

한반도 안보환경 변화에 따른 한미 방위비분담제도 발전 방향 연구

(A Study on the Development of Korea-U.S. Defense
Cost Sharing System considering the Changes in
Security Environment on the Korean Peninsula)

2022년 9월

국 방 부

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1. 훈련국 : 미국

2. 훈련기관명 : 조지워싱턴대학교
(The George Washington University)

3. 훈련분야 : 국방정책

4. 훈련기간 : 2020년 12월 18일~2022년 10월 17일

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- 안보정책학(Security Policy Studies) 과정은 졸업을 위해서 필수과목 (International Security, Security Policy Analysis, 6학점)과 전공선택, 캡스톤프로젝트 (4학점), 실무과목 (3학점) 등을 포함 총 40학점 이수 필요

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I. Introduction

Since the Korean War, the Republic of Korea and the U.S. have maintained a strong alliance. Today, Korea and the U.S. do not hesitate to describe their relations as the “Ironclad U.S.-ROK Alliance.”¹ In June 1950, when North Korea made surprise attacks on South Korea, the U.S. immediately dispatched the U.S. forces to help South Korea against North Korea’s brutal invasion. Over the next three years, the U.S. forces, along with the United Nations forces, contributed significantly to preventing the communization of the Korean peninsula. Also, the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea in 1953 to provide security, which has been the “foundation of a comprehensive alliance that endures today.”² In addition to the military field, South Korea and the United States have strengthened their alliance by expanding cooperation in various fields, including political, economic, and cultural areas, developing a comprehensive strategic alliance between the two countries.

However, it is also true that there was turbulence in bilateral relations in the past. The latest example is that Seoul and Washington had a conflict of interest during the Trump administration concerning the issue of defense cost-sharing. When Donald Trump was inaugurated as the 45th U.S. president in 2017, he prioritized defense burden-sharing as one of the most critical agendas in U.S. foreign policy. He openly highlighted “fair share” to U.S. allies and asked them to “pay more for their defense.”³ South Korea was no exception. During the 10th and 11th ROK-US Special Measures Agreement (SMA), the U.S. asked South Korea to increase the defense cost-share contribution, but the Korean Government was reluctant to the idea of a sudden

¹ “Strengthening the Ironclad U.S.-ROK Alliance,” US Department of State, accessed on May 27, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/strengthening-the-ironclad-u-s-rok-alliance/>.

² “U.S. Relations With the Republic of Korea,” US Department of State, accessed on May 27, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-republic-of-korea/>.

³ Brian Blankenship, “The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of US Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure,” *Security Studies* 5, no. 30 (December 2021): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.2018624>.

increase in its contribution to the SMA. This difference in position attracted the attention of the Korean people and became a crucial agenda between the two allies.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the Trump administration even considered alternatives to decrease the American military presence in South Korea because the conflict over defense cost-sharing continued.⁴ It showed the importance of the issue between Korea and the United States. On the other hand, the Korea Institute for National Unification released its survey in July 2020 that “an absolute majority of South Koreans are against a rise in the defense cost-sharing of the USFK regardless of their party affiliation.”⁵ Inevitably, South Korea and the United States had to experience difficulties in finding a fair share of defense cost-sharing in the 10th and 11th SMA negotiations. The long, painful, and complicated negotiations related to the defense cost-sharing did not help solidify the ROK-US alliance, which was not desirable for the two allies.

In order to prevent a negative effect on the ROK-US alliance, it is necessary to understand why the United States requested such an increase in the defense cost-sharing contribution of South Korea. It was because of US national security strategy changes, not the Special Measures Agreement itself. In this regard, this working report seeks to explore the issue of defense cost-sharing from the U.S. perspective, finding out what prompted it to shift. It will be great if this report helps to raise the level of mutual understanding between South Korea and the United States in future defense cost-sharing negotiations.

⁴ Michale R. Gordon and Gordeon Lubold, “Trump Administration Weighs Troop Cut in South Korea,” *The Wall Street Journal*, July 17, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-weighs-troop-cut-in-south-korea-11595005050>.

⁵ Sang Jin Lee, *South Korean Public Opinion on the ROK-U.S. Defense-cost Sharing Negotiations* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2020), <https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/4d047318-fc56-4361-a569-9359276ab77f>.

II. Changes in International Security Environment

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. expected a more peaceful world. Because the ideological war between communism and capitalism ended, the political and military competition with the Soviet Union seemed to have disappeared. In this regard, professor Francis Fukuyama argued in his article “The End of History?” saying that “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”⁶ Moreover, China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 and became an essential member of international economic development. In short, stability and rules-based liberal international order would be expected to dominate the world instead of disputes and conflicts among states.

However, the reality has been different from what the U.S. had expected. First, the type of war has changed. Previously, war occurred between states. However, civil wars, so-called a fight among actors within the state or intrastate, dominated after the end of the Cold War. The problem is that civil war within the state affects the international order and national security beyond the border.⁷ Second, there are different types of security threats. It is called emerging threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), organized crime, terrorism, religious extremism, ethnic clashes, and climate change. US national security has also been exposed to emerging threats. For instance, the US Forces intervened in the Somalia humanitarian crisis in 1992 and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. On September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked by al-Qaida, a terrorist group,

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *The National Interest*, no.16 (Summer 1989), 4, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184>.

⁷ 이현, “현대 국제분쟁의 유형과 성격: 분쟁과 개발의 관점에서,” *Journal of International Development Cooperation*, no.4 (November 2014), 11, <https://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE06344567>.

and later fought wars in Afghanistan against al-Qaida and Taleban until 2021. Also, the United States invaded Iraq to find weapons of mass destruction in 2003.

To make matters worse, the great power competition with China and Russia has reemerged in international politics. China is strengthening its military capabilities based on its strong economic growth, and Russia is threatening security in Europe by invading Ukraine. According to the CRS report, the United States acknowledged the re-emergence of great power competition in the various government reports and “formally reoriented U.S. national security strategy and U.S. defense strategy toward an explicit primary focus on great power competition with China and Russia.”⁸ In other words, the United States is facing a very complex security environment. Thus, the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community predicted that “the United States and its allies will face an increasingly complex and interconnected global security environment by the growing specter of great power competition and conflict, while collective, transnational threats to all nations and actors compete for our attention and finite resources.”⁹

Among various national security threats, the United States prioritizes competition and potential conflicts with other nation-states, such as China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.¹⁰ Among them, China, Russia, and North Korea are also closely connected with the security environment of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, this working paper looks into the security environment of those three countries on which the U.S. national security focuses.

⁸ Ronald O'Rourke, *Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense-Issues for Congress*, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2022), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf>.

⁹ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (Virginia: Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2022), 4, <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf>.

¹⁰ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 4.

a. China

i. U.S. Policy Towards China

After the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the U.S. government actively promoted democracy and the market economy to the world for its national security and economic prosperity.¹¹ The democratic peace theory was the theoretical background of this approach, believing that “democracies do not go to war with each other.”¹²

In particular, China, ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was one of the primary targets for implementing these ideas. The United States developed a broader engagement with China so that China could accept “a more open, market economy” and participate in “the regional security mechanism” to reduce the security concerns of neighbors and China itself.¹³ These efforts have continued until recently.

For instance, China would not have been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 without the support of the United States. In 2014, the U.S. forces even invited the PLA Navy to “the RIM of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercises,” which is “the world’s largest set of international maritime war games.”¹⁴ Undeniably, these efforts by the United States helped China grow rapidly and become an influential member of the international community.

ii. Recalibration of U.S. Policy

Then, did the United States achieve the original goal of making a peaceful world? It is

¹¹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, (Washington DC: GPO, 1994), 18-19. <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1994.pdf?ver=YPdbuschbfpPz3ty-QQxaLg%3d%3d>.

¹² Rasmus Sinding Sondergaard, “Bill Clinton’s ‘Democratic Enlargement’ and the Securitisation of Democracy Promotion,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 26, no. 3 (2015): 539.

¹³ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*.

¹⁴ Nicole L. Freiner, “What China’s RIMPAC Exclusion Means for US allies,” *Diplomat*, May 26, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/what-chinas-rimpac-exclusion-means-for-us-allies/>.

hard to say yes to this question. Economic interdependence between the U.S. and China has increased. However, the U.S. apparently failed to make China follow the rules-based international order. Many security analysts in the United States say that China has translated economic power into military power to become a regional hegemon in the Indo-Pacific region, even threatening global security.

For instance, China has built “naval air stations in the South China Sea, including on Mischief Reef, which is located within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines.”¹⁵ China has also claimed sovereignty over the Japanese Senkaku Islands. In addition, Beijing did not even respect the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling regarding the Philippines’ EEZ.¹⁶ Furthermore, China has increased its military activities to pressure Taiwan, sending hundreds of warplanes into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ).¹⁷

On the other hand, democracy and human rights have deteriorated in China. In 2020, China passed a national security law “limit[ing] free speech in Hong Kong” and “establish[ing] a secret police structure.”¹⁸ Western media also had to relocate their regional HQs to South Korea, such as New York Times and Washington Post. Also, there is a concern that China has detained more than one million Uyghurs in Xinjiang, abusing their human rights severely.¹⁹

Moreover, China’s espionage is another critical issue. According to the CSIS report,

¹⁵ James E. Fanell, “China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure,” *Naval War College Review* 72, no. 1 (2019): 17.

¹⁶ Fanell, “China’s Global Naval Strategy,” 36-37.

¹⁷ Helen Davidson and Chi Hui Lin, “Why is China increasing its military pressure on Taiwan?” *The Guardian*, October 6, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/06/why-is-china-increasing-its-military-pressure-on-taiwan>.

¹⁸ John Pomfret, “The Hong Kong Security law could be China’s blueprint to deal with the ‘Taiwan problem,’” *Washington Post*, July 6, 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/06/hong-kong-security-law-could-be-chinas-blueprint-deal-with-taiwan-problem/>.

¹⁹ “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 11, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang>.

China has illegally sought to acquire U.S. military or commercial technologies.²⁰ The Chinese military, government employees, and civilians were involved in 160 espionage cases from 2000 to 2021.²¹ In addition, China spends very little on acquiring intellectual property rights from other countries despite being the world's largest industrial exporter.²²

Kurt Campbell and Ely stated in their *Foreign Affairs* article "How Beijing Defied American Expectations," "the liberal international order has failed to lure or bind China as powerfully as expected."²³ Thus, both pointed out the necessity of "a clear-eyed rethinking of the United States' approach to China."²⁴ Since 2019, the U.S. government document has described China as a regional threat to U.S. interests and the United States.²⁵ In other words, China's actions were bound to affect U.S. national security policy, leading to great-power competition with China.

iii. China's Regional and Global Objectives and Activities

According to the *2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*, the U.S. forecasts that China will continuously pursue "President Xi Jinping's vision of making China the preeminent power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage."²⁶ In order to realize this vision, the United States predicts that the Chinese

²⁰ "Survey of Chinese Espionage in the United States Since 2000," Center for Strategic & International Studies, access April 11, 2022, <https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/survey-chinese-linked-espionage-united-states-2000>.

²¹ "Survey of Chinese Espionage in the United States Since 2000," Center for Strategic & International Studies.

²² Honda Chen, "China does not respect intellectual property," Taipei Times, June 14, 2019, <https://www.taipetimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2019/06/14/2003716888#:~:text=China%20is%20a%20big%20exporting,or%2011th%20in%20the%20world>.

²³ Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, "The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-02-13/china-reckoning>.

²⁴ Campbell and Ratner, "The China Reckoning."

²⁵ Daniel R. Coats, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community*, (Washington DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019). <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf>.

²⁶ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment* 6.

Communist Party (CCP) will “press Taiwan on unification, undercut U.S. influence, drive wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that favor its authoritarian system.”²⁷

However, there is a voice that China will try to reduce tensions with the United States for its benefit.²⁸ At the same time, China’s leaders will keep state direction essential to minimize reliance on foreign technology, facilitate military modernization, and sustain economic growth—ensuring the political power of the CCP and fulfilling its vision for national rejuvenation.²⁹

Currently, the United States thinks that Beijing considers competitive US-China ties part of an epochal geopolitical transition.³⁰ Moreover, China views Washington’s diplomatic, economic, and military moves against Beijing as part of a significant U.S. attempt to block China’s ascent and undermine the control of the CCP.³¹ Also, the U.S. assesses that China is intensifying its “criticism of perceived U.S. failures and hypocrisy,” such as the U.S. pullout from “Afghanistan and racial tensions in the United States.”³² Moreover, Beijing is gradually integrating military force with economic, technical, and diplomatic clout to consolidate CCP leadership, safeguard what it sees as its sovereign territory and regional dominance, and pursue global influence.³³ However, the U.S. intelligence community agrees that China faces a slew of domestic and foreign difficulties that will stymie CCP leaders’ objectives.³⁴ For instance, these include an “aging population, high levels of corporate debt, economic inequality,” and rising opposition in Taiwan and other nations to China’s heavy-

²⁷ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

²⁸ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

²⁹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

³⁰ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

³¹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

³² ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

³³ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

³⁴ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

handed methods.³⁵

In addition, the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment notes that “China uses coordinated, whole-of-government tools to demonstrate strength and compel neighbors to acquiesce to Beijing’s preferences, including its territorial and maritime claims and assertions of sovereignty over Taiwan.”³⁶ Washington predicts that Beijing will exert pressure on Taiwan to move toward unification and respond to more vital US-Taiwan interaction.³⁷ Also, the U.S. government anticipates tensions will rise as China increases military activities near Taiwan and Taiwanese politicians oppose Beijing’s efforts to move toward unification.³⁸ Since Taiwan dominates production, there is a concern that China’s control over Taiwan will likely adversely affect worldwide supply chains for semiconductor chips.³⁹

Regarding technical competitiveness, the U.S. forecasts that China will continue to be a severe threat to the U.S. as Beijing pursues vital industries and commercial and military technologies from the U.S. and its allies.⁴⁰ Beijing has employed several strategies to enhance its technical capabilities, ranging from public investment to espionage.⁴¹ Beijing’s readiness to utilize espionage, subsidies, and trade policy to give its enterprises a competitive edge constitutes not just an enduring problem for the U.S. economy and its workers but also helps China improve its potential to seize leadership of the world’s technical development and standards.⁴² Moreover, Beijing will maintain “diplomatic, defense, and technology cooperation with Russia to

³⁵ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

³⁶ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

³⁷ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

³⁸ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

³⁹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 6.

⁴⁰ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 7.

⁴¹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 7.

⁴² ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 7.

challenge the United States.”⁴³

iv. China’s Military Capabilities

China’s 2019 Defense White Paper claims that the United States has destabilized regional security in the Asia-Pacific.⁴⁴ It also says that China’s national defense policy focuses on its “sovereignty, security, and development interests,” as it sees them under threat.⁴⁵ For example, the document insists that the territorial dispute over the islands in the South China Sea threatens China’s sovereignty.⁴⁶ Also, Taiwan’s independence movement threatens China’s security, and the separation of Tibet and Xinjiang is a security risk to China.⁴⁷ China’s overseas interests are also threatened, and Chinese cyber and space security is in danger.⁴⁸ Thus, the strategy notes that China needs to develop the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s military strength due to its international standing, security, and interests, and its goal is to become a world-class armed force by the mid-21st century.⁴⁹ To achieve this goal, it says that China will implement military reform in leadership, command system, force structure, military policies, institutions, military science and technology, and defense expenditure.⁵⁰ In doing so, the document says that it will ultimately support the “Chinese Dream” under the leadership of Xi Jinping.⁵¹ As mentioned in the White Paper, the PLA is expected to push for this military modernization.

Regarding the strategic move of the PLA, the United States assesses that China will continue to pursue its objective of developing a world-class military capable of

⁴³ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 7.

⁴⁴ “China’s National Defense”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, accessed on May 31, 2022,

https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html.

⁴⁵ “China’s National Defense”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China.

⁴⁶ “China’s National Defense”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China.

⁴⁷ “China’s National Defense”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China.

⁴⁸ “China’s National Defense”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China.

⁴⁹ “China’s National Defense”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China.

⁵⁰ “China’s National Defense”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China.

⁵¹ “China’s National Defense”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China.

securing what it sees as its sovereign territory, establishing preeminence in regional affairs, and projecting power worldwide while countering “perceived U.S. military superiority.”⁵² Currently, China is developing essential military capabilities that it believes the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would require to engage the U.S. in a large-scale, long-term confrontation.⁵³ Specifically, the PLA Navy and Air Force are already the largest in the region, and they keep deploying new systems that strengthen their capabilities “to achieve air superiority and project power.”⁵⁴ “The PLA Rocket Force’s (PLARF) conventional short-, medium-, and intermediate-range conventional systems” potentially pose a threat to “U.S. forces and bases in the region.”⁵⁵ The PLARF debuted its first operational hypersonic weapons system, the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle-capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), in 2020, posing a threat to U.S. missile defense systems.⁵⁶ In addition, the United States anticipates that the PLA will continue to pursue military bases in foreign countries and access agreements to project military power and safeguard China’s interests abroad.⁵⁷

According to the comparison of US-China military power released by the INDO-PACOM, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command predicts China's military power will reach a very high level in 2025. Accordingly, it triggers a deep concern for the United States about China's rapid military growth.

⁵² ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 7.

⁵³ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 7.



⁵⁴ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 7.

⁵⁵ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 7.

⁵⁶ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 7.

⁵⁷ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 7.

Figure 1. Indo-Pacom China Military Project



Source: Adapted from Hans Kristensen, "(The Other) Red Storm Rising: INDO-PACOM China Military Projection, Federation of American Scientists, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/09/pacom-china-military-projection/>.

b. Taiwan

i. Trilateral Relations over Taiwan Issue

The Taiwan issue is a cubic equation. The United States, Taiwan, and China have different ideas about Taiwan's future. First and foremost, China has claimed Taiwan was China's territory throughout history. Thus, it is so natural that Taiwan is reunified with China. From China's point of view, reunification with Taiwan is a matter of "national sovereignty and territorial integrity," describing reunification as China's domestic affairs.⁵⁸

Looking back on the history of Taiwan, what China claims is "dubious at best."⁵⁹ For instance, it is hard to say that the Ming Dynasty ruled Taiwan officially, and the Qing dynasty indirectly controlled Taiwan for 200 years.⁶⁰ As soon as the Qing Dynasty "upgrad [ed] Taiwan's status from a subsidiary of Fukien to a formal province of China" in 1887, it gave up its sovereignty to Japan in 1895.⁶¹ Until the end of World War II, Taiwan was a colony of the Japanese Empire. Regarding Taiwan's history, there is a question mark lingering over China's argument.

