current problem. It is

argued that the more voluntary the transfer is, the more rationality can be guaranteed in the process of the transfer.

On the other hand, some argue that governments pursue a case abroad to justify their legitimacy since they have a 'natural tendency to look abroad' to know how others dealt with a similar problem (Bennett, 1991). More importantly, even if there is little external pressure to change policy above cases, the time pressure plays an important role in the transfer process. In other words, the higher an importing country feels forced to take action quickly, then the more rationality could be restricted its decision-making process (Cairney, 2011). Thus, the voluntary transfer has a risk of causing even more irrational consequences if time pressures, along with political purposes, push the policy process.

3.2. What is transferred?

The subject of transfer and the extent of borrowing are also essential variables in the process of transfer since they have a tremendous impact on the outcome. There is considerable variation depending on the type and extent of borrowing and lending. Rose (1993) and Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) tried to make clear the difference between various

degrees of the transfer. Both are somewhat different but mainly illustrate the same cline from direct copying to inspiration by another model.

The slight difference is that Rose (1993) analyses the degrees of 'copying, adaptation, making a hybrid, synthesis and inspiration' while Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) distinguish 'copying, emulation, combinations and inspiration'. Copying means that the policy of the exporting country is entirely transferred without any changes. It most likely happens within the same country because the environment of the transfer will be identical or similar, at least in terms of political system and culture. However, when copying occurs between other countries, it involves lots of risks of failure due to different political and social contexts (Park, Lee and Wilding, 2017). Adaptation or emulation accommodates the contextual discrepancy through borrowing the core ideas of the policy.

Combinations or making a hybrid mean that the elements of the exporting region are newly organised in the importing region. Synthesis refers to creating a new policy by extracting and combining various aspects of some different exporting countries. Lastly, inspiration means

merely learning lessons from others or acting as a motive for developing a new programme (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Rose, 1993). Also, Stone (2004) introduced a bit different degrees of transfer by pointing out 'selective borrowing'. It signifies that policy contents and procedures are modified and translated in line with the importer's local conditions, including communication between various actors in the process of transfer. This concept is meaningful because it could complement the discussion of seeking the successful elements of policy transfer in terms of 'incomplete' or 'uninformed' transfer (Giest, 2017).

3.3. What determines the success and failure of policy transfer?

We can see various examples of policy transfer. Nevertheless, there is limited literature on what conditions and circumstances are needed for successful policy transfer between countries requires (Fawcett and Marsh, 2012). Rose(1993) demonstrates that lesson-drawing can be more successful when policy satisfies the following conditions which are '(1) less unique; (2) to have many delivery institutions; (3) to have more resources; (4) with simple causality; (5) to involve small change; (6) to have the interdependence between countries; and (7) to receive more support from policymakers'.

Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) assert three conditions that may cause a failure of policy transfer, which can be categorised as 'incomplete; explicitly uninformed; and/or inappropriate transfer'. 'Incomplete' transfer takes place when all important elements of the original policy are not sufficiently delivered and applied in the importing country. 'Uninformed' transfer occurs when the importing country has a lack of information on the key elements, which were the success factors in the exporting country. Finally, 'inappropriate' transfer happens when proper and sufficient attention is not paid to each transfer process, or when there is a considerable gap between importing and exporting countries in political and social contexts and conditions.

On the other hand, some highlights the possibility of 'soft' forms of transfer that can build common understanding and local support for the policy transfer (Stone, 2012; Park et al., 2014). As the expression indicates, the 'soft' form is the opposite of 'hard' form of transfer; that is, the legislative or institutional adoption. They argue that ideas and policies are likely to be transferred successfully only when 'norm-takers' exist to adopt and implement the ideas and policies. The local context and mutual communication within the importing country are

critical when determining which ideas to be adopted (Stone, 2017).

Furthermore, this viewpoint on policy transfer criticises that the analytic focus of significant scholarly discussion was to evaluate the success and effectiveness in terms of 'hard' institutional transfer that inevitably involves reflecting of characteristic rooted in the legalistic processes. The focus only on the 'hard' transfer, such as institutional adoption brought about a short and limited insight and perspective toward other policy dynamics. Stone (2017) emphasises that the 'soft' transfer of norms and ideas is strongly influenced by feedbacks from domestic policy actors in transformative processes of the transfer.

Thus, it is arguable that a comprehensive understanding and communication among actors, including stakeholders, play an essential role in achieving successful transfer outcomes. According to this aspect, merely asking whether policy transfer failed (or is 'inappropriate') is an incorrect question in many views if anyone wants to understand the situation or the phenomenon. In other words, policy transfer does not terminate by a one-time borrowing, and it needs continuous adaption through endless communicative processes. Accordingly, they insist that policy transfer needs to become more

sophisticated and consider indigenisation and communication processes (Stone, 2012; Park et al., 2014).