Also, more than 60 percent of Taiwan's population now sees themselves as "solely Taiwanese."⁶² It means that Taiwan's identity differs from China's. In this sense, Taiwan argues that it should be recognized as an independent state in the international community. In particular, current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen is actively seeking independence. Taiwan even used the successful countermeasure against COVID-19 as

⁵⁸ "China's National Defense in the New Era," The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, Accessed February 2, 2022.

https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html.

⁵⁹ Gerrit van der Wees, "Has Taiwan Always Been Part of China?," *The Diplomat*, December 1, 2020.

⁶⁰ Wees, "Has Taiwan Always."

⁶¹ Wees, "Has Taiwan Always."

⁶² Amy Qin and Amy Chang Chien, "'We Are Taiwanese': China's Growing Menace Hardens Island's Identity," *New York Times*, January 19, 2022.

a diplomatic opportunity to improve its status in the international community.⁶³ In a word, China and Taiwan remain as far apart on the unification issue.

Meanwhile, the United States has pursued a policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan since 1979. The year 1979 marked a watershed regarding the Taiwan issue. In 1979, the U.S. established a formal diplomatic relationship with China and ended its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. At the same time, it was the year that the United States passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). According to the TRA, the United States will "preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations" with Taiwan.⁶⁴ Also, the United States promised to "provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character."⁶⁵ Despite diplomatic relations with Beijing, the U.S. has continued its relations with Taiwan.

How could this happen? The international security environment was dynamic in the 1970s. The United States wanted to end the Vietnam War, and China hoped to "find a support for its resistance to pressure from the Soviet Union."⁶⁶ From China's point of view, removing the nuclear threat from the U.S. was also a benefit because China could focus solely on the Soviet Union.

In terms of the Taiwan issue, China also confirmed the 'One China Policy' with the U.S. through the Joint Communiques. However, the United States acknowledged there was only one China, but it did not recognize 'Taiwan as a part of China'⁶⁷ In addition, 'policy' and 'Principle' were not mentioned in the Three Communiqué and the TRA.⁶⁸

⁶³ Javier C. Hernandez and Chris Horton, "Coronavirus Crisis Offers Taiwan a Chance to Push Back Against China." *New York Times*, April 22, 2020.

⁶⁴ Kerry Brown and Kalley Wu Tzu Hui, *The Trouble with Taiwan: History, the United States and a Rising China*. (London: Bloomsbury Academic & Professional, 2019), 156.

⁶⁵ Brown, *The Trouble with Taiwan*, 156.

⁶⁶ "U.S.-china Relations Since 1949," Asia for Educators, Columbia University, accessed February 1, 2022, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_us_china.htm.

⁶⁷ Miloh Hsieh, "One China "Policy" vs "Principle": How Language is used to Obscure Discussion on Taiwan," *New Boom Magazine*, April 21, 2019.

⁶⁸ Hsieh, "One China."

In other words, there is a slight difference in the shade of meaning between the two words. This ambiguity led to different interpretations in many discussions until today.

ii. China's Threat

Since 1979, China has regarded the issue of integration with Taiwan as homework to solve in the future. However, Xi Jinping, who became President in 2013, showed a different attitude from his predecessors. According to professor Oriana Skylar Mastro in her article in *Foreign Affairs*, she said that Xi Jinping "has publicly called for progress toward unification, staking his legitimacy on movement in that direction."⁶⁹ As a basis for this, she presented speeches conducted by Xi Jinping in 2017 and 2019, arguing that the Chinese dream claimed by Xi Jinping and the unification of Taiwan are connected.⁷⁰ And Professor Skylar Mastro emphasizes that the option to use military force is not excluded.⁷¹

Experts in the defense sector emphasize that China's military threat to Taiwan is escalating. According to Senior Defense Analyst of RAND Corporation, The PLA Air Force sorties more than doubled from 2020 to 2021, reaching 950 last year at an astonishing average of 2.6 flights per day.⁷² Military training of the PLA around Taiwan is frequently conducted and often violates Taiwan's air defense identification zone.

Due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the international community is very concerned about the possibility of China's invasion of Taiwan. U.S. President Joe Biden confirmed Washington's willingness to intervene militarily in a news conference

⁶⁹ Oriana Skylar Mastro, "The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation>.

⁷⁰ Mastro, "The Taiwan Temptation."

⁷¹ Mastro, "The Taiwan Temptation."

⁷² Derek Grossman, "Why China is Intensifying its Military Flights Against Taiwan," RAND Corporation, access on June 3, 2022, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/02/why-china-is-intensifying-its-military-flights-against.html>.

during his visit to Japan when asked if the U.S. would intervene militarily if China invaded Taiwan.⁷³ Also, U.S. Defense Secretary Austin stressed that "The United States will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability commensurate with the Chinese threat."⁷⁴ Such comments by the U.S. president and defense minister indicate that China's threat to Taiwan is real.

c. Russia

i. Russia's Regional and Global Objectives and Activities

According to the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment, the U.S. predicts Russia will remain a prominent force and a significant threat to the U.S. during the next decade despite the shifting geopolitics.⁷⁵ Washington also predicts that Moscow will continue to pursue its goals in competitive, often confrontational, and provocative ways, including striving for dominance over Ukraine and other nations in the "near-abroad" while seeking options for a "more stable relationship with Washington."⁷⁶

The same document evaluates that Russia does not want a confrontation with U.S. forces.⁷⁷ Russia seeks to agree with the U.S. on mutual non-interference in both nations' domestic affairs, as well as U.S. acknowledgment of Russia's claimed sphere of influence over most of the former Soviet Union.⁷⁸ Russia's authorities have long felt that the U.S. is attempting to destabilize Russia, weaken President Vladimir Putin, and establish Western-friendly governments in former Soviet nations and abroad, making

⁷³ Kevin Liptak, Donald Judd and Nectar Gan, "Biden says US would respond 'militarily' if China attacked Taiwan, but White House insists there's no policy change," CNN, May 23, 2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/politics/biden-taiwan-china-japan-intl-hnk/index.html>.

⁷⁴ Ryo Nakamura, "US willing to expand military aid to Taiwan: defense secretary," *Nikkei Asia*, June 1, 2022. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/U.S.-willing-to-expand-military-aid-to-Taiwan-defense-secretary>.

⁷⁵ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁷⁶ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁷⁷ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁷⁸ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

Russia react.⁷⁹

According to the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment, the U.S. believes that Moscow will continue to use various methods to achieve its objectives while undermining the interests of the U.S. and its allies.⁸⁰ Russia could use military, security, and intelligence instruments, with economic cooperation playing a minor part.⁸¹ The U.S. thinks that Russia will intervene in crises when Russia's interests are at stake, the expected intervention costs are minimal, or it gets a chance to benefit from a power vacuum.⁸² Russia will most likely continue to extend its "global military, intelligence, security, commercial, and energy footprints" and form alliances aimed at undercutting U.S. influence and bolstering its own.⁸³

The U.S. claims that Moscow is exploiting its engagement in Syria, Libya, and Sudan to bolster its power, weaken U.S. leadership, depict itself as a vital mediator, and acquire military access privileges and commercial possibilities in the Middle East and North Africa.⁸⁴ In the Western Hemisphere, Russia has increased its involvement with Venezuela, backed Cuba, and utilized arms sales and energy deals to try to extend access to markets and natural resources in Latin America, partly to mitigate the impact of sanctions.⁸⁵ The document notes that Moscow is well-positioned in the former Soviet republics to expand its role in the Caucasus and, if necessary, intervene in Belarus and Central Asia to quell instability following widespread anti-government protests, as it did in Belarus after the fraudulent 2020 election and in Kazakhstan earlier this year.⁸⁶

⁷⁹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁸⁰ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁸¹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁸² ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁸³ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁸⁴ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁸⁵ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁸⁶ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

The U.S. anticipate that Russia will continue to utilize energy as a foreign policy instrument to coerce collaboration and drive other governments to the bargaining table, as it did in 2021 when it suspended coal and electricity supplies to Ukraine.⁸⁷ Russia also employs its expertise in COVID-19 vaccine research and civilian nuclear reactor building in its foreign policy as a soft power tactic.⁸⁸

ii. Russia's Military Capabilities

The 2022 Annual Threat Assessment anticipates that Moscow will continue to modernize and strengthen its military forces, allowing it to protect Russia's national security while projecting influence worldwide and threatening the interests of the United States and its allies.⁸⁹ Despite slowing defense spending growth, Russia will prioritize the development and acquisition of new weapons that pose increased threats to the U.S. and regional actors while continuing its foreign military engagements, conducting training exercises, and incorporating lessons learned from its involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine.⁹⁰

Washington believes that Moscow can send soldiers to strategically critical locations, but the further it deploys from Russia, the less likely it will continue extensive combat operations.⁹¹ The document states that the Vagner Group and other private security firms run by Russian oligarchs close to the Kremlin extend Moscow's military reach at a low cost in places "ranging from Syria to the Central African Republic and Mali, allowing Russia to disavow its involvement and distance itself from battlefield casualties."⁹²

⁸⁷ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10.

⁸⁸ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 10-11.

⁸⁹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 11.

⁹⁰ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 11.

⁹¹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 11.

⁹² ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 11.

iii. Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Russian President Putin launched a full-scale attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The international community, including the United States, strongly condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In particular, U.S. President Joe Biden defined it as "Russia's unprovoked and unjustified attack on Ukraine."⁹³ Together with the international community, the U.S. has provided weapons to Ukraine and imposed economic sanctions on Russia.

Following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's address to the U.S. Congress on March 16, Biden pledged an extra \$800 million in military support.⁹⁴ Since Russia's incursion, the U.S. has committed \$3.4 billion in security aid, including heavy weaponry and artillery.⁹⁵ The United States has also significantly boosted the number of U.S. soldiers in Europe, increasing the total to above 100,000.⁹⁶ Although about five months have passed since Russia's invasion, Russia has no intention to stop the military operation in Ukraine, and the war between Russia and Ukraine continues.

d. North Korea

i. Regional and Global Objectives and Activities

According to the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will continue attempts to systematically build and improve Pyongyang's nuclear and conventional capabilities aimed against the United States and its allies, employing aggressive and possibly disruptive steps to shift the regional security environment to

⁹³ "Remarks by President Biden on Russia's Unprovoked and Unjustified Attack on Ukraine," The White House, accessed on June 3, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/24/remarks-by-president-biden-on-russias-unprovoked-and-unjustified-attack-on-ukraine/>.

⁹⁴ "Conflict in Ukraine," Council on Foreign Relations, access on June 3, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine>.

⁹⁵ "Conflict in Ukraine," Council on Foreign Relations.

⁹⁶ "Conflict in Ukraine," Council on Foreign Relations.

his advantage.⁹⁷ These steps will involve building and proving capabilities leading up to and perhaps including the restart of nuclear weapons and ICBM testing.⁹⁸

Kim sees nuclear weapons and ICBMs as the ultimate guarantee of his authoritarian control over North Korea, and he believes that he will acquire international acceptability as a nuclear state over time. “He probably does not view the current level of pressure on his regime, the economic hardships resulting from sanctions and his domestic COVID-19 countermeasures as enough to require a fundamental change in approach.”⁹⁹

The same document also claims that North Korea seeks status as nuclear power and strategic dominance over South Korea.¹⁰⁰ North Korea will almost certainly continue to try to weaken the ROK-US alliance by alternating between times of escalation and symbolic gestures toward the South to "exploit differences in Washington's and Seoul's approaches to resolving the Korea problem."¹⁰¹

The U.S. believes North Korea is still engaging in illegal operations such as cyber theft and exporting UN-prohibited goods to support regime objectives such as Kim's WMD development.¹⁰²

ii. Military Capabilities

The U.S. predicts that North Korea will continue to invest in specialized capabilities that give Kim a range of alternatives to discourage foreign involvement, counter lasting inadequacies in the country's conventional forces, and coercively advance his

⁹⁷ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 16.

⁹⁸ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 16.

⁹⁹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 16.

¹⁰⁰ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 16.

¹⁰¹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 16.

¹⁰² ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 16.

political ambitions, posing a real threat to the U.S. and its allies.¹⁰³

According to the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment, Kim specified his goals for developing new military systems in a report to the 8th Party Congress in early 2021, including a nuclear-powered submarine, hypersonic glide vehicles, long-range solid-propellant missiles, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). Although several of these capabilities are longer-term undertakings, the United States believes they reflect Kim's long-term commitment to growing and diversifying his arsenal.¹⁰⁴

North Korea claimed for the first time in September 2021 that it had tested an HGV capable of hitting regional targets. North Korea followed with two additional reported hypersonic missile flight tests in January 2022, proving its commitment to developing hypersonic weapons.¹⁰⁵

iii. Weapons of Mass Destruction

Kim is steadfast in his commitment to developing the country's nuclear arsenal and conducting ballistic missile research and development. North Korea's continuous development of ICBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs reveals its determination to strengthen its nuclear delivery capabilities.¹⁰⁶ North Korea continues to produce fissile materials and is likely to increase its uranium enrichment program.¹⁰⁷

In January, North Korea began setting the foundation for a rise in tensions that might involve an ICBM or nuclear test this year—actions Pyongyang has not performed

¹⁰³ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 16.

¹⁰⁴ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 16.

¹⁰⁵ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 16.

¹⁰⁶ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 17.

¹⁰⁷ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 17.

since 2017.¹⁰⁸ North Korea's flight tests are part of a drive to increase the number and variety of missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the United States.¹⁰⁹ North Korea continues to seek a sea-based nuclear attack capability. “North Korea flight tested a new SLBM” in October 2021.¹¹⁰ North Korea's chemical and biological weapons (CBW) capabilities remain a danger, and the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is concerned that Pyongyang could use such weapons during a conflict or in an unusual or covert assault.¹¹¹

e. Implications to U.S. National Security

As discussed earlier, the United States recognizes Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Great Power competition with China, and North Korea's nuclear and missile development as serious threats. The United States takes them seriously. In particular, the United States is very concerned about the modernization of the PLA among them.

In response, the U.S. Biden administration has shown signs of strengthening cooperation with allies and security partners in the Indo-Pacific region. For instance, the United States established a trilateral security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom, called AUKUS. Moreover, President Biden put much effort into the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) by holding a summit meeting with Japan, India, and Australia in person. The United States also created IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework) in an effort to compete with China not only in the military area but also in the economic domain.

¹⁰⁸ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 17.

¹⁰⁹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 17.

¹¹⁰ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 17.

¹¹¹ ODNI, *Annual Threat Assessment*, 17.

III. U.S. Grand Strategy

Before looking into the U.S. grand strategy, it is necessary to understand what the grand strategy means. There is a variety of definitions in academics. One of the most outstanding scholars in political science, Professor Hal Brands, explains it as the "intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy."¹¹² In other words, it is a "purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should go about doing so."¹¹³

In detail, professor Hal Brands specified the characteristics of the grand strategy as follows. First, the grand strategy is neither any one facet of foreign policy nor its general foreign policy.¹¹⁴ Foreign policy is the sum of the interaction with the world, but the grand strategy is "conceptual logic" that controls tools to "maximize the benefits for a nation's core interests."¹¹⁵ Second, grand strategy serves as a vital connection between short-term efforts and medium- and long-term goals.¹¹⁶ Third, grand strategy is fascinated with the link between means and ends, aims and capabilities.¹¹⁷ Fourth, grand strategy is a process as much as a single premise.¹¹⁸ Fifth, a grand strategy is an essentially participatory effort.¹¹⁹ Sixth, despite its typically competitive nature, grand strategy performs equally well in peacetime and warfare.¹²⁰ Lastly, while the grand strategy necessitates an intentional approach to policy, it does not have to be codified,

¹¹² Hal Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, (NY: Cornell University, 2014), 3.

¹¹³ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, 3.

¹¹⁴ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, 3.

¹¹⁵ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, 3.

¹¹⁶ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, 4.

¹¹⁷ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, 4.

¹¹⁸ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, 4.

¹¹⁹ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, 5.

¹²⁰ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, 5.

detailed, or identified in official speeches and publications.¹²¹

Then, why is it so important? According to Professor Hal Brands, a clear grand strategy is essential to competent statecraft.¹²² First, it is because there is an unavoidable disparity between resources and interests.¹²³ Second, even if great powers can escape this resource issue, the diversity of their interests risks distracting and confusing them.¹²⁴ Third, no grand strategy can provide leaders with ready-made solutions to these crises, but performing the intellectual tasks involved in doing grand strategy—defining and prioritizing goals and threats, understanding the extent and limits of a state's capabilities—can provide politicians with the fundamental conceptual backdrop against which to formulate an appropriate response.¹²⁵ Fourth, grand strategy is critical because of the competitive nature of international politics.¹²⁶ Fifth, and probably most importantly, grand strategy is critical because it is difficult to compensate for mistakes and deficiencies.¹²⁷ For instance, "states with a well-crafted grand strategy may be able to overcome mistakes in the daily conduct of military or diplomatic policy, while those with a fundamentally deficient grand strategy will be hard-pressed to preserve their core interests over the long term."¹²⁸

Taken together, it can be seen that the grand strategy serves as a lighthouse that provides guidance and allows efficient and effective judgment when making high-level policy decisions. Understanding the U.S. grand strategy helps us

¹²¹ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?* 6.

¹²² Brands, *What good is grand strategy?* 7.

¹²³ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?* 7.

¹²⁴ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?* 7.

¹²⁵ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?* 8.

¹²⁶ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?* 8.

¹²⁷ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?* 9.

¹²⁸ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?* 9.

analyze the current and future U.S. policy orientations. Furthermore, it is necessary for us to understand the U.S. strategy because the security of South Korea is significantly affected by the United States.

a. Components of Grand Strategy

i. Objectives

According to realist political scientist Hans Morgenthau, national interests provide the most important criterion for determining a successful and reasonable foreign policy.¹²⁹ Then, what is the national interest of the United States? In 2000, the Commission on America's National Interests published the document called "America's National Interests" to provide sustainable guidelines in the age of uncertainty.