Also, it is claimed that a clear distinction between the conditions for policy transfer and elements of successful policy implementation is very challenging (Cairney, 2011; Evans, 2009). In other words, if the assessment of policy transfer does not take the view of policy implementation into consideration, it is difficult to foresee whether the transfer would be successful or not. For this reason, the conditions suggested by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) are criticised for its insufficiency to offer answers to the evaluation of policy transfer success (Stone, 2012).

Furthermore, the conditions presented by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) do not necessarily mean or automatically lead to the successful implementation of the transfer. The success of policy transfer depends on the broader scope of implementation, such as compliance, political will and broader socio-economic factors (Cairney, 2011). Therefore, two interconnected studies, including transfer process and implementation conditions, are essential for a broader understanding of policy transfer.

The study on implementation mainly responds to why decisions made by policymakers may not be fulfilled successfully. Most 'top-down' implementation literature emphasises an 'implementation gap' for the failure, which means the difference between anticipation of policymakers and the actual policy consequences (Cairney, 2011; Hill and Hupe, 2009). This argument clarifies the conditions for policy implementation success as follows: (1) clear and consistent policy objectives are understood; (2) the policy will be implemented as intended; (3) experienced and compliant officials implement policy; (4) enough resources are secured; (5) policy is implemented with minimal interdependence and support from interest groups; and (6) uncontrollable variables by policymakers do not critically interrupt the process (Cairney, 2011; Sabatier, 1986).

4. Case Analysis

4.1. Policy adoption of an Arts Council


Beginning with the establishment of the Ministry of Culture and Public Information in 1968, the South Korean government began to establish a legal and institutional basis for cultural policy. In 1973, the Korea Culture and Arts Foundation (KCAF hereafter) was introduced as a non-governmental public organisation for arts funding, following the enactment of the Culture and Arts Promotion Law in 1972 (ARKO, 2013).

The KCAF later operated a variety of supporting projects over the whole arts sector including literature, theatre, visual arts, music, dance, and traditional arts, through the Culture and Arts Promotion Fund, which was secured from entrance fees charged on cultural facilities such as theatre, concert hall and museum. However, the KCAF had been blamed for the deficiency of objectivity and transparency of funding distribution; a rigid hierarchy; and its severely restricted autonomy from the government and politics, even though it was a non-governmental organisation (Lee, 2012; Sung, 2015).

In the late 1980s, the Civilian Government, which was launched after a

long term of military autocracy, tried to involve artists and professionals of the arts and culture fields. The political democratisation movement, which was diffused throughout the Korean society in the 1990s, raised new agendas in the cultural sector, such as deregulation, decentralisation and cultural welfare (Park, 2010).


Illustration 3. Changes in Cultural Policies in South Korea



More importantly, the liberal government, which was re-elected in 2003 after the first horizontal shift of the power in 1998, took the lead at downsizing the government's power and encouraging the private sector to participate in the policy process. With this liberal approach, the arts policy also experienced a critical reform from the KCAF to the ARKO in 2005. The ARKO, as an independent organisation based on consensus,

was expected to be a substantial protection wall from the government, as well as lay the groundwork for the artists themselves to participate in the arts policy formulation (Yonhap News, 2005).

Illustration 4. Failure of the ARKO in South Korea



Although it has been fifteen years after the policy transfer, however, it is difficult to evaluate that significant decision-making in the ARKO fully secured independence from the government, and it became to be operated based on consensus among artists. For instance, Kim Byeong-ik, the first chairperson, resigns abruptly in 2007 without fulfilling his term when a dispute arises between the council members (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2007). Kim Jung-hun, the second chairperson, was dismissed

in 2008 for causing a loss of the arts fund after he refused the voluntary resignation suggested by the new Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism. Afterwards, a court decision nullified this dismissal, creating a complicated situation of the ARKO having two chairmen (Donga Ilbo, 2008).

Besides, the controversy over the decision of the ARKO, including lawsuits against the council members regarding its funding allocation constantly arose, which could question its independence, autonomy, and fairness. More importantly, the ARKO lost its legitimacy and trust from the artists as it was involved in blacklisting over plenty of artists recently (Hong, 2019; Lee, 2019). In summary, the creation of the ARKO, which is a result of South Korea's adoption of the UK Arts Council model, did not bring about the intended result.

4.2. The characteristics of transforming to the ARKO

4.2.1. Actors: Who did it?

Regarding where the policy is borrowed from, the arts council model was from the UK, where a long liberal tradition and the respect for expert knowledge were embedded in its society (Rueschemeyer, 1983). It

is viewed that the policymakers in South Korea tend to imitate the rules or institutions in the UK and the US (Park, Lee, and Wilding, 2017). It was not surprising that the South Korean government looked for the solution in the UK since the US does not officially admit the presence of an arts policy and the arts sector does not the US does not rely on the public funding sourced from the government (Bosch, 1997).

It implied that transforming the KCAF to the ARKO took place without enough consideration about different political and social context since the only option for South Korean bureaucrats was the UK system. In other words, 'inappropriate' transfer was likely to happen in the process due to insufficient attention to different policy conditions.