Although the national interests emphasized by U.S. administrations may differ, this document is meaningful in that it shows the overall national interests pursued by the U.S. The document suggests four different types of national interests: vital national interests, extremely important national interests, important national interests, and less important or secondary national interests.

First and foremost, vital interests are strictly required to maintain and improve "America's survival and well-being in a free and secure nation."¹³⁰ According to the document, the "vital U.S. national interests are to:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States or its military forces abroad;

¹²⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau and Robert Blackwill, "What is the National Interest of the United States?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 282 (July 1952): 7.

¹³⁰ Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, and Rita Hauser, Co-Chairs. "America's National Interests: A Report from The Commission on America's National Interests, 2000." *Commission on America's National Interests*, July 2000. 5. <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/amernatinter.pdf>.

2. Ensure U.S. allies' survival and their active cooperation with the U.S. in shaping an international system in which we can thrive;
3. Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on U.S. borders;
4. Ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment); and
5. Establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries, China and Russia."¹³¹

The document claims that these vital interests will be enhanced and protected by promoting unique U.S. leadership, military and intelligence capabilities, credibility (including a reputation for adhering to clear U.S. commitments and dealing fairly with other states), and bolstering critical international institutions, particularly the U.S. alliance system around the world.¹³²

Second, extremely important national interests are conditions that, if jeopardized, would substantially damage but not strictly jeopardize the U.S. government's capacity to defend and improve Americans' well-being in a free and secure nation.¹³³ According to the document, the "extremely significant U.S. national interests are to:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons anywhere;
2. Prevent the regional proliferation of WMD and delivery systems;

¹³¹ Allison and Blackwill, "America's National Interests." 5.

¹³² Allison and Blackwill, "America's National Interests." 5.

¹³³ Allison and Blackwill, "America's National Interests." 6.

3. Promote the acceptance of international rules of law and mechanisms for resolving or managing disputes peacefully;
4. Prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in important regions, especially the Persian Gulf;
5. Promote the well-being of U.S. allies and friends and protect them from external aggression;
6. Promote democracy, prosperity, and stability in the Western Hemisphere;
7. Prevent, manage, and, if possible at reasonable cost, end major conflicts in important geographic regions;
8. Maintain a lead in key military-related and other strategic technologies, particularly information systems;
9. Prevent massive, uncontrolled immigration across U.S. borders;
10. Suppress terrorism (especially state-sponsored terrorism), transnational crime, and drug trafficking; and
11. Prevent genocide."¹³⁴

Third, important national interests are conditions that, if jeopardized, would have severe ramifications for the U.S. government's capacity to protect and improve the

¹³⁴ Allison and Balkwill, "America's National Interests." 6.

well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.¹³⁵ According to the document, "important U.S. national interests are to:

1. Discourage massive human rights violations in foreign countries;
2. Promote pluralism, freedom, and democracy in strategically important states as much as is feasible without destabilization;
3. Prevent and, if possible at low cost, end conflicts in strategically less significant geographic regions;
4. Protect the lives and well-being of American citizens who are targeted or taken hostage by terrorist organizations;
5. Reduce the economic gap between rich and poor nations;
6. Prevent the nationalization of US-owned assets abroad;
7. Boost the domestic output of key strategic industries and sectors;
8. Maintain an edge in the international distribution of information to ensure that American values continue to positively influence the cultures of foreign nations;
9. Promote international environmental policies consistent with long-term ecological requirements; and
10. Maximize US GNP growth from international trade and investment."¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Allison and Balkwill, "America's National Interests." 7.

Important U.S. national interests include the preservation of a strong U.N. and other regional and functional cooperation organizations.¹³⁷

Fourth, national interests that are less significant or secondary are not irrelevant.¹³⁸

They are significant and desirable criteria, but they have a minimal direct influence on the U.S. government's ability to preserve and improve the well-being of Americans in a free and secure society.¹³⁹ According to the document, "less important or secondary U.S. national interests include:

1. Balancing bilateral trade deficits;
2. Enlarging democracy everywhere for its own sake;
3. Preserving the territorial integrity or particular political constitution of other states everywhere; and
4. Enhancing exports of specific economic sectors."¹⁴⁰

ii. Tools

There are a wide variety of tools used for a grand strategy. More than anything else, the military is the most explicit and potent tool available to the United States for achieving the goals of the grand strategy. It is because the United States has the most capable military power in the world, "with a unique ability to project power on a global basis."¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Allison and Blackwill, "America's National Interests." 7.

¹³⁷ Allison and Blackwill, "America's National Interests." 7.

¹³⁸ Allison and Blackwill, "America's National Interests." 8.

¹³⁹ Allison and Blackwill, "America's National Interests." 8.

¹⁴⁰ Allison and Blackwill, "America's National Interests." 8.

¹⁴¹ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Chapter Three: North America," *The Military Balance* 121,

Then, what makes the U.S. military powerful? The senior fellow of Brookings, Michael O'Hanlon, argues that "what separates the U.S. armed forces from all others is technology- space assets, advanced fighters, stealth bombers, quiet submarines, precision munitions, unmanned aircraft, a large nuclear arsenal, missile defenses, and the like."¹⁴² The enormous defense budget of the United States supports cutting-edge defense technology development. As illustrated in table 1, the enacted defense budget for 2022 was \$777.7 billion.¹⁴³ Specifically, U.S. Congress authorized \$740.3 billion for the Department of Defense (DOD) and \$27.8 billion for national security programs within the Department of Energy (DOE).

Table 1. Funding Summary of FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act

FY22 Defense Funding Levels (in billions of dollars)	
Department of Defense	\$740.30
Department of Energy	\$27.8
NDAAs Topline	\$768.2
Defense-related Activities Outside NDAAs Jurisdiction	\$9.9
National Defense Topline	\$777.7

Source: Data adapted from "Summary of the Fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act," U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, accessed on <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY22%20NDAA%20Agreement%20Summary.pdf>

This defense budget is greater than the combined defense spending of China, India, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Japan. However, compared to GDP, it just accounts for 3%, making it a relatively modest amount.

In addition, U.S. military establishment "spans widely across America, with tentacles reaching out to East Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the world at large."¹⁴⁴

Generally, it is estimated that "some 750 American military facilities remain open in

no. 1 (2021): 47.

¹⁴² Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defense 101: Understanding the Military of Today and Tomorrow* (NY: Cornell University Press, 2021), 34.

¹⁴³ "Summary of the Fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act," US Senate Committee on Armed Services, accessed on <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY22%20NDAA%20Agreement%20Summary.pdf>.

¹⁴⁴ O'Hanlon, *Defense 101*, 43.

80 nations and territories around the world."¹⁴⁵ Table 2 shows that U.S. bases in three countries "rise head and shoulders above all others - Germany, Japan, and South Korea, each of which hosts tens of thousands of G.I.s."¹⁴⁶ Recently, there was a significant change in overseas U.S. troops. In July 2021, President Biden announced that the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan would "conclude on August 31," and the U.S. military had withdrawn entirely from Afghanistan.¹⁴⁷ Also, the U.S. Department of Defense announced in February 2022 that the "United States will move approximately 3,000 service members to Romania, Poland and Germany in response to Russia's continuing build-up of forces on its western border Ukraine and Belarus."¹⁴⁸ In short, massive defense spending, high-tech military capabilities, and overseas bases prove that the United States has tremendous resources to carry out a grand strategy.

¹⁴⁵ Doug Bandow, "750 Bases in 80 Countries Is Too Many for Any Nation: Time for the US to Bring Its Troops Home," *CATO institute*, October 4, 2021, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/750-bases-80-countries-too-many-any-nation-time-us-bring-its-troops-home>.

¹⁴⁶ O'Hanlon, *Defense 101*, 35.

¹⁴⁷ "Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan," The White House, accessed on June 6, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forces-in-afghanistan/>.

¹⁴⁸ Jim Garamone, "US to Deploy 3,000 Troops to Romania, Poland, Germany," DOD News, February 2, 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2920844/us-to-deploy-3000-troops-to-romania-poland-germany/>.

Table 2. U.S. Troops abroad by Country (as of late 2019)

Country of Region	Number of Troops
EUROPE	
Belgium	1,046
Germany	35,275
Italy	12,902
Spain	3,658
Turkey	2,500
United Kingdom	9,254
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	
Japan	55,245
Korea	26,525
NORTH AFRICA, NEAR EAST,	
Bahrain	7,000
UAE	5,000
Jordan	3,000
Qatar	13,000
Saudi Arabia	3,000
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	
Djibouti	88
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	
Cuba (Guantanamo)	776
CONTINGENCY OPERATION SUPPORT	
Afghanistan	14,000 (and declining)
Kuwait	13,000
Iraq	5,200
Syria	800

Source: Data adapted from Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defense 101: Understanding the Military of Today and Tomorrow* (NY: Cornell University Press, 2021), 36.

However, there is a concern about the overmilitarization of U.S. foreign policy.

Former defense secretary Robert Gates highlighted the importance of nonmilitary tools by saying, "Washington has become overly dependent on military tools and has

seriously neglected its nonmilitary instruments of power, which have withered and weakened as a result."¹⁴⁹ He admits the importance of building and maintaining a strong military. However, he also argues that it is more "important to know when and how to use it."¹⁵⁰ Unfortunately, in the past, the U.S. forgot to have clear objectives for its troops and changed its missions without considering the "mismatch between US aspirations and US capabilities."¹⁵¹ That is why mission creeps happened often in the past. The strategic mistakes can be found in the US military intervention in Somalia, Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan.

Robert Gates argues that nonmilitary methods should address this issue.¹⁵² First and foremost, the United States' economic power is a valuable nonmilitary tool for pressuring competitors and encouraging collaboration with partners.¹⁵³ Second, foreign aid can be a helpful instrument. However, the former Secretary of Defense claims that the U.S. Agency for International Development has shrunk since the end of the Cold War, giving up an essential instrument of power.¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, China has been particularly good at leveraging economic projects to nurture foreign leaders and purchase access and influence.¹⁵⁵ "Its boldest gambit on this front has been the Belt and Road Initiative, which in 2019 encompassed projects in 115 countries with an estimated cost of over \$1 trillion."¹⁵⁶ Third, he underscores that the U.S. must reinforce its strategic communications capabilities.¹⁵⁷ During the Cold War, "the U.S. Information Agency and its many outlets and programs reached every corner of the planet." It was one of the most sophisticated and successful nonmilitary

¹⁴⁹ Robert M. Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2020.

¹⁵⁰ Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy."

¹⁵¹ Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy."

¹⁵² Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy."

¹⁵³ Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy."

¹⁵⁴ Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy."

¹⁵⁵ Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy."

¹⁵⁶ Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy."

¹⁵⁷ Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy."

instruments.¹⁵⁸ Fourth, Mr. Gates argues that cyber warfare has evolved into one of the most effective weapons in a nation's inventory, allowing governments to access an adversary's military and civic infrastructure, interfere with democratic processes, and exacerbate political divides. Thus, it is necessary to deal with cyberwarfare actively as one of the nonmilitary tools.¹⁵⁹

Taken together, military force has been a precious tool for accomplishing the national interests of the United States, but it seems to have been overused. As a result, there is a strong voice that the United States must aggressively utilize nonmilitary tools like economic power, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and cyberwarfare to accomplish its grand strategy. Thus, a mix of military and nonmilitary tools is the best approach to advance the United States' national interests.

The significance of economic tools has grown in recent years. According to Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, the more economic transaction is stimulated, the more asymmetrical power is produced.¹⁶⁰ "As globalization has advanced, it has fostered new networks of exchange-whether economic, informational, or physical-that have remade domestic economies, densely and intimately interconnecting them in ways that are difficult to unravel."¹⁶¹ Global economic networks have long-reaching repercussions that go far beyond states' unilateral actions to give or refuse market access or apply bilateral pressure.¹⁶² They allow certain nations to weaponize interdependence at the network level.¹⁶³ There are two types of weaponization. The first weaponizes the capacity to harvest essential knowledge from information flows,

¹⁵⁸ Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy."

¹⁵⁹ Gates, "The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy."

¹⁶⁰ Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion," *International Security* 44, no 1 (Summer 2019): 74.

¹⁶¹ Farrell and Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence," 47.

¹⁶² Farrell and Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence," 54.

¹⁶³ Farrell and Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence," 54.

which we call the "panopticon effect."¹⁶⁴ The second channel includes the privilege state's ability to ban or penalize third-party usage of hubs, which we call the "chokepoint effect" (e.g., other states or private actors).¹⁶⁵ Since the U.S. has leverage over network hubs and appropriate institutions, it can weaponize the interdependence of SWIFT, the Internet, supply chains, and the dollar clearing system by panopticon and chokepoint effects.¹⁶⁶ In other words, inequality of networks in economic interdependence can create coercion from the security perspective. Thus, this can be another tool in the US grand strategy.

Also, there is a tool of resilience in grand strategy. Professor Ganesh Sitaraman argues that "American democracy is beset by broken processes and vulnerable to outside meddling."¹⁶⁷ In order to provide resilience, he claims it needs resilience in the domestic foundation.¹⁶⁸ However, it does not mean that the United States should be isolated from the world. Most countries, including the United States, cannot be self-sufficient.¹⁶⁹ In other words, not all vital resources and industrial capacity will be accessible domestically, and not all countries will have the economic strength to "withstand political and economic pressure from great-power competitors."¹⁷⁰ In this respect, the solution is strengthening the linkages and alliances that unite North America, Western Europe, and Northeast Asia's like-minded liberal democracies, creating "resilient multilateralism."¹⁷¹

The importance of cooperation with allies is also stressed by Professor Mira Rapp-Hooper as well. According to her argument, former President Donald Trump undermined the United States' 70-year-old alliance system by refusing to honor the

¹⁶⁴ Farrell and Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence," 55.

¹⁶⁵ Farrell and Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence," 55-56.

¹⁶⁶ Farrell and Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence," 74.

¹⁶⁷ Ganesh Sitaraman, "A Grand Strategy of Resilience," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2020.

¹⁶⁸ Sitaraman, "A Grand Strategy of Resilience."

¹⁶⁹ Sitaraman, "A Grand Strategy of Resilience."

¹⁷⁰ Sitaraman, "A Grand Strategy of Resilience."

¹⁷¹ Sitaraman, "A Grand Strategy of Resilience."

country's promises and seeking significant increases in defense expenditure from long-standing friends such as Japan and South Korea.¹⁷² She insists that the United States "needs its alliance system to preserve order."¹⁷³ The alliance is especially vital when the rivalry between the United States and China intensifies. Rapp-Hooper contends that it is unavoidable for the United States to bear the more significant economic burden because of financial and political leadership roles and that comparing the economic burden to the allies is inappropriate.¹⁷⁴ In fact, "U.S. allies also contribute to their alliance with the United States in ways that are not captured by their defense expenditures- such as by granting low-cost leases for U.S. bases and constructing facilities for use by U.S. troops."¹⁷⁵ As a result, Professor Rapp-Hooper argues that the American alliance system has been maintained because it was a cost-effective strategy to achieve American security and prosperity.¹⁷⁶

iii. Obstacles

Generally, the U.S. perceives four sets of challenges in a grand strategy. First and foremost, the great power competition is a significant challenge to US national security. The United States competes with Russia and China, as discussed in the international security environment. The United States, in particular, thinks that it must maintain the liberal international order while contending with Russia and China.

In the 1990s and 2000s, American leaders felt that Russia and China were coming to terms with the West on fundamental world order issues.¹⁷⁷ Also, they thought those countries would collaborate on common concerns, and previous geopolitical rivalries

¹⁷² Mira Rapp-Hooper, "Saving America's Alliances," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2020.

¹⁷³ Rapp-Hooper, "Saving America's Alliances."

¹⁷⁴ Rapp-Hooper, "Saving America's Alliances."

¹⁷⁵ Rapp-Hooper, "Saving America's Alliances."

¹⁷⁶ Rapp-Hooper, "Saving America's Alliances."

¹⁷⁷ Thomas Wright, "The return of great-power rivalry was inevitable," Brookings, September 12, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-return-to-great-power-rivalry-was-inevitable/>.

would be far less critical.¹⁷⁸ However, the "era of convergence" ended when Russian and Chinese leaders realized that the global success of the liberal order would constitute "an existential threat to their regimes."¹⁷⁹ China and Russia believed that "Western liberalism and freedom" threatened authoritarian rule.¹⁸⁰ A lot of Western policymakers considered that it might be good for the Chinese and Russian people, although it is bad for their regimes.¹⁸¹ As a result, China and Russia started to resist, and the return to great-power rivalry was inevitable.¹⁸² How the US should compete and collaborate with Russia and China has become a critical issue for US national security.

Second, new nuclear (WMD) states are a security challenge to the United States. Indeed, the nuclear weapons possessed by Russia and China pose a severe threat to U.S. security. There is also a risk that weak and failing countries may unintentionally foster nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons-related terrorism or spread and leak WMD-related technologies because of poor government control.¹⁸³ According to the United Kingdom, of the 17 states that have current or suspended WMD programs beyond the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, 13 countries are at risk of instability."¹⁸⁴ A terrifying potential is that a nuclear-armed state, such as Pakistan or North Korea, may lose control of its nuclear weapons through collapse or theft, leaving the nukes in the hands of a successor government or nonstate actors with no qualms about using them.¹⁸⁵ A more plausible scenario would be the transfer of

¹⁷⁸ Thomas Wright, "The return of great-power rivalry was inevitable," Brookings, September 12, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-return-to-great-power-rivalry-was-inevitable/>.

¹⁷⁹ Thomas Wright, "The return of great-power rivalry was inevitable," Brookings, September 12, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-return-to-great-power-rivalry-was-inevitable/>.

¹⁸⁰ Thomas Wright, "The return of great-power rivalry was inevitable," Brookings, September 12, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-return-to-great-power-rivalry-was-inevitable/>.

¹⁸¹ Thomas Wright, "The return of great-power rivalry was inevitable," Brookings, September 12, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-return-to-great-power-rivalry-was-inevitable/>.

¹⁸² Thomas Wright, "The return of great-power rivalry was inevitable," Brookings, September 12, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-return-to-great-power-rivalry-was-inevitable/>.

¹⁸³ Stewart Patrick, "Weak States and global threats: Fact or fiction?" *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (2006): 36

¹⁸⁴ Patrick, "Weak States and global threats," 36.