Actors involved in this transfer were the same as the domestic policy process since the change to the ARKO was driven by internal needs, not external pressure such as supranational institutions or other countries. South Korea has evident characteristics that are the strong state and fragile private sectors because it did not have a sufficient course or time of establishing a balance between the state and the private sector due to Japan's colonial rule (1910-1945) and military dictatorship (1961-1987). The government had a significant influence over the whole policy

process to control the politics and the public, while the autonomy of private sectors had been suppressed (Lee, 2019).


Besides, the circumstance of the divided state turned the private arts sector into a battlefield of ideology. This politicisation of arts led to intense divisions within the arts sector (Park, 2010). In details, the arts sector has been divided into conservative associations (the Korean Arts Organisations Federation) and progressive ones (the Korean People's Artists Federation). The strong government, which had the initiative in policy-making, listened to the arts sector to reflect their opinions, but it was nothing more than secondary (Park et al., 2017). Instead, deep-rooted ideological conflicts in the arts sector weakened the chances of delivering their opinions during the transforming to the ARKO. It implies that the asymmetrical relationship between the government and the arts sector would hurt the whole transfer process (Lee, 2012).

4.2.2. The reason for the transfer: Was it voluntary?

Around the earlier 2000s, as the arts sector's complaints and distrust for the funding allocation of the KCAF grew severe, the National Assembly suggested the KCAF's reform as a core task in arts policy (Lee et al. 2001). Despite the start of the practical discussion in the arts

sector, the catalyst to turn the KCAF into an art council came from the launching of the newly elected Democratic government in 2003. In succession to the spirit of the former Democratic government (1997-2003), the new government aimed to promote political democracy and economic liberalisation based on three governing principles which were 'participation', 'autonomy' and 'decentralisation'.

Illustration 5. Arts Council in South Korea modelled after the UK



The introduction of an arts council was considered to be consistent with these governing principles of the new government (Yang, 2005). Thus, in 2003, the government began to lead this transformation and

proposed the revised bill, leading to the change of the KCAF to the ARKO, into the national assembly.

Since then, however, the conflict between the conservative and progressive artists associations about the new institution remained the same about a year (Chung et al., 2016). This conflict will be discussed later in this paper. The bill with some amendments to the draft legislation was passed in December 2004 since the government, under pressure to produce the outcome at the beginning of the new government, partially accepted the conservative association's view (Lee, 2012).

This aspect can be interpreted that it is challenging to separate voluntary and coercive transfer in the process of the adoption of the UK Arts Council. According to the policy transfer continuum by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), it was close to 'voluntarily transfer but driven by perceived necessity'. It refers to a voluntary transfer process in which the borrowing country recognises the need for change. The impetus for transfer came from the borrower, while there were compelling factors such as time pressure for completing the reform and strong opposition to the Korean arts policy (Chung et al., 2016).

These characteristics can be analysed that two risks are involved in the policy transfer process. Firstly, the core values of the UK Arts Council were likely to be modified and contested in South Korea's adoption because the rationality acquired through the examination about the UK system at the beginning could be easily restricted due to time pressure and intense conflicts. Secondly, the government-led policy transfer and deep divisions within the arts sector imply that the artists, who should be the most influential actor, could be more vulnerable to the government or politics during the forthcoming transfer process including implementation.

4.2.3. What did they transfer in what scope?

The essential contents of the policy transfer regarding an arts council were to benchmark the primary organisational structure and the decision-making style of the UK Arts Council. It included the composition of 15 council members including one chairperson from the arts sector, term limit of council members, and the council's final decision-making authority about the allocation of arts funding (ARKO, 2013; Sung, 2015). Also, the revised bill reflected details to ensure the purpose of establishing the ARKO to minimise the influence of the

government as well as to secure the organisational autonomy and independence (Lee, 2012).

First, in order to legally block the link with the government, the obligation to report and approve the operation of the Culture and Arts Promotion Fund periodically to the government had been deleted. Second, it emphasised the ARKO's disconnection from the political power by introducing new provisions to the Culture and Arts Promotion Law that legally guarantee the professional independence of the council's members and disqualify public officials from becoming members.

However, some of the core elements of the UK Arts Council had not been transferred during the introduction process due to strong opposition from domestic stakeholders and different contexts between the UK and South Korea.

First of all, concerning the appointment of council members, the government proposed that the Ministry of Culture and Tourism¹ (MCT hereafter) would have an authority to appoint overall council members

¹ The Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) was transformed into the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) in 2008.

following the British way. However, the arts sector, which emphasised the representativeness of each genre, expressed strong opposition to this appointment system. Thus, the appointment through a recommendation committee was chosen as a negotiated alternative. This option emphasises the representativeness of each genre and poses a risk that the conflicts between genres would continue in the future decision-making of funding allocation by the ARKO (Chung et al., 2016).

Secondly, clear performance indicators, one of the core principles supported by the arm's length principle of the UK Arts Council, had not been established in South Korea. In the UK, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) concluded to sign a funding agreement every three years with the Arts Council under the arm's length principle, which explicitly defines the level of authority and delegation.