¹⁸⁵ Patrick, "Weak States and global threats," 36.

biological weapons, which are easy to manufacture and transport but challenging to trace.¹⁸⁶ The emergence of new nuclear powers or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a vital threat when considering grand strategy in the United States.

Third, transnational security threats like climate change, terrorism, and pandemic exist. According to Morgan Bazilian and Cullen Hendrix, the United States has security strategies and policies that are very vulnerable to climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁸⁷ They argue that the United States should change everything, including budget allocation, research and development, education, and security training to cope with transnational threats like climate change and pandemics.¹⁸⁸

However, it is not easy to deal with such challenges. More than anything else, climate change and pandemics are security threats without actors.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, the pace and scope of these new security threats are not evident.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, it is difficult to respond to the existing security system.¹⁹¹ Moreover, the nature of the threat and the agency responsible for the threat are not matched.¹⁹² For example, the Environment Protection Agency or the Department of Interior is not usually involved in security issues in the United States.¹⁹³

Fourth, the United States deals with democracy and humanitarian aid as an essential component of a grand strategy. Wherever democracy was in danger, the United States actively protected democracy. Also, the United States executed humanitarian aid to save people from various crises. However, the Trump administration has regularly

¹⁸⁶ Patrick, "Weak States and global threats," 36.

¹⁸⁷ Morgan Bazilian and Cullen Hendrix, "An Age of Actorless Threats: Rethinking National Security in Light of COVID and Climate," Just Security, October 23, 2020, <https://www.justsecurity.org/72939/an-age-of-actorless-threats-re-thinking-national-security-in-light-of-covid-and-climate/>.

¹⁸⁸ Bazilian and Hendrix, "An Age of Actorless Threats"

¹⁸⁹ Bazilian and Hendrix, "An Age of Actorless Threats"

¹⁹⁰ Bazilian and Hendrix, "An Age of Actorless Threats"

¹⁹¹ Bazilian and Hendrix, "An Age of Actorless Threats"

¹⁹² Bazilian and Hendrix, "An Age of Actorless Threats"

¹⁹³ Bazilian and Hendrix, "An Age of Actorless Threats"

exacerbated these values by praising overseas authoritarian regimes, undermining democratic standards at home, and fostering discord among the world's democracies.¹⁹⁴ It had repercussions for the global leadership of the United States.

On the other hand, the United States has conducted humanitarian interventions using military and nonmilitary ways. For example, the United States conducted military interventions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti for humanitarian aid. In addition, the United States spent about \$48 billion on foreign assistance in 2019, and about 20 percent of foreign assistance was for humanitarian activities.¹⁹⁵ "The United States is the largest foreign aid donor in the world, accounting for nearly 23% of total official development assistance from major donor governments in 2019 (the latest year for which these data are available)."¹⁹⁶

b. US Foreign Policy Schools

Since South Korea is allied with the United States, it requires understanding the U.S. government's foreign and security policy stance. Professor Walter Russell Mead analyzed the foundations of US foreign policy. He explained that four schools of thought had affected US foreign policy: Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian. The following section explains each school of foreign policy.

i. The Hamilton Way

According to Mead, many people associate the Hamiltonian tradition of statesmanship with the realistic and unsentimental philosophy of the snake because of its "commercial orientation, lack of illusions about the frailties of human nature, and

¹⁹⁴ Hal Brands and Charles Edel, "A Grand Strategy of Democratic Solidarity," *The Washington Quarterly* 44 no. 1 (Spring 2021): 30.

¹⁹⁵ Emily M. Morgenstern and Nick M. Brown, *Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2022), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R40213.pdf>.

¹⁹⁶ Morgenstern and Brown, *Foreign Assistance*.

willingness to consider morally painful" ideas like the "balance of power and the use of force in international relations."¹⁹⁷ However, it is not simple as that. Hamiltonians, like Continental realism, use exact phrases like "the national interest" and "the balance of power," but the traditional Hamiltonian thought on foreign policy differs from continental realism.¹⁹⁸ For example, "European states were forced to understand their interests primarily in military terms."¹⁹⁹ However, the Hamiltonians believed that commerce determined US security interests.²⁰⁰ Geographical characteristics of the United States and the United Kingdom affected Hamiltonians to have this idea.

Also, Hamiltonians saw commerce as a possible source of peace.²⁰¹ In the twentieth century, the expansion of trade, and the replacement of the win-win strategy of commerce for the zero-sum game of war, would become important Hamiltonian goals.²⁰² According to Hamiltonians, the American state required a capable military, but the state itself was civilian. American ambassadors spent significantly more time dealing with trade and far less with military or other state concerns than their foreign counterparts.²⁰³ "Hamiltonians did not have to believe that the United States had to conquer or be conquered in its international relations; they could and did believe that the United States could seek constructive compromises of mutual benefit in its dealings with foreign powers while not neglecting its military forces."²⁰⁴

Hamiltonians developed the concept of "American realism," and the essential thing they thought of early on was "the freedom of the sea."²⁰⁵ Because peaceful trade in the United States was a matter of American national interest and survival, and over time,

¹⁹⁷ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*, (NY: Knopf, 2001) 99.

¹⁹⁸ Mead, *Special Providence*, 100.

¹⁹⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 101.

²⁰⁰ Mead, *Special Providence*, 102.

²⁰¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 103.

²⁰² Mead, *Special Providence*, 103.

²⁰³ Mead, *Special Providence*, 104.

²⁰⁴ Mead, *Special Providence*, 105.

²⁰⁵ Mead, *Special Providence*, 105.

protecting American commerce has become an increasingly important issue. Moreover, in the 21st century, "freedom of the Skies" was added.²⁰⁶ Hamiltonians saw trade in U.S. goods and ensuring navigation of U.S. ships on the open seas as a crucial issue in the national interest, and if this were threatened, they would use force.²⁰⁷ In addition, Hamiltonians regarded a variation of the open door as another national interest.²⁰⁸ For example, the United States actively responded to the case of monopolizing essential substances such as oil against the United States. Oil and energy became critical considerations in U.S. foreign and military policy.²⁰⁹ Also, the free flow of money between trading countries was seen as a vital U.S. interest.²¹⁰ With the transfer of financial power from the UK to the United States in the early 21st century, the United States maintained a stable and active international financial system.²¹¹ Moreover, even after the end of the Cold War, preserving a stable international system and promoting the free flow of capital became the basis of American foreign policy.²¹²

"The Hamiltonian and mercantile tradition in American foreign policy has always regarded Pacific trade" as a natural and necessary component of American commerce. The protection and advancement of that commerce have been a recurring theme throughout American history in Hamiltonian diplomacy and activity.²¹³ Since then, the United States has advocated a balance-of-power policy in Asia, helping smaller states against great powers to deter any force that may dominate the rest.²¹⁴ Japan had that power until 1945, and the US continuously fought for its goals. Following the Communist triumph in China, China appeared to be the aspiring hegemon, allied with

²⁰⁶ Mead, *Special Providence*, 107.

²⁰⁷ Mead, *Special Providence*, 107.

²⁰⁸ Mead, *Special Providence*, 110.

²⁰⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 110.

²¹⁰ Mead, *Special Providence*, 111.

²¹¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 111.

²¹² Mead, *Special Providence*, 111-112.

²¹³ Mead, *Special Providence*, 113.

²¹⁴ Mead, *Special Providence*, 114.

the Soviet Union.²¹⁵ Still committed to its traditional Asian objectives, the United States reversed and backed a war-weakened Japan against a resurgent China.²¹⁶ It is conceivable that new shifts in the Asian balance of power would force the U.S. to reconsider its alliances, and for the foreseeable future, concern for the Asian balance of power will remain a crucial issue in American diplomacy.²¹⁷

As described above, Hamiltonian ideas were a vital school that formulated the US foreign policy and were the backbone of American realism. Moreover, their policies are deeply rooted in the heart of the Federalists, Whigs, and the Republican parties.²¹⁸ Hamiltonians' trade and security policy will continue to play a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy.²¹⁹

ii. Wilsonianism and its mission

The second school of foreign policy is Wilsonianism. Wilsonians were actively molding American foreign policy even before Wilson went to Washington.²²⁰ The beliefs underpinning this Wilsonian school are more firmly based on national character and more directly tied to the national interest than may appear initially.²²¹ In order to understand Wilsonianism, it is necessary first to look at the role of missionary work. In the United States, missionary work was not just a religious activity but a concept encompassing medical, relief, and political activism worldwide.²²² The American missionary tradition pursued a "global meliorist" role in the international community.²²³

²¹⁵ Mead, *Special Providence*, 114.

²¹⁶ Mead, *Special Providence*, 114.

²¹⁷ Mead, *Special Providence*, 114.

²¹⁸ Mead, *Special Providence*, 131.

²¹⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 131.

²²⁰ Mead, *Special Providence*, 134.

²²¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 134.

²²² Mead, *Special Providence*, 139.

²²³ Mead, *Special Providence*, 138.

Specifically, looking at the activities of American missionaries, they witnessed social injustice while doing missionary work and became very interested in this issue.²²⁴ In addition, American missionaries played an important role in stabilizing and policing the behavior of American businesspeople.²²⁵ They played a role in mediating lest the economic benefits and religious values of the United States were not contradictory.²²⁶ Missionaries put much effort into providing improved educational opportunities abroad and establishing and spreading Rotary International and the YMCA.²²⁷ These missionaries' efforts also contributed to the development of the international civil society.²²⁸

The notion of a global civil society sprang from the missionary movement; except for a few isolated thinkers, no one before the missionaries believed that the world's cultures and civilizations shared or could share enough in common to make a single global society conceivable or desirable.²²⁹ Before the missionaries, no significant group of people set out to create such a world. The idea that "backward" nations could and should grow into Western-style industrial democracies arose among missionaries, and missionary relief and development groups such as World Vision and Catholic Relief Services continue to lead development initiatives.²³⁰ The belief that governments in the Western world had a positive obligation to promote the development of underprivileged nations through financial aid and other types of assistance also stems from the missionary culture.²³¹ Most modern international organizations that offer disaster assistance, house refugees, educate medical personnel for developing nations, or conduct other essential international services may trace

²²⁴ Mead, *Special Providence*, 144.

²²⁵ Mead, *Special Providence*, 144-145.

²²⁶ Mead, *Special Providence*, 144.

²²⁷ Mead, *Special Providence*, 145.

²²⁸ Mead, *Special Providence*, 145.

²²⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 146.

²³⁰ Mead, *Special Providence*, 146.

²³¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 146.

their roots back to missionary organizations or the missionary environment.²³² In short, American missionaries' efforts to change the world socially, economically, medically, and religiously greatly influenced the formation of American foreign policy.

The missionaries saw that there were three things that the U.S. government needed to do. First, there was a demand for the American government to take an active role in granting American missionaries the right of entry into other countries, providing them with legal protection once there, protecting their property, and, eventually, protecting the Christian minority against private pogroms or government discrimination and/or persecution as converts were made.²³³ Second, protecting their lives, property, and interests became necessary as the missionary movement grew.²³⁴ Third, missionaries attempted to encourage the U.S. government to utilize its power to promote what is now known as human rights in developing countries.²³⁵ These missionaries' efforts had more influence on the world than on achieving religious achievements. For example, it spread liberal democracy in Southern, Southeastern, and most of northeastern Asia.²³⁶ The Wilsonians tried to align these efforts with American foreign policy and the goals of these international movements.²³⁷

The fundamental premise of Wilsonian foreign policy is that democracies are more reliable and trustworthy allies than monarchs and tyrannies.²³⁸ In contrast, nonrepresentative governments are untrustworthy partners for a variety of reasons.²³⁹ "Nonrepresentative polities are unstable not simply because their rulers can be erratic."²⁴⁰ They are untrustworthy because public opinion is inadequately represented

²³² Mead, *Special Providence*, 146.

²³³ Mead, *Special Providence*, 147.

²³⁴ Mead, *Special Providence*, 147.

²³⁵ Mead, *Special Providence*, 148.

²³⁶ Mead, *Special Providence*, 161.

²³⁷ Mead, *Special Providence*, 161-162.

²³⁸ Mead, *Special Providence*, 162.

²³⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 162.

²⁴⁰ Mead, *Special Providence*, 162.

in governance.²⁴¹ Democracies are also dependable because they thrive.²⁴² Following the advancement of democracy, the next purpose of the Wilsonian theory is war prevention.²⁴³ The second branch of the movement tried to decrease the horrors of battle by setting norms of behavior and controlling the manufacturing, distribution, and use of weapons.²⁴⁴ The third branch of the contemporary peace movement attempts to prevent conflict by building alternatives to it, such as forums for states to resolve issues rather than fighting them out and international institutions for collective security.²⁴⁵ In short, Wilsonianism has been a critical component of the American School of Foreign Policy.

iii. Jeffersonian Tradition

As described above, Hamiltonians and Willsonians are well known, but the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians are much less understood. "In very different ways, Jeffersonians and Jacksonians believe that the specific cultural, social, and political heritage of the United States is a precious treasure to be conserved, defended, and passed on to future generations; they celebrate what they see as the unique, and uniquely valuable, elements of American life and believe that the object of foreign policy should be to defend those values at home rather than to extend them abroad."²⁴⁶ Also, both of them consider foreign policy "as an instrument of domestic policy"; they embrace specific foreign policy ideas because they feel that certain approaches to international politics will best advance the sort of domestic policies and order they want to promote.²⁴⁷

What Jeffersonians are concerned about most is democracy. Jeffersonians respond

²⁴¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 162-163.

²⁴² Mead, *Special Providence*, 163.

²⁴³ Mead, *Special Providence*, 165.

²⁴⁴ Mead, *Special Providence*, 165.

²⁴⁵ Mead, *Special Providence*, 166.

²⁴⁶ Mead, *Special Providence*, 175.

²⁴⁷ Mead, *Special Providence*, 176.

with the clear and persuasive argument that capitalism and commerce cannot thrive unless society is "healthy and democratic."²⁴⁸ Furthermore, Jeffersonians have frequently warned that capitalism's unrestrained functioning does not always strengthen democracy.²⁴⁹ The rise of huge fortunes and private wealth concentrations "perverts and suborns the political process."²⁵⁰ Thus, they argue that people should not take democracy for granted and that "it must be vigilantly defended."²⁵¹

Also, Jeffersonians believe the American Revolution will continue until all the undemocratic elements disappear.²⁵² They think "the people should govern themselves as simply as possible."²⁵³ Similarly, Jeffersonians think the central government is "a necessary evil" or "the most dangerous enemy of freedom."²⁵⁴ This philosophical background of the Jeffersonians can be found "in the rich traditions of English and Scottish dissents."²⁵⁵ Jeffersonians saw themselves as the political and intellectual vanguard of the ordinary citizen, the heirs and finishers of the long British battle for liberty.²⁵⁶ The American Revolution was a unique opportunity to create a new nation, and establishing a free country became the most important goal for the Jeffersonians.²⁵⁷ Furthermore, preserving "sanctuary and Revolution has been and remains the highest aim of Jeffersonian statecraft in international relations."²⁵⁸

The ideas of the Jeffersonians, who valued democracy above all else, were embodied in a unique form in foreign policy. First, the Jeffersonians perceived diplomacy as a threat rather than an opportunity. For instance, it was seen that foreign countries could

²⁴⁸ Mead, *Special Providence*, 177.

²⁴⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 177.

²⁵⁰ Mead, *Special Providence*, 177.

²⁵¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 177.

²⁵² Mead, *Special Providence*, 178.

²⁵³ Mead, *Special Providence*, 178.

²⁵⁴ Mead, *Special Providence*, 178.

²⁵⁵ Mead, *Special Providence*, 180.

²⁵⁶ Mead, *Special Providence*, 181.

²⁵⁷ Mead, *Special Providence*, 181.

²⁵⁸ Mead, *Special Providence*, 181.

threaten American liberty in the form of invading the United States or bribing it. Also, what the U.S. does to other countries could threaten American democracy by spreading American values to foreign countries or protecting the United States.²⁵⁹ So the Jeffersonians preferred to minimize the risk and cost of intervening externally, protecting US democratic institutions.²⁶⁰

In this respect, "War was the first and greatest evil Jeffersonians sought to avoid."²⁶¹ Jeffersonians thought that money would be needed to wage war, worsening the nation's financial situation. Moreover, it was seen that increasing national debt puts democracy at risk because it divides citizens into "taxpayers and interest collectors."²⁶² So the Jeffersonians were pessimistic about strengthening defense capabilities which would cause an increase in national debt.²⁶³ War in conflict with foreign countries was seen as a last resort.²⁶⁴ Thus, Jeffersonians were the last of the primary schools to recognize the necessity of American engagement in the two world wars and the Cold War; throughout the Cold War, they were the least convinced of the necessity or benefit of the battle.²⁶⁵

These Jeffersonians' ideas can be seen as a combination between a realistic approach to international affairs and a desire to secure national interests at a minimum cost. Paradoxically, once the war is declared, Jeffersonian "pacifism and skepticism" tend to unite the American people.²⁶⁶ In World War II, the vast and well-organized isolationist movement publicly supported the war effort following the attack on Pearl Harbor.²⁶⁷ On the other hand, the advantage of Jeffersonian's approach to foreign policy is that it

²⁵⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 184.

²⁶⁰ Mead, *Special Providence*, 186.

²⁶¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 186.

²⁶² Mead, *Special Providence*, 187.

²⁶³ Mead, *Special Providence*, 188.

²⁶⁴ Mead, *Special Providence*, 190.

²⁶⁵ Mead, *Special Providence*, 191.

²⁶⁶ Mead, *Special Providence*, 216.

²⁶⁷ Mead, *Special Providence*, 216.

can provide logical reasons when the United States reduces its involvement in the international community.²⁶⁸ Moreover, in the changing international security environment, the Jeffersonians can present strategies to accommodate the new world order while maintaining US domestic institutions and values.²⁶⁹

iv. The School of Andrew Jackson

In a word, Jacksonians can be seen as hard-line hawks. When "the commercial realism of the Hamiltonians, the crusading moralism of Wilsonian transcendentalists and the supple pacifism of the principled but slippery Jeffersonians" cannot explain American ruthlessness at war, Jacksonians can answer.²⁷⁰ The school of Jacksonians stemmed from US president Andrew Jackson who won "the Battle of New Orleans, laid the foundations of American politics for the nineteenth century, and his influence is still felt today."²⁷¹ For example, the solid supporting base of President Trump was Jacksonians, and professor Mead described it as "the Jacksonian Revolt."²⁷² Then, what is the Jacksonians' argument?