The Arts Council prioritises public funding according to the goals of the arts policy in the funding agreement, distributes them independently, and makes annual reports on the Arts Council's performance and budget (Arts Council England, 2013). In South Korea, however, the lack of precise performance goals and criteria for the arts policy made the ARKO receive overlapping evaluations from many

governmental organisations such as the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB), the MCT, the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) and the National Assembly (Ryoo, 2015).

These characteristics of South Korea’s adoption of the UK Arts Council can be analysed as ‘selective borrowing’, which is introduced by Stone (2004). In sum, the original policy contents were changed along with the context of South Korea and communication between major actors during its introduction process. It implied that the autonomy of the ARKO, the purpose of this policy transfer, would be constantly threatened throughout the implementation process.

Table 1. Arts Council in the UK and South Korea

		UK	South Korea
organisation	Composition	16 members (including one chairman)	11 members (including one chairman)
	Tenure	Four years	Chairman: 3 years Members: 2 years
	appointment	Secretary of DCMS	Minister of MCT (through a recommendation committee)
Budget and	Source of revenue	Government subsidy and the National Lottery	Culture and Arts Promotion Fund and the National Lottery

Policy	Budget planning	Conclusion of funding agreement between DCMS and the Arts Council (every three years)	Approval of MCT, MPB and National Assembly (every year)
Audit	Auditor	The National Audit Office	Overlapping Audit (MCT, MPB, BAI, and the National Assembly)
Performance Evaluation	Evaluator	DCMS (by annual report)	Overlapping evaluation (MCT, MPB, BAI, and the National Assembly)

Source: Kim, H and Ryoo, J. (2015)

4.3. What factors led to the failure of policy transfer?

I will address South Korea's adoption of the UK Arts Council in terms of the conditions presented Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) and Stone (2012) to evaluate success or failure of the outcome of policy transfer: 1) hard form of transfer including incomplete; uninformed; and inappropriate transfer; and 2) soft form of transfer including norm-taking and communication. Also, the requirements for successful policy implementation would also be considered as mentioned earlier.

4.3.1. Analysis of the hard form of policy transfer

Concerning the hard aspect of policy transfer, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) insist that 'incomplete; and/or uninformed; and/or

inappropriate transfer' could fail transfer. At first, it is necessary to examine major legislations and institutions between the exporting and importing country, whether this transfer is incomplete or not. Although at first glance both arts councils might look similar in terms of their formal organisation and structure, there are apparent differences in several significant areas, such as the composition of council members, the way in making and implementing funding allocation, and the legal characteristics of the council (Chung et al., 2016).

When it comes to the composition of council members, there are essential differences between the two countries. Unlike the UK, where most council members are from the arts sector, the proportion of non-arts sector or those who were closely connected with the government increased in the ARKO. According to the Culture and Arts Promotion Law in 2005, when the ARKO was introduced, all members of the ARKO were required to choose among “experts who have a general understanding of culture and arts”.

However, with the revision of the law in 2008, this qualification was expanded to “experts of legal, educational, media or business circles” (Sung, 2015). As a result, it posed a severe threat to autonomy as well

as the arts sector-centred decision-making, which was the core value of the ARKO.

It is generally known that the way how to decide funding allocation is the most fundamental function of an arts council since it is designed to distribute public funding to the arts sector, on behalf of the government. Historically, the UK Arts Council tends to take advantage of informal ways to make decisions on funding allocation. Thus, as discussed earlier, the decision-making of the Arts Council has depended mainly upon the informal networks and consultation among council members, staffs, the government and the arts sector, who share similar backgrounds (Hutchison, 1982).

Accordingly, when the ARKO was introduced, it was expected that members from the arts sector could lead to adequate decision-making based on their consensus. Nevertheless, unlike the UK, the deep-rooted distrust within the arts sector resulted in the complicated decision-making process by formalised rules and procedures, not by their consensus (Yang, 2005). These complex procedures and rules caused more time and resources to be spent on decision-making. For example, there was a legal dispute between the council members over the ARKO's

funding decisions since most council members, as specific genre representatives, felt pressure to secure equitable funding for each genre. Besides, the power struggle between the conservative and progressive artists made it more challenging to reach a consensus within the ARKO (Lee, 2012).

In addition, there is also a clear difference in the relationship between the government and the art council of two countries. The UK Arts Council has been considered as a non-governmental and private organisation in line with its autonomy. At the birth of the ARKO, likewise the UK, it was provided as a non-governmental organisation to secure autonomy. However, its legal status was changed to a quasi-governmental agency with the enactment of the Law on the Operation of Public Organisations (2007) due to the active voice derived from New Public Management (NPM).

This amendment required the chairperson of the ARKO to be appointed directly by the government and to sign with yearly contracts with the government. Besides, the government strengthened control over the budget planning and implementation of the ARKO, and various audits and performance evaluations by multiple governmental agencies

became mandatory. This firm government control, which is rarely found in the UK, seriously undermined the autonomy of the arts sector, the essential value of transforming from the KCAF into the ARKO (Lee, 2018).

In sum, the core elements that enabled the implementation of the arm's length principle through autonomy and consensus in the UK were not transferred during the policy transfer to the ARKO in South Korea. It can be concluded that this 'incomplete' transfer hurt the outcome of the policy transfer.

According to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), 'uninformed' transfer happens when there is insufficient information on the critical conditions for the success in the borrower country. In the UK, concerning the nomination of council members, the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) has the authority to appoint all the council members. It is based on the firm belief that individual members will seek common interests for the arts sector, rather than represent specific art forms (Hutchinson, 1982).

However, as outlined above, this British appointment system was not accepted in South Korea due to strong opposition of the arts sector,

who stressed genre representativeness without enough understanding about the UK arts council. Even if the nomination method through a recommendation committee was introduced as an alternative in South Korea, the appointment method based on genre representation was difficult to harmonise with the arts council system based on consensus (Chung et al., 2016).

Consequently, the arts sector's restricted information and understanding on the UK Arts Council made it difficult for the ARKO to make a decision by consensus and even exacerbated conflicts between genres, an endemic problem in the Korean arts sector. In brief, it seems that an 'uninformed' transfer, due to not enough information about the critical conditions led to the success of the UK Arts Council, ended up with policy transfer failure.

Most literature in policy transfer framework highlights the differences in political, social, economic conditions between the importing and exporting countries, which is categorised as an 'inappropriate' transfer (Cairney, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2009). As outlined above, the arts sector's autonomy from the state and the arts patronage tradition coupling with the middle class through a long

history, made the UK Arts Council successful.

However, such a horizontal relationship between government and the arts sector can be hardly seen in South Korea because of its historical and political context such as the experience of the authoritarian regime and divided country (Lee, 2012; Park, 2010). The dominant state and the low level of social respect for the art made the legitimacy of the public funding for the arts dependent on the government, not on broad social consensus.

Also, the concept of the middle class, who were actively supporting for the arts patronage, cannot be adapted to South Korea. It is because the middle class in South Korea, which has a short history of democratisation, means merely socioeconomic status, such as occupation and income (Kang, 2008).

Furthermore, the trajectory of the divided state caused extreme conflicts within the art, as mentioned before. Thus, the South Korean government had absolute power on the primary policy process, including decision-making and resource allocation. Subsequently, it was not surprising that the arts sector was perceived as mere beneficiaries, not an independent partner in the policy process.

Consequently, it can be analysed that the different political, historical, and social contexts in South Korea, which contradict the UK, prevented the formal introduction of an arts council organisation from the substantive norm change to the horizontal and autonomous relationship between the government and the arts sector (Lee, 2019; Sung, 2015). Summing up, the evidence suggests that ‘incomplete’, ‘uninformed’, and ‘inappropriate’ transfer failed the policy transfer of an arts council from the UK to South Korea.

4.3.2. Analysis of the soft form of policy transfer

The support and cooperation of stakeholders are crucial for the successful policy transfer because their understanding of the new system internalises the new norms at the introduction stage and brings about the intended consequences at the implementation stage (Marsh and McConnell, 2010).

Since the discussion on the introduction of the ARKO began in 2003, criticisms among the artistic practitioners and associations were levelled against the government’s proposal, especially concerning the appointment of council members and how to allocate fund. Some point out that such a different view began with different understandings

between major policy actors about an arts council system (Chung, Park and Wilding, 2016).

Most importantly, the understandings about the arm's length principle, which is the core purpose of the transfer, were massively different between the government and the arts since this principle was an abstract concept. The arts sector regarded the arm's length principle as not being interfered by the government or securing the critical authority in the fund distribution decision-making.

On the other hand, the government acknowledged that it guarantees artists the right to participate in the decision-making process with autonomy, but took the view that their participation should be limited to discussions on the fund allocation. Consequently, the discordance of understandings led to conflicts in the forthcoming policy process, such as the way of the appointment of council members and allocating fund.

Also, there were considerable differences over understanding the new system within the arts sector. At the stage of collection of public opinion, the conservative arts association reacted against the establishment of the ARKO since the new organisation could strengthen the power of liberal art groups while weakening their authority (Lee,

2012).

Furthermore, as outlined above, the different interpretation of consensus resulted in complex procedures and rules. In the UK, consensus could induce effective decision-making through minimising conflicts and reducing the time and resources required for formal discussion process. However, as for the ARKO, the consensus was primarily understood as a process that strives to reach an agreement, causing a massive waste of time and resources (Lee, 2012).

The soft aspect of policy transfer highlights the communication and feedbacks among the domestic policy actors to overcome different understandings (Stone, 2012; Park et al., 2014). It is argued that thorough feedback raises the likelihood of policy transfer through policy indigenisation in line with the needs and context of actors in the importing country.

Instead of discussing dissenting opinion, however, the South Korean government attempted to persuade the arts sector through emphasising the most favourable pieces of the UK system, rather than communicate with them (Chung, 2013). After the policy draft was put forward to the National Assembly in 2003, the government focused only

on the persuasion of the Assembly members. Subsequently, different views about the details of the ARKO became a sharp political issue between the ruling and opposition party for more than a year, without meaningful communication with the arts sector.