Jacksonians are politically suspicious of unchecked federal power and are pessimistic about the prospects for domestic and foreign goodwill (welfare at home, foreign aid abroad).²⁷³ Also, they oppose federal taxes but favor federal programs primarily helping the middle class.²⁷⁴ While Jeffersonians are most passionate about the First Amendment, which protects freedom of expression and prohibits the federal establishment of religion, Jacksonians consider the Second Amendment and the right

²⁶⁸ Mead, *Special Providence*, 217.

²⁶⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 217.

²⁷⁰ Mead, *Special Providence*, 220.

²⁷¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 223.

²⁷² Walter Russell Mead, "The Jacksonian Revolt," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-01-20/jacksonian-revolt>.

²⁷³ Mead, *Special Providence*, 224.

²⁷⁴ Mead, *Special Providence*, 224.

to keep and bear weapons as the "citadel of liberty."²⁷⁵ Jacksonians are frequently portrayed as the most obstructive of the schools, with the slightest willingness to support Wilsonian initiatives for a better world, the slightest understanding of Jeffersonian calls for patient diplomacy under challenging situations, and the least willing to accept Hamiltonian trade strategies.²⁷⁶

"If Jeffersonianism is the book ideology of the United States, Jacksonian populism is its folk ideology."²⁷⁷ American populism is historically built on "community values and sense of identity" among the British colonizers who colonized this nation before the Revolution rather than on Enlightenment concepts.²⁷⁸ Jacksonian populism can be traced back to a subgroup of these settlers known as "the Scotch-Irish, who settled the backcountry regions of the Carolinas and Virginia" and later went on to settle much of the Old West, including "West Virginia, Kentucky, parts of Indiana and Illinois, and the south and south-central states of Tennessee, Missouri, Alabama, and Mississippi."²⁷⁹ Today, Jacksonian populism has expanded beyond its ethnic and geographical boundaries.²⁸⁰

In order to understand how Jacksonians affected American foreign policy, it is necessary to see what Jacksonians value. It is an honor. Honor acts as a kind of code of conduct. The first principle of honor is self-help. Jacksonians think making their way rather than relying on welfare or inheritance is essential. The second principle of honor is equality. Jacksonians think that "members of the folk community who pull their weight" deserve "absolute equality of dignity and right."²⁸¹ The third principle is individualism. "Jacksonian America offers every individual the opportunity to seek

²⁷⁵ Mead, *Special Providence*, 225.

²⁷⁶ Mead, *Special Providence*, 225.

²⁷⁷ Mead, *Special Providence*, 227.

²⁷⁸ Mead, *Special Providence*, 227.

²⁷⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 227.

²⁸⁰ Mead, *Special Providence*, 227.

²⁸¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 233.

satisfaction and salvation through whatever means the individual finds helpful."²⁸²

However, despite this individualism, the Jacksonians accept certain social mores and principles, such as "loyalty to family, raising children right, sexual decency (usually identified with heterosexual monogamy, which can be serial), and honesty within the community."²⁸³ The fourth principle is financial esprit.

To some extent, credit is viewed as an opportunity rather than a liability, and Jacksonians have always advocated for looser monetary policy and bankruptcy rules.²⁸⁴ The last pillar in the Jacksonian honor is courage. Jacksonians believe that men and women "must be ready to defend their honor in great things and small."²⁸⁵ Thus, Jacksonians love weapons because they think the "right to bear arms is a mark of civic and social equality."²⁸⁶ Taken together, "an honorable person is ready to kill or to die for family and flag."²⁸⁷

Regarding the Jacksonian foreign policy, there are several things to note. First, the Jacksonian school is based on realism. The foundation of Jacksonian realism is the stark contrast in popular sentiment between the inside of the folk society and the dismal world outside.²⁸⁸ Jacksonian patriotism is a feeling, similar to familial love, rather than an ideology.²⁸⁹ A profound sense of national honor, and the necessity to live up to, and be perceived to live up to, the standards of an honor code, is another part of Jacksonian foreign policy.²⁹⁰ The political significance of this code should not be understated; Americans are willing to go to war over national honor concerns.²⁹¹ In the twenty-first century, it would be a national honor for the United States to keep its

²⁸² Mead, *Special Providence*, 233.

²⁸³ Mead, *Special Providence*, 234.

²⁸⁴ Mead, *Special Providence*, 235.

²⁸⁵ Mead, *Special Providence*, 235.

²⁸⁶ Mead, *Special Providence*, 235.

²⁸⁷ Mead, *Special Providence*, 235.

²⁸⁸ Mead, *Special Providence*, 235.

²⁸⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 235.

²⁹⁰ Mead, *Special Providence*, 250.

²⁹¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 250.

promise to safeguard Taiwan against invasion.²⁹² Without Jacksonian backing, the United States cannot undertake a large foreign war; once committed, politicians cannot safely exit the conflict except on Jacksonian terms.²⁹³ In short, Jackson's impact on American history has been and continues to be significant.²⁹⁴

c. Frameworks for Contemporary US Grand Strategy

i. Primacy

What is the primacy in international politics? According to Samuel Huntington, Primacy in international politics is "the power of one actor" to affect the conduct of others regardless of whether it is government or not.²⁹⁵ He argued that it is natural for countries to struggle for international primacy.²⁹⁶ During the Cold War, military power was the foremost field in the US, and the Soviet Union competed. However, under the security environment in which the military threat of the Soviet Union disappeared, Huntington predicted that the "principal conflicts of interest involving the United States and the major powers are likely to be economic issues."²⁹⁷ Japan was chosen as the country that would challenge the U.S. economic primacy.²⁹⁸

In reality, Japan sought to maximize its economic power by the strategy of producer dominance, industry targeting, expansion of market shares, import restriction, and sustained trade surplus.²⁹⁹ In response to this economic threat from Japan, professor Huntington argued that maintaining the U.S. primacy is also desirable for the U.S. and

²⁹² Mead, *Special Providence*, 250.

²⁹³ Mead, *Special Providence*, 260.

²⁹⁴ Mead, *Special Providence*, 259-260.

²⁹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security* 17, no 4 (Spring 1993): 68.

²⁹⁶ Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," 71.

²⁹⁷ Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," 71.

²⁹⁸ Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," 71.

²⁹⁹ Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," 71-75.

the world.³⁰⁰ It is because no other country in the world can contribute as much to international order and stability as the United States.³⁰¹ Moreover, "the United States is the only major power whose national identity is defined by a set of universal political and economic values," such as "liberty, democracy, equality, private property, and markets."³⁰²

Currently, the threat of China is the object of controversy. Professor Michael Beckley argues China's threats and the U.S. primacy as follows. Historically, countries with hegemony have declined with the advent of new great powers, so the United States can disappear from history like "the Habsburg, French, and British Empires."³⁰³ However, he has a different idea. The U.S. is both a "system-maker" and a "privilege-taker," paying a disproportionate amount of system-maintenance expenses while reaping a disproportionate share of the advantages.³⁰⁴ The United States has many instruments to reward and punish as a hegemon.³⁰⁵ Also, compared to emerging countries like China, the United States is well-positioned to absorb new technologies, supporting a concentration of technical and military assets in the US.³⁰⁶ Therefore, Professor Beckley argues that the first step toward smart strategy is acknowledging that the United States' current situation is favorable: it does not confront a hegemonic challenger, and trends point to prolonged American supremacy.³⁰⁷ The primary purpose of American foreign policy should be to maintain the current situation.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁰ Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," 82.

³⁰¹ Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," 82.

³⁰² Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," 82.

³⁰³ Michael Beckley, "China's Century: Why America's Edge Will Endure," *International Security* 36 no. 3 (Winter 2011/12): 44.

³⁰⁴ Beckley, "China's Century," 48.

³⁰⁵ Beckley, "China's Century," 48.

³⁰⁶ Beckley, "China's Century," 55.

³⁰⁷ Beckley, "China's Century," 78.

³⁰⁸ Beckley, "China's Century," 78.

ii. Liberal Internationalism

According to professor Walter Russell Mead, the Wilsonian era has ended, and liberal internationalism has failed.³⁰⁹ "Although Wilsonian ideas will not disappear and there will be a continuing influence of Wilsonian thought on U.S. foreign policies, the halcyon days of the post-Cold War era, when American presidents organized their foreign policies around the principles of liberal internationalism, are unlikely to return anytime soon." In other words, he predicted the gloomy future of liberal internationalism.

However, Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry argue that liberal internationalism will be strengthened. They acknowledge that "the dark forces of world politics—illiberalism, autocracy, nationalism, protectionism, spheres of influence, territorial revisionism—have reasserted themselves."³¹⁰ For instance, China and Russia have bolstered their authoritarian regimes at home while defying international standards.³¹¹ So the hope that they would move toward democracy and liberal international order has faded away. However, they insisted that "it is too soon to write the obituary of liberalism as a theory of international relations, liberal democracy as a system of government, or the liberal order as the overarching framework for global politics."³¹²

Deudney and Ikenberry insist that there are several reasons that liberalism will survive. First, liberal democracies banded together to establish an international order representing their common goals following WWII.³¹³ Thus, the system is becoming increasingly challenging to overthrow due to its growing interdependence. Second,

³⁰⁹ Walter Russell Mead, "The end of the Wilsonian Era: Why Liberal Internationalism Failed," *Foreign Affairs*, January/ February 2001.

³¹⁰ Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal World: The Resilient Order," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2018, <https://www-foreignaffairs-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world>.

³¹¹ Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

³¹² Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

³¹³ Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

ever-increasing reliance and rapidly changing dynamics will only worsen.³¹⁴ In other words, climate change, cyberwarfare, weapons of mass destruction, and global capitalism have increased the need for international cooperation. Thus, even a realist must be an internationalist in this "age of global interdependence."³¹⁵ Third, the international order is also likely to survive since its members do not have to be liberal democracies.³¹⁶ Rather, they are Westphalian in that they are only intended to handle the issues of sovereign nations, whether democratic or authoritarian.³¹⁷ During the Cold War, the Soviet Union collaborated to reduce weaponry and avoid contagious illnesses. Fourth, most institutions in the liberal order do not require their sponsors to be liberal democracies; instead, they must be status quo forces that can keep their promises.³¹⁸ The United Nations is an excellent example. Fifth, the revival of ideological conflict is another reason to assume that the liberal system will survive.³¹⁹ Sixth, the Trump administration's trade and alliance policies have sparked widespread concern and apprehension, but their actual impact is far less threatening.³²⁰

Above all, the case for optimism about liberalism rests on a simple truth: the solutions to today's problems are a more liberal order.³²¹ Liberalism is unique among the major theories of international relations in its protean vision of interdependence and cooperation—features of the modern world that will only become more important as the century unfolds.³²²

iii. Restraint

According to Barry Posen, American leaders' long-standing agreement on grand

³¹⁴ Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

³¹⁵ Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

³¹⁶ Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

³¹⁷ Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

³¹⁸ Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

³¹⁹ Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

³²⁰ Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

³²¹ Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

³²² Deudney and Ikenberry, "Liberal World."

strategy has stayed impressively intact despite a decade of expensive and inconclusive combat and growing economic burden.³²³ "As the presidential campaign made clear, Republicans and Democrats may quibble over foreign policy at the margins, but they agree on the big picture: that the United States should dominate the world militarily, economically, and politically, as it has since the final years of the Cold War, a strategy of liberal hegemony."³²⁴ Thus, he argues that "shifting to a more restrained global stance" is necessary for the United States to save lives and resources and prevent pushback.³²⁵

Up to date, the activity of the United States has resulted in a long list of ambitious foreign policy initiatives. Washington has intervened militarily in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Libya, aiming to safeguard human rights, repress undesired nationalist movements, and create democratic governments, among other things.³²⁶ Posen insists it is time for the United States to forsake its hegemonic policy in favor of one of restraint.³²⁷ Because the alliances of the United States have offered such a high degree of insurance to its European and Asian partners that they have outsourced their defense to Washington, the United States should replace its unnecessary, ineffective, and expensive hegemonic quest with a more restrained grand strategy.³²⁸

A restraint-based grand strategy would concentrate US foreign policy on those three main goals.³²⁹ First, the US would restructure its alliances such that other countries share genuine defense responsibilities.³³⁰ In particular, Posen argues that "the United

³²³ Barry R. Posen, "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2013.

³²⁴ Posen, "Pull Back."

³²⁵ Posen, "Pull Back."

³²⁶ Posen, "Pull Back."

³²⁷ Posen, "Pull Back."

³²⁸ Posen, "Pull Back."

³²⁹ Posen, "Pull Back."

³³⁰ Posen, "Pull Back."

States should withdraw from the military command structure" in NATO and renegotiate the security treaty with Japan, and "reassess the US commitments in the Persian Gulf."³³¹ Second, under a restricted grand strategy, the United States military forces might be drastically reduced to save money and convey to allies that it is time they did more for themselves.³³² Third, the total number and quality of US military forces should be defined by the critical contingency that they must address: "the defense of key resources and allies against direct attack."³³³

Professor Posen claims that the US could not do any of these things and instead chose to continue on its current path, squandering resources and incurring the animosity of particular governments and peoples while infantilizing others.³³⁴ However, if the United States' debt continues to rise and influence continues to migrate to other nations, a future economic or political catastrophe might force Washington to quickly change its course, forcing both friendly and unfriendly countries to adjust. He argues that it appears to be the riskier option.³³⁵

d. Strategic Direction of the Biden Administration

i. National Security Strategy

In March 2021, the Biden administration issued the 'Interim National Security Strategic Guidance' to the public. This document helps understand the Biden administration's national security strategy. The document evaluates the global security landscape as follows. First, a lot of the serious threats that we face have no borders or walls, and they must be tackled with concerted effort.³³⁶ Second, democracies

³³¹ Posen, "Pull Back."

³³² Posen, "Pull Back."

³³³ Posen, "Pull Back."

³³⁴ Posen, "Pull Back."

³³⁵ Posen, "Pull Back."

³³⁶ Joseph R. Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (Washington DC: The White House, 2021), 7, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>.

worldwide, including the U.S., are under growing threat.³³⁷ Third, the global distribution of power is shifting, posing new risks.³³⁸ Fourth, the relationships, institutions, and norms that support the international order that the US helped construct are being tested.³³⁹ Fifth, a technological revolution is that both threatens and promises.³⁴⁰ In short, the Biden administration recognizes that the United States is facing a new security environment.

In the face of new challenges in this security environment, the Biden administration has once again clarified the national interests of the United States. First and foremost, the most important duty is to ensure the safety of the American people.³⁴¹ Second, while the U.S. has a long-term interest in increasing economic prosperity and opportunity, the U.S. must reframe America's economic objectives in terms of working people's livelihoods rather than corporate profits or aggregate national wealth.³⁴² Third, the U.S. must continue working toward achieving and preserving the democratic principles at the heart of the American way of life.³⁴³

In order to protect the national interest of the United States, the following tasks are set in terms of national security: “defend and nurture the underlying sources of American strength, including our people, our economy, our national defense, and our democracy at home; promote a favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting access to the global commons, or dominating key regions; and lead and sustain a stable and open international system, underwritten by strong democratic alliances, partnerships,

³³⁷ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 7.

³³⁸ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 7-8.

³³⁹ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 8.

³⁴⁰ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 8.

³⁴¹ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 9.

³⁴² Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 9.

³⁴³ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, 9.

multilateral institutions, and rules.”³⁴⁴

The Biden Administration understands that the United States can do none of this work alone. For that reason, the document highlights that the United States will “reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world.”³⁴⁵ In addition to reaffirming our alliances and relationships, the document notes that the U.S. will recommit to international collaboration to pursue a better, safer, more resilient, and prosperous world.³⁴⁶ Thus, the United States plans to reclaim its leadership role in international organizations, collaborating with the international community to address the climate issue and other shared concerns.³⁴⁷ At the same time, the document says that the United States will prioritize diplomacy as the primary tool.³⁴⁸

On the other hand, the document highlights that “US trade and international economic policies must serve all Americans, not just the privileged few.”³⁴⁹ The American middle class must increase, more and better jobs must be created, wages must be raised, and communities must be strengthened due to trade policy.³⁵⁰ Furthermore, the document underscores that protecting democracy does not stop in the US because “Authoritarianism is on the global march.”³⁵¹ Thus, it is required to cooperate with “like-minded allies and partners to revitalize democracy the world over.”³⁵² After all, what the Biden administration highlights is that the new security environment threatens the United States. However, cooperation with allies and security partners can give the United States an edge over the competition with China and ultimately protect

³⁴⁴ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. 9.

³⁴⁵ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. 10.

³⁴⁶ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. 11.

³⁴⁷ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. 11.

³⁴⁸ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. 14.

³⁴⁹ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. 15.

³⁵⁰ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. 15.

³⁵¹ Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. 19.

³⁵² Biden, Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*. 19.

the U.S. national interest. Therefore, the Biden Administration will further emphasize the role of allies like Korea, Japan, and Australia.

ii. Indo-Pacific Strategy

When the AUKUS was newly created on September 15, 2021, President Biden stressed the importance of the Indo-Pacific region, stating that the “future of each of our nations – and indeed the world – depends on a free and open Indo-Pacific.”³⁵³ Considering this importance, the Biden administration issued an Indo-Pacific strategy in February 2022. It hints at how the U.S. intends to pursue strategic competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region.³⁵⁴

In the introduction of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the U.S. clearly states that “the United States is an Indo-Pacific power.”³⁵⁵ The changes in the Indo-Pacific have affected the security and prosperity of the United States. The strategic role of the United States has also been required continuously. Thus, the document says that the Biden administration is also “determined to strengthen the long position in and commitment to the Indo-Pacific.”³⁵⁶

The document explains what the United States hopes to achieve in the Indo-Pacific region. The strategic goal is the “free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient” Indo-Pacific.³⁵⁷ In the Indo-Pacific, the US will focus on five goals, each of which will be pursued in collaboration with friends and partners, as well as regional

³⁵³ “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS,” The White House, access on June 14, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/15/remarks-by-president-biden-prime-minister-morrison-of-australia-and-prime-minister-johnson-of-the-united-kingdom-announcing-the-creation-of-aukus/>.