In the end, under the time pressure to accomplish the output at the beginning of the newly elected government (2003~2008), the MCT was forced to accept the political compromises such as the use of a recommendation committee for the appointment as well as to promise the conservative arts association a balanced funding distribution.

Although the arts sector wanted more discussions on the details of the new system, the government's top-down and one-way communication, which can be considered as the historical legacy of South Korea, resulted in the substantial modification of the original draft to realise the autonomy and consensus pursued by the introduction of the ARKO (Chung et al., 2016). Furthermore, the conflicts within the arts sector, which were intensified during the discussion on the ARKO, had negative impacts on the implementation of the consensus-based organisation.

4.3.3. Analysis of the implementation

More importantly, the success of transfer is entirely dependent on implementation issues such as resources, dependency relationship, intended policy implementation and skilful staffs (Sabatier, 1986; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).

First of all, although enough resources, including public support, are fundamental to the successful implementation, the ARKO failed to secure the required resources. As discussed above, the passage of the Law on the Operation of Public Organisations (2007) made the ARKO under robust government control due to an annual assessment of management efficiency². During the legislative stage, the arts sector vehemently opposed to designate the ARKO as a quasi-governmental agency, arguing that the application of metric indicator-based performance evaluations to the arts organisation would severely damage the autonomy of the arts sector. However, such claim did not support from the National Assembly and the public (Chung, 2013).

² After the blacklisting scandal, the South Korean government changed the legal status of the ARKO as other public organisations, not a quasi-governmental agency, so the ARKO has become excluded from an annual assessment of management efficiency from 2019.

Moreover, the Constitutional Court concluded in 2003 that it was unconstitutional to devote the entrance fees to the theatre, concert hall and museum to the Culture and Arts Promotion Fund. Subsequently, the size of the arts fund continued to run out from 527.3 billion won (approximately 360 million pounds) in 2003 to 42.2 billion won (approximately 29 million pounds) in 2017(ARKO, 2018).

The resource constraints led to the reliance on the external sources of the arts sector, increasing the complexity of dependency relationship about the decision-making of the ARKO. After the decision of the Constitutional Court, the ARKO had difficulty in raising funds to support the arts sector. The government supplemented the lack of the Culture and Arts Promotion Fund with the Tourism Promotion Development Fund, the National Sports Promotion Fund, and the Lottery Fund.

Such supports from outside sources resulted in a significant change in the ARKO's mission. For instance, the Lottery Fund Act restricts the use of the lottery fund to projects for the underprivileged, and this led to a significant increase in the portion of promoting access and participation of cultural experiences of the public. Under such a shift,

the ARKO prioritised the public popularity and social values of the artwork in the funding decisions.

According to the government's survey (MCT, 2000), the artists set a high value on art creation itself rather than its social impact. Such a discrepancy of perception between the ARKO and the artists increased the arts sector's dissatisfaction about the decision-making of the ARKO, combined with the ambiguous causality of artistic support and outcome (Schuster, 2003; Yang, 2010).

In brief, it meant a retreat of the ARKO's initial goal, which was to revitalise artistic creation and the foundation of the fine arts through the decision-making led by the arts sector. It is significantly different from the developed countries such as the UK and the US, where artists themselves still participate in the arts policy formulation despite increasing social pressure toward the public's participation and consumption of cultural services.

Also, the transforming to the ARKO, which pursued autonomy and consensus through an arm's length principle, was not implemented as intended because of unceasing political intervention in South Korea. As mentioned before, the conservative government, which was elected in

2008, dismissed the second chairperson who was appointed by the previous progressive government. Additionally, the government appointed the council members with those who shared conservative values and abolished most detailed policies made in progressive government (Sung, 2015).

In 2010, for example, the ARKO requested a writers' association to submit an official letter that it would not participate in anti-government demonstrations if it wanted to receive its grant (Hangyeorye Shinmun, 2010). Furthermore, the ARKO's decision by firm political intervention, not by its autonomy and consensus-based decision-making, seriously undermined the consistency and stability of funding allocation.

As can be seen in Table 2, there was a drastic change in the size of public funding by genres between 2009 and 2010, after the transition to the conservative government. More importantly, the widespread blacklisting scandal³, which was one of the main reason for the

³ The Cultural Blacklist Investigation and System Reform Committee (2018) officially announced that 342 arts organisations and 8,931 artists had been listed on blacklists since 2008; as a result, they cannot receive support from public funding.

impeachment of former President Park (2013~2017), proves that the government and the politics completely disregarded the ARKO's autonomy that policy transfer intended.