³⁵⁴ “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” The White House, accessed on June 14, 2022, 4, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>.

³⁵⁵ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 4.

³⁵⁶ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 5.

³⁵⁷ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 7.

institutions: “advance a free and open Indo-Pacific, build connections within and beyond the region, drive Indo-Pacific prosperity, bolster Indo-Pacific security, build regional resilience to 21st-century transnational threats.”³⁵⁸

The United States is implementing the following efforts to achieve the strategic goals above. First and foremost, the Biden administration is increasing the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic investment in the Indo-Pacific region.³⁵⁹ Second, the United States suggests a new Indo-Pacific economic framework called IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework).³⁶⁰ Third, the United States plans “to defend its interests, deter military aggression against the U.S. and its allies and partners-including across the Taiwan Strait-and promote regional security by developing new capabilities, concepts of operation, military activities, defense industrial initiatives, and a more resilient force posture.”³⁶¹ As part of this effort, the United States supports Australia in building nuclear submarines. Fourth, the United States is strengthening its ties with ASEAN by making new investments.³⁶² Fifth, the US will aim to maintain a strategic alliance with India in which the two countries collaborate to enhance stability in South Asia, both individually and via regional groupings.³⁶³ Six, the Biden administration will enhance the Quad as a top regional organization and guarantee that it delivers on Indo-Pacific concerns.³⁶⁴ Seventh, almost every significant Indo-Pacific crisis necessitates strong coordination among the US allies and partners, especially Japan and the Republic of Korea.³⁶⁵ The United States will continue to work closely through trilateral channels concerning the DPRK, regional development and infrastructure, vital technology and supply-chain challenges, and women's leadership

³⁵⁸ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 8-14.

³⁵⁹ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 15.

³⁶⁰ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 15.

³⁶¹ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 15.

³⁶² The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 16.

³⁶³ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 16.

³⁶⁴ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 16.

³⁶⁵ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 17.

and empowerment.³⁶⁶ Eighth, the U.S. will collaborate with allies to form a multilateral strategic grouping that will assist Pacific Island countries in developing their ability and resilience as secure, independent players.³⁶⁷ Ninth, President Biden will strengthen the capacity of Indo-Pacific countries to make independent political decisions by assisting partners in combating corruption, mainly through foreign aid and development programs, leadership at the G7 and G20, and a reinvigorated participation in the Open Government Partnership.³⁶⁸ Last but not least, the United States will “support open, resilient, secure, and trustworthy technologies.”³⁶⁹

Thus, the U.S. will actively collaborate with allies and security partners in the Indo-Pacific region in various domains such as diplomacy, security, economics, and technology, as well as make efforts to preserve the U.S. national interest via global and regional leadership. The Indo-Pacific region is becoming increasingly vital to the United States, and the alliance between the US and South Korea is expected to strengthen over time.

iii. National Defense Strategy

At the time of writing this working report, the 2022 National Defense Strategy is not published yet. However, the U.S. Department of Defense, in March 2022, released a fact sheet regarding the contents of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Although a fact sheet is brief, it is meaningful because it shows the strategic direction of the US military strategy, possibly affecting the ROK-US military alliance.

According to the fact sheet, the 2022 National Defense Strategy states the four defense priorities: “defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed

³⁶⁶ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 17.

³⁶⁷ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 17.

³⁶⁸ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 17.

³⁶⁹ The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” 17.

by the PRC; deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners; deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe; and building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.”³⁷⁰

2022 National Defense Strategy considers four countries as the main threat to US national security. First, it considers “the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge” for the Department of Defense.³⁷¹ Second, the document describes Russia as an “acute threat.”³⁷² Third, the Department of Defense recognizes North Korea and Iran as persistent threats in the National Defense Strategy.³⁷³

The National Defense Strategy not only increases US defense capabilities but also underlines the strength of the US alliance and partnership. Simultaneously, the U.S. Department of Defense mentions that it will achieve its goals in three ways: “integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages.”³⁷⁴

The U.S. Department of Defense thinks that integrated deterrence involves “developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships.”³⁷⁵ Combat-credible troops provide integrated deterrence backed by a secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent.³⁷⁶ Next, the US Department of Defense expects that campaigning increases deterrence and allows it to “gain advantages against the full

³⁷⁰ “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed on June 15, 2022, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF>.

³⁷¹ U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy.”

³⁷² U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy.”

³⁷³ U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy.”

³⁷⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy.”

³⁷⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy.”

³⁷⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy.”

range of competitors' coercive actions.”³⁷⁷ Lastly, the National Defense Strategy underscores the necessity of reforms to build “enduring advantages for the future Joint Force to accelerate force development and get the technology more quickly.”³⁷⁸

To sum up, the 2020 National Defense Strategy emphasizes competition with China despite the crisis in Ukraine. It predicts that the security cooperation with allies and security partners will be strengthened. In the same vein, the ROK-US alliance in security areas is expected to be bolstered further.

iv. Implications to Korea's Security

As previously stated, the United States views gaining an advantage in rivalry with China as the most important goal of the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, the Indo-Pacific Strategy, and the 2020 National Defense Strategy. The United States believes that if it fails to win the competition with China, it will have many difficulties in maintaining the liberal international order established after World War II. Competition with China is not confined to just strengthening the US military; it also acknowledges the need for cooperation with allies and security partners.

The United States, in particular, is paying attention to South Korea since it is a vital ally and strategic partner of the United States in many areas, as well as having high-quality industrial technology and significant economic strength. The US Secretary of States and Defense visited Korea in March 2021 to hold a Korea-US Foreign-Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) following the inauguration of the Biden administration. It was a strategic move of the United States to deepen bilateral relations with South Korea.

³⁷⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy.”

³⁷⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy.”

In this meeting, both states “acknowledged that the ROK-U.S. Alliance has developed into a comprehensive global partnership grounded in mutual respect and trust, close friendship, strong people-to-people ties, and shared values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”³⁷⁹ Regarding the defense cost-sharing, which had many conflicts between Korea and the U.S., Korea and the U.S. acknowledged that “a new multi-year Special Measures Agreement is a symbol of the shared commitment to the ROK-U.S. Alliance, supports the stable presence of U.S. forces stationed in Korea, and enhances our combined defense posture.”³⁸⁰ More than anything else, both states confirmed that “they oppose all activities that undermine and destabilize the rules-based international order. South Korea and the United States emphasized that they remain united in their shared commitment to maintaining peace and stability, unimpeded lawful commerce, and respect for international law.”

Furthermore, former President Moon Jae-in visited the United States in May 2021 and met with President Biden. It happened after the meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister. The expert evaluates that the Biden administration has indicated its “intent to restore U.S. alliances, which are central to his efforts to counter Chinese influence.”³⁸¹ The United States will likely want to strengthen and expand a coalition of like-minded Asian and European countries to support a rules-based regional order.³⁸² It will assist the Biden administration in addressing its top strategic goal of restoring the credibility of democratic governance models by competing with China in developing advanced technologies, providing public goods, and adhering to a rules-based rather than a power-driven approach to international disputes.³⁸³ During the

³⁷⁹ “Joint Statement of the 2021 Republic of Korea-United States Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”), U.S. Department of State, accessed on June 16, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-2021-republic-of-korea-united-states-foreign-and-defense-ministerial-meeting-22/>

³⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the 2021 Republic of Korea-United States Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”).

³⁸¹ Scott A. Snyder, “The U.S.-South Korea Summit: A Relationship Restored?” *Council on Foreign Relations*, May 25, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/us-south-korea-summit-relationship-restored>.

³⁸² Scott A. Snyder, “The U.S.-South Korea Summit: A Relationship Restored?”

³⁸³ Scott A. Snyder, “The U.S.-South Korea Summit: A Relationship Restored?”

summit meeting, the Biden administration agreed to abolish the South Korea Ballistic Missile Range Guidelines.

Furthermore, as soon as President Yoon Suk-yeol was inaugurated in Korea, President Biden visited South Korea to hold a summit meeting. Since this summit meeting took place after Russia invaded Ukraine, people have paid attention to the agenda of the summit meeting. President Biden's visit focused on strategic economic and technical cooperation, as well as North Korean nuclear and missile issues and strategic alliance enhancement. The White House stated that “two Presidents pledge to deepen and broaden cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, and cyber security.”³⁸⁴ Both countries also agreed to expand their cooperation in energy security, global supply chain resilience, space, emerging technologies, defense technology, and nuclear energy.³⁸⁵ In particular, President Biden visited Samsung Electronics in person and showed much interest in increasing investments and enhancing industrial cooperation between the two countries.

³⁸⁴ “United States-Republic of Korea Leader’ Joint Statement,” The White House, accessed on June 16, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/>.

³⁸⁵ “United States-Republic of Korea Leader’ Joint Statement.”

IV. Korea-US Security Cooperation

a. Overview of Korea-US Relations

As discussed earlier, the Biden administration is trying to strengthen the alliance and partnership, facing the great power competition with China. Many US government documents related to US national security underline the importance of this strategy. South Korea is one of the strong US allies in the Indo-Pacific region. In this sense, looking into the history of the ROK-US alliance and its current status is worthwhile. The watershed moment of Korea-US relations was the Korean War. Since the United States intervened on the Korean Peninsula in 1950, fighting with the South Korean soldiers and the UN forces to prevent a North Korean takeover of South Korea.³⁸⁶ During the three-year war, nearly 36,000 US servicemen were killed, and over 100,000 were wounded in battle.³⁸⁷ A little over two months after the parties to the conflict signed an armistice agreement, the United States and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953, stating that if a third nation attacks one side, the other will act to meet the mutual risk.³⁸⁸

Afterward, the two countries gradually expanded their security alliance to various areas, such as economy, politics, science, and education. Currently, a great number of Koreans support the alliance with the U.S. and express favorable opinions of the United States.³⁸⁹ According to various polls performed in recent years, more than 85 percent of South Koreans appreciate the ROK-US alliance, and more than 70 percent have favorable views of the US.³⁹⁰ As for this phenomenon, William Stueck and Boram Yi argue that the South Koreans, having experienced the consequences of the

³⁸⁶ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2022), 14, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41481>.

³⁸⁷ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 14.

³⁸⁸ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 14.

³⁸⁹ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2022), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41481>.

³⁹⁰ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*. 14.

US withdrawal in 1949, respected the American commitment to assist them from 1950 to 1953, and they realized that a continued US presence was crucial for their future existence both for security and economic recovery.³⁹¹

However, it is also true that bilateral relations experienced turbulence. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report mentions that “the relationship became more strained” during the Donald Trump administration.³⁹² Although the two administrations worked on a variety of subjects and their officially stated views toward North Korea coincided, “subtle and not-so-subtle differences in approach to North Korea, China, and trade made collaboration more difficult.”³⁹³ Nevertheless, the two countries attempted to create a more solid ROK-US alliance. Currently, a new administration has been launched in Korea and the United States, and the two countries are continuously trying to strengthen an amicable and robust alliance, with President Biden visiting Korea in May 2022.

According to the Congress Research Service report, there are five factors that affect the current bilateral relationship between Korea and the United States. Those factors are as below:

- “the challenges posed by North Korea, particularly its weapons of mass destruction programs, cyberattacks, as well as occasionally different perceptions about the level and nature of the threats posed by the Kim Jong-un regime, through its actions and/or the risk of its collapse;
- the PRC’s rising influence and assertiveness, which has made China an increasingly integral consideration in many aspects of U.S.-South Korea strategic and economic policymaking;

³⁹¹ William Stueck and Boram Yi, “An Alliance Forged in Blood” The American Occupation of Korea, the Korean War, and the US-South Korean Alliance,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 33, no. 2 (2010): 205.

³⁹² Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 15.

³⁹³ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 15.

- South Korea's status as one of the world's leading economies and its firms' integral role in the supply chain of several key industries, which have made the South Korean government and South Korean conglomerates key players in discussions over issues such as the shape of the region's economic institutions, supply chain resiliency, and digital trade;
- South Korea's continued democratization since military rule ended in 1988, which has increased the influence public opinion often has on Seoul's foreign policy; and
- the growing desire of South Korean leaders to use the country's middle-power status to achieve greater autonomy, including within the U.S.-ROK alliance, and to play a larger regional global role."³⁹⁴

b. Korea-US Security Alliance

As mentioned, the ROK-US alliance was formed in 1953 by signing the Mutual Defense Treaty. Based on Article IV of the treaty, US military forces have maintained a continuous presence on the Korean Peninsula and are committed to assisting South Korea in defending itself, notably against North Korean aggression. South Korea is covered by the United States "nuclear umbrella," sometimes known as "extended deterrence."³⁹⁵ The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), which once numbered more than 300,000 during the Korean War, currently has 28,500 troops. Most U.S. Forces in Korea consist of the Army and the Air Force, with 19,200 troops and 8,800 airmen. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps have just 250 troops each.³⁹⁶

South Korea and the U.S. hold a Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) every year by the defense ministers to discuss security issues and to develop the Korea-U.S. defense


³⁹⁴ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 13.

³⁹⁵ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 19.

³⁹⁶ Andrew McCormick, "Fears arise that suspension of US-south Korea military exercises may have dangerous repercussions," *South China Morning Post*, August 23, 2018, <https://ph.news.yahoo.com/fears-arise-suspension-us-south-155700945.html>.

cooperation. In particular, the defense ministers of South Korea and the U.S. issue a joint communique at the end of the SCM, reaffirming the willingness of the U.S. to implement the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. For instance, at the SCM in December 2021, the U.S. Secretary of Defense underlined “the firm U.S. commitment to providing extended deterrence to the ROK utilizing the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities. Both leaders committed to strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence posture by leveraging all available capabilities, including cyber and space capabilities.”³⁹⁷


Figure 2. U.S. Troop Levels in South Korea, 1955-2018



Source: Data adapted from Larry Nicksch[i], “Special Report: Potential Sources of Opposition to a U.S. Troop Withdrawal from South Korea,” *The National Committee on North Korea*, <https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/special-report-us-troop-withdrawal>.

³⁹⁷ “53rd Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique,” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed on July 6, 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2858814/53rd-security-consultative-meeting-joint-communique/#:~:text=The%2053rd%20Republic%20of%20Korea,defense%20and%20foreign%20affairs%20of> officials.

Figure 3. Major US Bases in South Korea



Source: Adapted from Andrew McCormick, “Fears arise that suspension of US-south Korea military exercises may have dangerous repercussions,” *South China Morning Post*, August 23, 2018, <https://ph.news.yahoo.com/fears-arise-suspension-us-south-155700945.html>.

c. Major Security Issues between Korea and the US

While the Korea-U.S. alliance lasted about 69 years, South Korea and the United States have discussed and resolved a wide variety of defense issues. The report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) categorizes major issues in the ROK-US military alliance as follows.

First and foremost, the document discusses the strategic flexibility of the U.S. Forces Korea, expanding its mission from defending against North Korea’s attack to dealing

with a crisis in the Indo-Pacific region amid the deepening U.S.-China tension.³⁹⁸ On this point, the new USFK Commander, Paul LaCamera, supported the idea of “utilizing USFK capabilities in a range of Indo-Pacific contingencies” in the US Congress.³⁹⁹ However, experts are skeptical about this change. It is because the South Korean military is currently focusing on responding to threats from North Korea. Scholars in Korea are also debating this issue, and it remains to be seen how the U.S. Forces Korea will be affected in the midst of the deepening U.S.-China conflict.

Second, the report points out the suspension of South Korea-U.S. military exercises.⁴⁰⁰ The South Korean and U.S. military authorities have conducted large-scale joint military exercises to secure combined operational capabilities. However, at the 2018 North Korea-U.S. summit, President Donald Trump requested the cancellation of the South Korea-U.S. military training, and afterward, only a small-scale training was conducted.⁴⁰¹ In addition, the coronavirus also affected the suspension of large-scale South Korea-U.S. military drills.⁴⁰² However, the coronavirus has recently subsided, and a new administration has been established in the U.S. and South Korea. Thus, combined military exercises between Korea and the U.S. is expected to be conducted on a large scale.

Third, the report explains Korea's nuclear armament issue.⁴⁰³ During the Cold War, the United States deployed tactical nuclear missiles in South Korea. However, in 1991, the United States withdrew all of them from South Korea. However, as North Korea develops nuclear missiles, discussions on nuclear armament are becoming more active in South Korea. In South Korea's presidential election last year, the need to share U.S. nuclear missiles or develop South Korea's own nuclear weapons was discussed. “In a

³⁹⁸ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 21.

³⁹⁹ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 21.

⁴⁰⁰ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 22.

⁴⁰¹ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 22.

⁴⁰² Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 22.

⁴⁰³ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 23.

2021 Asan Institute poll, 69.3% of respondents indicated they favor “the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea,” the highest level of support since the Asan Institute began asking this question in 2010.”⁴⁰⁴ Over 61 percent of respondents supported reinstating tactical nuclear weapons by the United States, while over 96 percent supported maintaining the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea.⁴⁰⁵ The pros and cons of the nuclear armament of South Korea are expected to be discussed continuously in the future.

Fourth, regarding Korea's independent development of anti-aircraft and missile defenses, the report says that the United States has long encouraged South Korea to incorporate its missile defense system into the region's more extensive BMD infrastructure, claiming that doing so would improve regional and South Korean BMD capabilities as a whole.⁴⁰⁶ However, South Korea has not accepted the suggestions of the United States because of “its desire to preserve strategic autonomy, skepticism of deepening cooperation with its historical rival Japan, wariness of angering China, and desire to boost its domestic defense industry.”⁴⁰⁷ In particular, the diplomatic friction in 2016 that Korea experienced with China while deploying a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system proves this concern.

Fifth, the relocation of US Forces Korea (USFK) is in progress. South Korea and the U.S. are pushing for the relocation of U.S. bases to change the role of U.S. forces in Korea and resolve problems arising from the U.S. presence in Yongsan.⁴⁰⁸ A number of U.S. bases are being transferred to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, and Camp Humphreys is known as the largest U.S. overseas military base in the world.⁴⁰⁹ “In congressional testimony in April 2016, a U.S. official stated that South Korea is

⁴⁰⁴ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 23.

⁴⁰⁵ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 23.

⁴⁰⁶ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 23-24.


⁴⁰⁷ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 24.

⁴⁰⁸ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 24.

⁴⁰⁹ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 24.

funding 91% of the total \$10.7 billion cost of USFK relocations.”⁴¹⁰ Although the USFK headquarters moved to Pyeongtaek, the Combined Forces Command (CFC) remains in Yongsan.⁴¹¹ Until July 2021, “USFK has returned 68 of the 80 bases designated for returns to South Korea.”⁴¹² However, the relocation of the U.S. military base may be delayed a lot due to the cost of “environmental contamination cleanup.”⁴¹³ Korea and the US should put forth a multilateral effort to solve this problem.

Figure 4. USFK Bases After Realignment Plan is Implemented



Source: Adapted from Marck E. Manyin et al., *US-South Korea Relations* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2022), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41481>.

Sixth, the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the South Korean military is one of the critical issues between Korea and the U.S. If a crisis

⁴¹⁰ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 24.

⁴¹¹ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 25.

⁴¹² Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 25.

⁴¹³ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 25.

occurs on the Korean Peninsula, the war will be carried out under the U.S. four-star general as Combined Forces Commander. However, if the wartime operational control is transferred, the South Korean commander will serve as Combined Forces Commander during the war.

In 2007, Korea and the US agreed to transfer wartime operational control to the South Korean military. However, it is still not implemented and has been postponed twice. After many provocations by North Korea in 2010 and worries over whether South Korean forces were sufficiently equipped to take over, the OPCON transfer was delayed until 2015.⁴¹⁴ Also, in a joint statement released in October 2014, the United States and South Korea stated that they would adopt a "conditions-based approach" to the transfer of OPCON and decide the best time depending on South Korean military capabilities and the security situation in the Korean Peninsula.⁴¹⁵

South Korea and the U.S. have successfully maintained peace against North Korea's military threats since the Korean War. While maintaining the military alliance between South Korea and the United States, they have worked together to reconcile differences on various military issues, as mentioned above. Nonetheless, the defense cost-sharing between the U.S. and South Korea has been a vital issue. Thus, the next section will profoundly discuss the defense cost-sharing system between the two countries.

⁴¹⁴ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 27.

⁴¹⁵ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 27.

V. Korea-US Defense Cost-sharing

a. Overview of KOR-US Defense Cost-sharing

Since 1991, South Korea has provided financial support for the U.S. military stationed in South Korea. Before that, Korea mainly supported the USFK indirectly, such as facilities and land, at no cost. The legal basis for indirect support was the Mutual Defense Treaty and SOFA, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Clauses regarding Defense Burden-Sharing in the Mutual Defense Treaty and SOFA


Treaty/Agreement		Article
Mutual Defense Treaty	ARTICLE IV	The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.
SOFA ⁴¹⁶	Article 2 - Facilities and Areas - Grant and Return	1. (a) The United States is granted, under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the use of facilities and areas in the Republic of Korea. Agreements as to specific facilities and areas shall be concluded by the two Governments through the Joint Committee provided for in Article XXVIII of this Agreement. "Facilities and areas" include existing furnishings, equipment, and fixtures, wherever located, used in the operation of such facilities and areas.
	Article 5 - Facilities and Areas - Cost and Maintenance	1. It is agreed that the United States will bear for the duration of this Agreement without cost to the Republic of Korea all expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States armed forces in the Republic of Korea, except those to be borne by the Republic of Korea as provided in paragraph 2. 2. It is agreed that the Republic of Korea will furnish for the duration of this Agreement without cost to the United States and make compensation where appropriate to the owners and suppliers thereof all facilities and areas and rights of way, including facilities and areas jointly used, such as those at airfields and ports as provided in Articles II and III. The Government of the Republic of Korea assures the use of such facilities and areas to the Government of the United States and will hold the Government of the United States as well as its agencies and employees harmless from any third party claims which may be advanced in connection with such use.

Source: Adapted from Dohee Kim, "Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing through Theoretical Approaches to the Evolution of an Asymmetric Alliance," KOREA OBSERVER 51, no.1 (Spring 2020): 37.

⁴¹⁶ The official name of SOFA is *AGREEMENT UNDER ARTICLE IV OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, REGARDING FACILITIES AND AREAS AND THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA*.

However, when the United States requested Korea to pay for the cost of the USFK, it required creating a new legal document for the direct financial contribution of Korea.⁴¹⁷ Thus, the Korea-US Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was signed separately in 1991 in order for South Korea to provide direct financial support. South Korea’s cost-sharing contribution consists of three categories: “labor (salaries for the Koreans who work on U.S. bases), logistics, and construction (by ROK firms for U.S. facilities).”⁴¹⁸ The specific method of payment of the total amount has been adjusted through negotiations between Korea and the United States. For example, the construction of U.S. military facilities has changed from cash support to in-kind support.

Figure 5. Current Defense Cost-Sharing Division System



⁴¹⁷ The official name of SMA is *AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING SPECIAL MEASURES RELATING TO ARTICLE V OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER ARTICLE IV OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING FACILITIES AND AREAS AND THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA*

⁴¹⁸ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 26.

Source: Modified from Won Gon Park, *A Challenge for the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Defense Cost-Sharing*, EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper 30, (Seoul, Korea: The East Asia Institute, 2013), 3, http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/2013091110583697.pdf.

The total amount of Korea's contribution was usually determined through multiple negotiations between Korea and the United States. In most cases, the defense cost-sharing contribution of South Korea increased when a new SMA was signed between Korea and the US, as shown in Table 4. There were two exceptions in the past due to South Korea's foreign exchange crisis in 1998 and the decrease in the number of U.S. troops stationed in Korea in 2005.

Table 4. Trends by Year of South Korea’s Defense Cost-Sharing 1st -11th

SMA	Year	Amount (billion, KRW)	Growth Rate (%)	Defense Cost-Sharing - Defense Budget Ratio (%)
1 st	1991	107.3		1.44
	1992	103.5		1.55
	1993	169.4		1.84
2 nd	1994	208.8	18.2	2.06
	1995	240.0		2.17
3 rd	1996	247.5	10.0	2.02
	1997	290.4		2.11
	1998*	408.2		2.96
4 th	1999	441.1	8.0	3.21
	2000	468.4		3.24
	2001	488.2		3.17
5 th	2002	613.2	25.7	3.75
	2003	668.6		3.82
	2004	746.9		3.94
6 th	2005	680.4	-8.9	3.22
	2006	680.4		3.02
7 th	2007	725.5	6.6	2.96
	2008	741.5		2.78
8 th	2009	760.0	2.5	2.62
	2010	790.4		2.67
	2011	812.5		2.59
	2012	836.1		2.53
	2013	869.5		2.53
9 th	2014	920.0	5.8	2.58
	2015	932.0		2.48
	2016	944.1		2.43
	2017	950.7		2.36
	2018	960.2		2.22
10 th	2019	1,038.9	8.2	2.22
11 th	2020	1,038.9		
	2021	1,183.3	13.9	
	2022	1,247.2	5.4	
	2023	1,289.6	3.4	
	2024	-		
	2025	-		

*In 1998, Korea’s share was initially set to be paid at US\$ 399 million but was reduced to 314 million due to the financial crisis in Korea. It then paid US\$ 135 million, and the remaining 245.6 billion won in KRW.

** Defense cost-sharing contributions in 2024 and 2025 will be applied to the increased rate of the defense budget in each previous year.

Source: Adapted and modified from Dohee Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing through Theoretical Approaches to the Evolution of an Asymmetric Alliance,” KOREA OBSERVER 51, no.1 (Spring 2020): 46.

According to the CRS report, “In the past, South Korea generally paid 40-50 % (over \$800 million annually) of the total non-personnel costs of maintaining the U.S. troops

in South Korea.”⁴¹⁹ Sometimes, South Korea and the US were not satisfied with the total amount of South Korea’s defense cost-sharing. It often caused conflicts when South Korea and the U.S. negotiated the growth rate of Korea’s defense cost-sharing contribution. South Korean people and Korea’s National Assembly always paid attention to the result of the Korea-US defense cost-sharing negotiations because the Korean taxpayer paid it. It frequently became the critical agenda in alliance diplomacy.

In particular, the conflict intensified during the Trump administration. According to CNN, President Donald Trump demanded that South Korea raise its payment by almost 400 percent.⁴²⁰ As a result, the negotiations on the 10th SMA did not go smoothly. Instead of a multiple-year agreement, a one-year stop-gap agreement was signed in February 2019, which was an eight percent increase from the previous year’s financial support.⁴²¹ However, the agreement expired in December 2019, forcing 4,500 Korean workers on American bases to take a leave of absence.⁴²² The Korea-US defense cost-sharing negotiation was not finished during the Trump administration.

When President Biden took office, South Korea and the U.S. agreed on a new six-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) in March 2021, ending lengthy negotiations between the two countries. According to the new deal, South Korea will pay over \$1 billion yearly, an increase of roughly 13.9% from earlier SMAs.⁴²³ In addition, it was agreed to set the total amount of the SMA based on the previous year's increase rate of the defense budget in Korea. Korea and the U.S. will negotiate a new SMA in 2025 when the 11th SMA ends.

⁴¹⁹ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 26.

⁴²⁰ Nicole Gaouette, “Trump Hikes price tag for US forces in Korea almost 400% as Seoul questions alliance,” *CNN*, November 15, 2019.

⁴²¹ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 25.

⁴²² Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 25.

⁴²³ Marck E. Manyin et al, *US-South Korea Relations*, 25.

b. The Outcome of the 11th Korea-US Special Measures Agreement (SMA)

The 11th SMA went through protracted negotiations between the U.S. and Korea. So it will likely be a starting point for the 12th SMA negotiations. So it is necessary to look at the contents of the 11th SMA negotiations and understand how they negotiated.

According to the press release of Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both countries agreed on the following. First and foremost, the 11th agreement is a multi-year agreement valid for six years, from 2020 to 2025.⁴²⁴ The current six-year defense cost-sharing deal will relieve the two sides of the strain of regular negotiations over the next two to three years while also contributing to the SMA's stability and public faith in the system.⁴²⁵ The period of the previous SMAs was various: "one year (10th), two years (2nd, 6th, 7th), three years (1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th), and five years (8th and 9th)."⁴²⁶

In addition, the Korean government announced that the total amount in 2021 was KRW 1.1833 trillion, an increase of 13.9 percent compared to 2020. The 13.9 percent was calculated from the 7.4 percent increase in defense spending in 2020 and the 6.5 percent increase in labor costs for Korean workers in the U.S. Forces Korea due to the expansion of the minimum allocation rate for defense cost-sharing.⁴²⁷ The increase rate of 13.9% is exceptional because of the temporary change in labor costs.⁴²⁸ However, there is a negative view of using the growth rate of the defense budget because it does not correctly reflect the requirement for the contribution.⁴²⁹ South Korea and the US used it to determine the total contributions in the 10th SMA, and it

⁴²⁴ "제11차 한미 방위비분담특별협정[SMA]협상 최종 타결," 외교부, accessed on July 30, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=370989.

⁴²⁵ "Analysis of the 11th ROK-U.S. Special Measures Agreement (SMA)," Jae Ok Paek.

⁴²⁶ "Analysis of the 11th ROK-U.S. Special Measures Agreement (SMA) and Development Direction for the SMA," Jae Ok Paek, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, access on July 30, 2022, <https://www.kida.re.kr/cmm/viewBoardImageFile.do?idx=32603>.

⁴²⁷ "제11차 한미 방위비분담특별협정[SMA]협상 최종 타결," 외교부.

⁴²⁸ "제11차 한미 방위비분담특별협정[SMA]협상 최종 타결," 외교부.

⁴²⁹ "Analysis of the 11th ROK-U.S. Special Measures Agreement (SMA)," Jae Ok Paek.

was re-used in the 11th SMA. It is not easy to decide the right index for the SMA.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea also said that South Korea and the US agreed to raise the labor cost allocation ratio from 75% to 87% from 2021, 85% of which was changed from the previous "endeavor" rule to the "shall" rule.⁴³⁰ In addition, Korea and the U.S. agreed for the first time that labor costs could be paid at the previous year's level in case of the absence of the agreement. The possibility of the recurrence of furlough for Korean workers on the U.S. bases was prevented.⁴³¹ This improvement in the SMA will contribute to the employment stability of USFK Korean workers.⁴³² Nevertheless, there is also a view that raising the lower limit of the labor-cost allocation ratio could cause problems in the personnel management of Korean employees and manpower efficiency.⁴³³

Although the 11th SMA was signed after lengthy negotiations, some point out that the terms in the SMA should be further improved in the future. For example, there is a view that the total contribution of South Korea should be determined according to the requirements of individual categories to determine a reasonable defense cost share, not the current lump-sum method.⁴³⁴ Next, it is also pointed out that both countries should share detailed implementation to improve transparency.⁴³⁵ In addition, it is very important to appreciate South Korea's indirect financial support aside from SMA.⁴³⁶ For instance, the SMA does not include the U.S. base relocation, manpower support (KATUSA), real estate, and public utility charges & fees exemption and reduction.

⁴³⁰ “제11차 한미 방위비분담특별협정[SMA]협상 최종 타결,” 외교부, accessed on July 30, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=370989.

⁴³¹ “제11차 한미 방위비분담특별협정[SMA]협상 최종 타결,” 외교부, accessed on July 30, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=370989.

⁴³² “Analysis of the 11th ROK-U.S. Special Measures Agreement (SMA),” Jae Ok Paek.

⁴³³ “Analysis of the 11th ROK-U.S. Special Measures Agreement (SMA),” Jae Ok Paek.

⁴³⁴ “Analysis of the 11th ROK-U.S. Special Measures Agreement (SMA),” Jae Ok Paek.

⁴³⁵ “Analysis of the 11th ROK-U.S. Special Measures Agreement (SMA),” Jae Ok Paek.

⁴³⁶ “Analysis of the 11th ROK-U.S. Special Measures Agreement (SMA),” Jae Ok Paek.

c. Theoretical Approach

In 1953, when Korea and the U.S. formed a military alliance, direct financial support for the USFK was not included. Then, how did South Korea provide financial support to U.S. Forces Korea? What made the U.S. request cost-sharing contributions to South Korea?

There are some theories that deal with defense cost-sharing. Interestingly, they try to explain their theories based on asymmetric partnerships. First and foremost, the Autonomy-Security Tradeoff model is the most well-known theory.⁴³⁷ According to this theory, a powerful country frequently gains foreign policy concessions, such as military base deployments, while protecting a weak state.⁴³⁸ Usually, the bulk of security assets is provided to a weak state in the name of extended deterrence, forming a patron-client relationship.⁴³⁹ In this relationship, a powerful country could exert additional influence on the weak state even though it is not agreed upon or expected when signing the agreement.⁴⁴⁰ It is called residual control, and a specific example would be the Special Measures Agreement (SMA).⁴⁴¹ Although coercive, a powerful country can prevent the weak state's free ride by using residual control.⁴⁴² In short, the Autonomy-Security Tradeoff model explains how defense cost-sharing derives from the relationship between the powerful country that provides security and the weak that receives it.

Second, Development Power Theory explains the alliance change caused by weak states' economic growth.⁴⁴³ Specifically, it suggests that the economic development of

⁴³⁷ Dohee Kim, "Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing through Theoretical Approaches to the Evolution of an Asymmetric Alliance," *KOREA OBSERVER* 51, no.1 (Spring 2020): 30.

⁴³⁸ Kim, "Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing," 30.

⁴³⁹ Kim, "Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing," 30.

⁴⁴⁰ Kim, "Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing," 30.

⁴⁴¹ Kim, "Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing," 30.

⁴⁴² Kim, "Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing," 30.

⁴⁴³ Kim, "Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing," 31.

weak states causes “democratization and the replacement of elites” and leads to a shift in foreign policy.⁴⁴⁴ In addition, economic development enhances the national “resources and means to pursue national interests,” providing confidence and pride to pursue “stronger independent military power and more assertive role in the international community.”⁴⁴⁵ Dohee Kim argues that “these changes are likely to trigger conflicts within the alliance over defense cost-sharing.” For example, conflicts arise in the process of the weak countries trying to restore autonomy that they had previously conceded to the powerful countries and the powerful countries refusing to provide security or demanding greater cost-sharing.⁴⁴⁶ In short, Development Power Theory helps us to understand how the conflict occurs between the powerful country and the weaker state concerning defense cost-sharing.

Third, there are some theories of defense cost-sharing.⁴⁴⁷ These theories discuss the free rides on security-related costs and try to define whether the joint security provided by the alliance is public or private goods.⁴⁴⁸ There is also an argument that the higher the security threat, the higher the security cost burden of allies. In addition, some argue that if a powerful nation weakens, it demands an increase in cost-sharing with its allies to maintain its status.⁴⁴⁹ In short, these theories consider the prevention of free rides, the increase of external threats, and the change in the status of powerful countries as the main factors that increase the cost burden of allies.

As described, there are many theoretical approaches related to defense cost-sharing. Based on those theories, Dohee Kim argues in her journal article that the demand of the U.S. for bigger host-nation support is not “just part of the negotiating process for a

⁴⁴⁴ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 31.

⁴⁴⁵ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 31.

⁴⁴⁶ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 31.


⁴⁴⁷ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 32.

⁴⁴⁸ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 32.

⁴⁴⁹ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 32-33.

cost-sharing arrangement.”⁴⁵⁰ She insists it should be considered “the symptom of changing dynamics within an asymmetric alliance, caused by the growth of a weaker country and the decline in the hegemony of a powerful nation.”⁴⁵¹ Thus, she focuses on the relationship between Korea and the U.S., changing from a patron-client relationship to a partner relationship.⁴⁵² This theoretical approach helps us gain valuable insight concerning the structural issue of defense cost-sharing within an asymmetric alliance between Korea and the U.S.

Figure 6. Changes in the Asymmetric Alliance and Defense Burden-Sharing



Source: Adapted from Dohee Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing through Theoretical Approaches to the Evolution of an Asymmetric Alliance,” *KOREA OBSERVER* 51, no.1 (Spring 2020): 35.

⁴⁵⁰ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 28.

⁴⁵¹ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 28.

⁴⁵² Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 28-29.