Table 2. Change in the size of public funding by genres

(unit: %)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Interdisciplinary Arts	4.2	3.5	4.6	5.8	6.4	3.1	4.2	5.7	7.4
Dancing	7.5	9.0	9.6	11.5	6.2	11.4	13.8	15.4	15.3
literature	17.4	14.4	15.3	18.7	24.4	12.8	14.0	12.5	14.6
Visual Arts	13.1	14.3	13.6	13.3	18.1	10.3	18.9	19.9	20.6
Theater	25.3	15.5	21.8	17.8	20.7	37.0	27.7	25.0	21.3
Music	8.8	5.7	9.5	11.1	5.9	10.2	8.9	9.2	9.1
Traditional Arts	13.3	11.0	13.5	15.2	7.4	14.1	9.1	10.5	9.9
The others	10.4	26.5	12.3	6.6	10.9	1.2	3.2	1.9	1.8

Source: Sung (2015-223)

Finally, bureaucrats of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST hereafter) and the ARKO's staffs were not experienced or compliant to support the operation of the ARKO. The Cultural Blacklist Investigation and System Reform Committee, which was launched in July 2017 to investigate blacklisting scandal of the conservative

government, requested the punishment of those who were responsible for its implementation in June 2018 after a year-long investigation (MCST, 2019).

Accordingly, the MCST announced in December 2018 that it would ask the prosecution office to investigate ten people and take disciplinary action or hand out a disciplinary warning against 68 people. The government admitted that 39 officials from the MCST and 19 members of the ARKO staffs played a role in implementing the blacklists instead of resisting it.

It is argued that strong state support for culture acted as an effective instrument for blacklisting scandal (Yuk, 2019). The Presidential Office categorised many artists who are critical to the conservative government as a blacklist, delivered the blacklists down to the MCST and the ARKO. In response to this, the MCST reviewed its current public funding programs and secretly established a policy project, named 'Action Plans towards a Healthier Cultural Ecology.' The paper illustrated that the MCST would monitor and intervene in all the arts funding process, and the MCST reported this plan to the Presidential Office (The Board of Audit and Inspection, 2017).

According to the ideal bureaucracy, the state bureaucracy can act as a bulwark from arbitrary political power through supporting the rule of law and protecting civil rights (Peters, 2010; Weber, 1968). However, the bureaucracy was abused to maintain the political interests of the ruling party (Dimock, 1959; Miller, 1978). It is because the bureaucrats of the MCST misused their bureaucratic autonomy to follow wrong and unconstitutional instructions from the Presidential Office.

Also, the ARKO was helpless against government interference and even cooperated with the government. For example, in 2014, the Seoul Theatre Association applied for the theatre venue rental competition, which provides performing venues of the ARKO. However, its application was not selected for the reason that it was one of the critical blacklists. As the decision faced a severe backlash from the theatrical world, the ARKO reversed its decision. Nevertheless, the Presidential Office continued to raise the issue, and the ARKO closed down the theatre for an emergency safety inspection during the period the Seoul Theatre Association needed (MCST, 2019).

Furthermore, some point out that the ARKO itself narrowed its role, causing the government's intervention to conduct critical arts


policymaking (Lee, 2012). The ARKO's staff tended to carry out the arts funding decision-making by focusing on the private arts sector. They did not want to be involved with the conflicts between conservative and progressive arts organisations. Thus, they continually insisted that the government should be responsible for negotiating with two representative arts associations. Despite the purpose of the ARKO, leading the arts policy formulation by the artists, the narrow perception of staffs during the implementation made the ARKO fail to obtain independence from the government in significant decision-making (Yang, 2006). In conclusion, insufficient capacities of implementation caused the failure of transfer rather than the stabilisation of the ARKO.

4.3.4. Discussion

The case of the ARKO reveals that three variables for successful policy transfer interact and affect each other in complex ways, as illustrated in Figure 2.

The deficiency in terms of the hard aspect of policy transfer, such as focusing on complicated procedures or vertical relationship between the state and the arts sector due to historical context in South Korea, led to the different interpretation and top-down communication during

the legislative process as well as constant political interference at the implementation stage.



The lack of soft policy transfer, including different understandings about the arm's length principle and the meaning of consensus between policy actors, resulted in incomplete transfer such as few similarities on the decision-making method between two countries. The government's one-way communication and intensified conflicts among

the arts sector at the introduction stage made it impossible for the ARKO to operate based on the consensus during the implementation process.

Also, the drawback of implementation such as resource constraints, political intervention, and complicated dependency relationship allowed continual adaption of the ARKO to the interests of the government, not to the feedback of the arts sector. In other words, it increased the vulnerability of the ARKO, making critical modifications about the organisation and rules of the ARKO, further amplified the conflict within the arts sector.

5. Conclusion

This study outlined why South Korea's adoption of the UK Arts Council model, policy transfer done in entirely different contexts, failed to get the intended consequence. The findings suggest that the case of the ARKO was not able to accommodate elements and conditions for successful policy transfer.

Firstly, in terms of the hard aspect of policy transfer, there are few similarities in the composition of members, their decision-making method about funding allocation, and the legal status of the council. The Korean arts sector's limited information and understanding of the UK system caused negotiated appointment way of council members, which made it difficult for the ARKO to be operated by consensus as well as worsen conflict between different art forms.

Also, the transition to an independent relationship between the government and the arts sector, the original purpose of the ARKO, has been perverted and contested within a different historical and political context. Unlike the UK, an unbalanced relationship between strong state and fragile arts sector in South Korea due to the trajectory of the authoritarian and divided country consistently hindered organisational

structure and the decision-making style of the ARKO from functioning as intended.

Secondly, when it comes to the soft feature of policy transfer, different understandings between the government and the artists about the arm's length principle, which is the final goal of the transfer, led to the perversion of the transfer. For example, there was the modification of the draft stipulates that the appointment of members and funding distribution follow the UK Arts Council.

Also, different interpretations of the ARKO between the conservative and progressive arts associations cause complicated procedures and rules of the decision-making, causing a waste of time and persistent conflict. More importantly, the government's top-down communication, not listening to the voices of the arts sector, due to the historical legacy of South Korea during the legislation process, affected the negotiated modification of the original draft to realise the values of autonomy and consensus of the ARKO.

Thirdly, although the ARKO imported some of the formal requirements that applied in the UK, it did not derive the same effect that the UK had because of lacking implementation capabilities. The ARKO became

under various audits with the advent of New Public Management (NPM), and the scale of the arts fund continued to run out after the judgment of unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Court.

The lack of resources, in turn, increased dependency relationship surrounding the ARKO and made it susceptible to the government. Ceaseless political intervention such as the blacklisting scandal made it impossible for the ARKO to be implemented as intended. The decision-making without regard to its autonomy cause inconsistent and unfair funding distribution. Meanwhile, even if the bureaucrats of the MCST and the ARKO's staffs should comply with the original purpose of the policy or the law, they appear to give obedience to the existing power, playing a role in illegal political intervention.

In brief, elements transferred from the UK were distorted and challenged without satisfying every condition for successful policy transfer; thus, South Korea's borrowing of the UK Arts Council failed to achieve the desired result.

Although there is criticism about the distinctiveness of the policy transfer framework (James and Lodge, 2003), policy transfer analysis gives us lessons about why countries borrow some policies over others

and why some policies fail to achieve the intended outcome in some countries than others under the spread of globalisation (Cairney, 2011).

This study highlights that three variables for successful policy transfer, which are the 'hard', 'soft' aspect of policy transfer and policy implementation, affect each other intricately. It implies that policy transfer needs continuous transformation based on a long-term strategy, including various communicative processes since it does not end with a one-time borrowing of formal elements.

It should also be noted that the local understanding and communication process significantly influence the transfer process (Stone, 2012; Park et al., 2014). In particular, in Asian countries with historical legacies of the authoritarian regime, formally borrowed elements are unlikely to elicit the desired effect. Their vertical relationship between the state and the stakeholders leads to different understandings and top-down communication about transferred policy; thus, during the transfer and its implementation process, the contents of borrowing might face biased adoption towards the viewpoint of the strong government without adapting the policy following the concerns of stakeholders (Beeson and Stone, 2013).

Accordingly, building shared understanding and communication under given historical and political contexts, as the aspect of soft transfer, can be used as an independent variable, handling obstacles during the process. The local support and understanding for the transferred policy via a thorough communication among policy actors encourage the importing country to correct its misplacement and misinterpretation about the borrowed contents during its implementation process (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007).

In this regard, the tireless adjustment of the ARKO is needed in response to distinctive requirements in South Korea. First of all, a broadly shared understanding and agreement on the arm's length principle, which is the fundamental value of the ARKO, should be drawn among the arts sector, the government and the public. After the blacklisting scandal, a place for discussion about the reform of the ARKO was set up.

However, it seems that the focus of the debate is on the details about the operation of the ARKO, rather than on the arm's length principle. Furthermore, the current discussion is likely to overrepresent the voices of progressive artists due to the political environment in the

reign of the liberal. It involves a risk that the ARKO may experience ups and downs depending on the future political changes in South Korea.

Thus, the various opinions of the arts sector should come to the table of public discussion, and produce a shared consensus of the artists among themselves. Based on their consensus, the arts sector should communicate with the public about the details of the arm's length, and reach the social agreement about the legitimacy of public supports for the arts sector. The consensus-making process might take much time and effort; nevertheless, as the case of the ARKO highlights, it is an essential one to accomplish the intended outcomes of policy transfer.

Next, in the historical and political contexts of South Korea, the efforts of politics and government are also significant. The government, especially the MCST, should endeavour to actively promote and persuade the political world and the public about the specificity of the arts policy represented by the arm's length principle. Simultaneously, the politics should stipulate sharp and clear punishment for the officials who implement illegal intervention of politics, not resist it.

Lastly, after the institutionalisation of consensus among the arts sector, the politics, the government, and the public on the intention of

borrowing, the discussion on the detailed operation of the ARKO, including the composition and the appointment of council members, decision-making methods, and evaluation should be followed. When discussions take place in such order, policy transfer of the UK Arts Council will achieve a fruitful outcome in the context of South Korea.

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