As shown in Figure 6, the dependence on the alliance decreases as weaker countries' economies grow in a patron-client relationship.⁴⁵³ However, economic growth in the weaker countries does not mean the end of the alliance.⁴⁵⁴ The alliance is maintained based on the strategic interests of the allies. Although the economic growth of the weaker countries reduces their dependence on the alliance, the defense cost-sharing contribution increases further. As the economy of the weaker state grows, it becomes an equal partner with the powerful country. However, Dohee Kim underscores that economic growth in the weaker countries can reduce their dependence on the alliance but cannot completely exclude it.⁴⁵⁵ It is because strategic interests and external threats could further strengthen the dependence of the alliance.⁴⁵⁶ For instance, the Korea-U.S. relationship has passed the patron-client relationship phase and is in the partner relationship phase.⁴⁵⁷ Facing North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, South Korea desperately needs an alliance with the U.S., making the defense cost-sharing critical.⁴⁵⁸ She predicts that the U.S. demand for an increase in “greater Korean contribution” will continue unless there is a future change in the Korea-U.S. alliance.⁴⁵⁹ Furthermore, it can be ruled out a possibility that the U.S. will ask to create the new cost category of “operation support” in future SMA negotiations because of the dynamic of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region.⁴⁶⁰

d. Cost of U.S. Military Presence in Korea

If the U.S. asks South Korea to pay a “fair share” of the defense costs, how much is the U.S. spending on the U.S. Forces in Korea? In 2021, the United States Government Accountability Office reported the benefits and costs of the U.S. military

⁴⁵³ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 33.

⁴⁵⁴ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 33.

⁴⁵⁵ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 34-35.

⁴⁵⁶ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 43.

⁴⁵⁷ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 43.

⁴⁵⁸ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 50.

⁴⁵⁹ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 50.

⁴⁶⁰ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 49.

presence in Korea to the U.S. Congress. This report gives an idea of how much the U.S. Department of Defense spends on U.S. military presence in South Korea. More than anything else, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the cost items used by the U.S. Department of Defense to support overseas U.S. military bases. The U.S. Department of Defense uses five different appropriation accounts, as explained in Table 5.

Table 5. Appropriation Accounts Used to Support U.S. Permanent Military Presence in Host Countries

Appropriation account	Description
Military personnel	Pay, allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, interest on deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station travel, and expenses of temporary duty travel between permanent duty stations for active duty military personnel
Operation and maintenance	Includes expenses associated with the current operations of the force and maintenance of equipment and vehicles, as well as civilian salaries; also, certain minor military construction, facilities repair, and purchases of items below a threshold
Family housing operation and maintenance	Operation and maintenance expenses associated with family housing, including debt payment, leasing, minor construction, principal and interest charges, and insurance premiums
Family housing construction	Construction—including acquisition, replacement, addition, expansion, extension, and alteration—of family housing units
Military construction	Acquisition, construction, installation, and equipment of temporary or permanent public works, military installations, facilities, and real property

Source: Adapted from “Burden Sharing: Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea,” US Government Accountability Office, accessed on July 30, 2022, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-270>.

According to the GAO report, “DOD obligated a total of \$13.4 billion for the U.S. military presence in South Korea in 2016 through 2019.”⁴⁶¹ DOD obligations in South Korea remained pretty consistent, peaking in 2018.⁴⁶² In particular, the Department of Defense (DOD) committed \$3.1 billion in 2016, \$3.3 billion in 2017, \$3.5 billion in


⁴⁶¹ “Burden Sharing: Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea,” US Government Accountability Office, accessed on July 30, 2022, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-270>, 14.

⁴⁶² “Burden Sharing,” US Government Accountability Office, 17.

2018, and \$3.4 billion in 2019.⁴⁶³

Generally, the cost of military personnel is not included when calculating the non-personnel stationing cost (NPSC) of defense-cost sharing. It is because non-personnel stationing cost considers the direct cost of the U.S. military in Korea, except for the US personnel salaries.⁴⁶⁴

Figure 7. Funds Obligated for the U.S. Military Presence in South Korea, by Military Service, Calendar Years 2016-2019



Source: Adapted from “Burden Sharing: Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea,” US Government Accountability Office, accessed on July 30, 2022, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-270>.

Figure 7 displays that about 98 percent of funds were obligated to the Army and the


⁴⁶³ “Burden Sharing,” US Government Accountability Office, 17.

⁴⁶⁴ Kim, “Case Analysis of the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing,” 47.

Air Force. Figure 7 shows this trend because the Army and Air Force take up most US Forces in Korea. On the other hand, “The Marine Corps obligated \$82.8 million, the smallest of the services’ obligations.”⁴⁶⁵

In addition, Figure 8 illustrates that “military personnel and operation and maintenance obligations accounted for the majority of DOD’s obligations in South Korea.”⁴⁶⁶

Figure 8. Funds Obligated for the U.S. Military Presence in South Korea, by Appropriation Account, Calendar Years 2016-2019




Source: Adapted from “Burden Sharing: Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea,” US Government Accountability Office, accessed on July 30, 2022, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-270>.

⁴⁶⁵ “Burden Sharing,” US Government Accountability Office, 18.

⁴⁶⁶ “Burden Sharing,” US Government Accountability Office, 8.

Although the U.S. government is spending such a huge amount of money on U.S. Forces in Korea, the GAO report positively evaluates the presence of U.S. troops in Korea. It contributes to South Korea and Japan in various ways: regional stability and security; defense capability and interoperability; contingency response; denuclearization and nonproliferation; strong alliances; and free and open Indo-Pacific.⁴⁶⁷

Figure 9. Direct Cash and In-Kind Financial Support by South Korea for the U.S. Military Presence, Calendar Years 2016-2019



Source: GAO analysis of data provided by U.S. Forces Korea. | GAO-21-270

Source: Adapted from “Burden Sharing: Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea,” US Government Accountability Office, accessed on July 30, 2022, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-270>.

⁴⁶⁷ “Burden Sharing,” US Government Accountability Office.

Meanwhile, South Korea provided \$5.8 billion in direct financial support in the same period, as shown in Figure 9. About \$3.3 billion was provided through the special measures agreement (SMA). As mentioned, the U.S. government obligated about \$13.4 billion for the USFK from 2016 to 2019. However, if the cost for military personnel is deducted, the non-personnel stationing cost (NPSC) of the USFK is \$5.4 billion. If we just compare those numbers, we can understand that South Korea bore about 60 percent of the non-personnel stationing cost (NPSC) of the USFK from 2016 to 2019. In other words, it can be said that South Korea took a fair share of defense cost-sharing based on the data from the U.S. However, it is also true that there are other factors to consider to say a fair share of defense cost-sharing. It is not a good idea to rely on this figure alone.

VI. Case Study: Japan

a. United States Forces in Japan (USFJ)

The United States is known to be satisfied with the defense cost-sharing with Japan. In January 2017, former U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis underscored that “Japan has been a model of cost sharing and burden sharing,” calling Japan “an example for other nations to follow.”⁴⁶⁸ Therefore, this chapter will examine the US-Japan defense cost-sharing to refer to Korea's defense cost-sharing development.

First, it is necessary to understand the current status of the U.S. military stationing in Japan. According to *Military Balance 2022*, 55,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan under the U.S. Pacific Command.⁴⁶⁹ The Navy has about 20,000 sailors and is based in Yokosuka and Sasebo in Japan. There are also 13,000 U.S. Air Force personnel stationed in Japan, including Okinawa, and about 20,000 Marines stationed in Japan. Overall, the U.S. military is stationed in Japan on a relatively large scale. In Korea, the U.S. Army and Air Force are stationed as major forces, while in Japan, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are the main forces. The number of troops in USFJ is 1.9 times larger than that of USFK. Figure 9 displays the U.S. facilities in Japan. It is clear that the U.S. military is stationed in strategically essential places throughout Japan.

⁴⁶⁸ Brad Lendon, “Mattis: US will defend Japanese Islands claimed by China,” *CNN*, February 4, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/03/asia/us-defense-secretary-mattis-japan-visit/index.html>.

⁴⁶⁹ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Chapter Three: North America,” *The Military Balance* 122, no. 1 (2022): 57-58.

Figure 10. Map of U.S. Facilities in Japan




Source: Adapted from Emma Chanlett-Avery et al., *Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress*, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33436.pdf>.

b. Japan’s Defense Cost-Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

Japan usually conducts defense cost-sharing negotiations with the United States every five years. The US-Japan Special Measures Agreement is composed of labor costs, utilities costs, training relocation costs, and costs for facilities improvement programs (FIP). However, the newly signed Special Measures Agreement in 2021 created a new cost category called Training Equipment, and Materials Procedure.⁴⁷⁰

Figure 11. USFJ-Related Costs (Budget for FY2021)



Notes 1: Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend into the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs.

2: The SACO-related costs refer to the costs for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refer to the costs relating to measures to contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. Since the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately.

3: The costs for the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥40.4 billion, FY2020 Budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥164.2 billion, FY2020 Estimated Costs).

4: Numbers may not add up due to rounding.

Source: Adapted from Kishi Nobuo, *Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2021), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2021/DOJ2021_EN_Full.pdf.

⁴⁷⁰ “Special Measures Agreement (SMA) and Related Measures,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed on July 31, 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_003074.html.

The Japanese government contributes \$1.7 billion to \$2.1 billion per year (depending on the yen-to-dollar exchange rate) to offset the direct cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan.⁴⁷¹ Following the newly signed SMA in 2021, Japan's cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ in 2022 is about ¥205.6 billion. Japan will spend an average of ¥211.0 billion per year under the new SMA over the next five years.⁴⁷² However, as shown in Figure 11, the total amount is substantial if it includes indirect support or other support projects.


Figure 11 illustrates that Japan contributed \$12.6 billion in direct financial support from 2016 to 2019. Specifically, Japan provided \$5.3 billion (¥609.1 billion) in cash and in-kind financial assistance in these categories from 2016 to 2019. In addition to SMA assistance, Japan provided \$7.3 billion (¥953.9 billion) in “direct financial support for the Defense Policy Review Initiative, the Facilities Improvement Program, non-SMA labor, and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa initiatives.”⁴⁷³

⁴⁷¹ Emma Chanlett-Avery et al., *Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress*, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33436.pdf>.

⁴⁷² “Special Measures Agreement (SMA) and Related Measures,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

⁴⁷³ “Burden Sharing,” US Government Accountability Office, 20.


Figure 11. Direct Cash and In-Kind Financial Support by Japan for the U.S. Military Presence, Calendar Years 2016-2019



Source: Adapted from “Burden Sharing: Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea,” US Government Accountability Office, accessed on July 30, 2022, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-270>.

In contrast, the US government Obligated about \$20.9 billion for the U.S. military presence in Japan from 2016 to 2019. Figure 12 shows funds obligated for the USFJ from 2016 through 2019. Moreover, Figure 13 shows the funds obligated for the USFJ by appropriation account from 2016 to 2019. In order to understand the non-personnel stationing cost (NPSC), the cost of military personnel should be deducted. Then, the NPSC of USFJ is \$9.4 billion. Since Japan provided \$5.3 billion through the Special Measures Agreement, it can be said that Japan bore roughly 56% of the NPSC. Compared to the case of South Korea, there is no big difference in the non-personnel stationing cost.

Figure 12: Funds Obligated for the U.S. Military Presence in Japan, by Military Service, Calendar Years 2016—2019




Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data. | GAO-21-270

Source: Adapted from “Burden Sharing: Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea,” US Government Accountability Office, accessed on July 30, 2022, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-270>.

Compared to the total amount of direct and indirect financial support, Japan contributed financial support about two times higher than that of Korea from 2016 to 2019. If the total amount of items stipulated in the Special Measures Agreement is compared, Japan supported about \$5.2 billion to USFJ, and Korea supported \$3.3 billion to USFK from 2016 to 2019. Although Japan provides more defense cost-sharing contributions to the United States than South Korea, it may be unreasonable to simply compare the total amount paid by Japan and South Korea. The reason is that the size of the U.S. military presence stationing in Japan and South Korea, the cost categories of defense cost-sharing, the method of determining the amount of defense cost-sharing contribution, and detailed execution procedures are different.

Figure 13: Funds Obligated for the U.S. Military Presence in Japan, by Appropriation Account, Calendar Years 2016—2019



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data. | GAO-21-270

Source: Adapted from “Burden Sharing: Benefits and Costs Associated with the U.S. Military Presence in Japan and South Korea,” US Government Accountability Office, accessed on July 30, 2022, <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-270>.

The case study of the US-Japan Special Measures Agreement shows that Japan’s direct financial support is larger than Korea's. Although Japan provides more defense cost-sharing contributions, the NPSC comparison shows that it is hard to say that Japan provides more direct financial support to the US. In addition, the detailed defense cost-sharing system differs in many ways between Korea and Japan: cost categories, ways to calculate the cost, and administrative procedures.

VII. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

After the end of the Cold War, the great power competition disappeared, and the United States did not expect it would return. In order to create a peaceful world, the United States promoted the market economy and democratic values. The policymakers in the United States thought it was a good way to solidify the rules-based liberal international order, established by the United States after WWII.

However, the security environment has not changed as the United States had expected. According to various US government documents, the United States perceives the changes in the international security environment. First, China has become a grave threat to U.S. national security. China has translated economic growth into military power. China often disputed with its neighboring countries based on its strong military strength.

Moreover, China officially claims Taiwan as its territory and warns against U.S. diplomatic and military intervention. China is also getting access to foreign ports for strategic interests in Africa and Indo-Pacific. In other words, China does not hesitate to project its strong economic, political, and military power to the world. From the U.S. perspective, it is an effort to change the rules-based liberal international order.

Next, Taiwan has become one of the most dangerous places in the world. On August 2, the United States House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi officially visited Taiwan. It triggered a strong response from China. China is threatening Taiwan's security with live-firing exercises. The United States is concerned that Taiwan would be a flash point for an armed conflict between China and the United States. As such, the Taiwan issue is at the heart of the US-Chian competition, and US security experts are concerned about it seriously.

In addition, the United States considers Russia a significant threat to U.S. National Security. The United States interpreted Russia's invasion of Ukraine as an act to restore the influence of the disappeared Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War. However, the priority of US national security is China's threat, and the U.S. is focusing its resources on coping with the challenge of China.

Lastly, the United States is concerned about the nuclear and missile development of North Korea. North Korea tested nuclear bombs six times and declared itself a nuclear state. It seems that North Korea plans to do another nuclear test soon. The proliferation of nuclear arms is a nightmare for U.S. national security. It worries the United States because it will affect the stability of regional security in East Asia.

Based on these threat assessments, the United States has devised its grand strategy. In particular, the National Security Strategic Guidance, the Indo-Pacific Strategy, and the National Defense Strategy help us to understand what US grand strategy is. The common denominator of these documents focused on the return of great power competition with Russia and China and prioritized China's strategic threat in various fields. More than anything else, the United States is trying to protect the rules-based liberal international order. However, the Biden administration thinks it is hard to achieve this goal by the U.S alone. Thus, it highlights the importance of the allies and partners in various documents, showing the intention to strengthen the alliance.

As part of this effort to strengthen the alliance, the United States has created the AUKUS, revitalized the QUAD, improved transatlantic relations with NATO, and solidified the relationship with allies in Indo-Pacific. At the same time, the United States is enhancing economic cooperation with like-minded countries. The IPEF is one example of this economic approach, trying to check China in the regional economy. The United States also solidifies the international supply chain, such as

semiconductors and raw materials. The fact that Taiwan is the center of global semiconductor production makes the U.S. concerned about China's growing intention to unify Taiwan. In addition, the Biden administration is trying to enhance the military strength in the Indo-Pacific to compete with China's increasing military capability. For instance, the Biden administration has recently increased the US national defense budget to develop new military technologies.

Considering all of these, it appears that the Biden administration is following the foreign policy of Jeffersonian tradition. Jeffersonians are a realist who cherishes the value of democracy and freedom and pursues national interests at a minimum cost. For example, maintaining strategic ambiguity over Taiwan or providing weapons rather than direct intervention in the Ukrainian war seems connected with the Jeffersonian tradition.

On the other hand, South Korea is not free from the turbulence of escalating rivalry between the U.S. and China. It is well-known that South Korea is one of the world's longest US allies; about 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in Korea. In addition, the U.S. has provided extended deterrence against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. If there is any change in U.S. national security strategy, it will naturally take effect on South Korea's security. In particular, every time South Korea and the US negotiated the defense cost-sharing, it became a bone of contention between the two allies. During the Trump administration, this issue negatively influenced the ROK-US alliance. It was resolved only after the Biden administration started. However, there is no guarantee that this trend will continue when the next 12th Special Measures Agreement negotiations begin. In addition, it is hard to predict the 2024 US presidential election for now, and it is hard to rule out the possibility of the return of former President Donald Trump.

As discussed above, the nuclear and missile threat of North Korea continues. The United States is the most important ally for the security of South Korea. However, many security experts point out that the U.S. is still powerful but not a superpower anymore, facing a grave threat from China. In order to compete with China, the United States asks for the help of allies and partners. The United States wants allies to play a bigger role in US-China competition. In other words, North Korea's nuclear and missile threat and US efforts to maintain its current status in the international community affect the security of South Korea. It is what the theories about US defense cost-sharing explain.

Looking into the case of the US-Japan Special Measure Agreement, there were many differences in detail: the cost categories, administrative procedures, payment methods, and ways to decide the total contribution amount and number of US troops. Indeed, Japan's total amount of direct and indirect financial support is much higher than Korea's. However, the Non-personnel stationing cost (NPSC) showed no significant difference between Korea and Japan.

Then, how should South Korea deal with the Korea-US defense cost-sharing system in the future? Here are some policy recommendations for improvement.

First and foremost, it is necessary to keep in mind that the goal of the defense cost-sharing system is to strengthen the Korea-US combined defense posture, supporting the ROK-US alliance. It should not undermine the ROK-US alliance considering South Korea is under the nuclear and missile threats of North Korea.

Second, the increase in the total amount of direct financial support should be decided reasonably. In the past, both countries used a variety of indexes when determining the total amount of defense cost-sharing contribution. Since each index has pros and cons, it is necessary to go through sufficient consultation with the U.S. to decide the right

one. Otherwise, it will be tough to convince the Korean people, and the defense cost-sharing system will be on shaky ground.

Third, the transparency of the defense cost-sharing system should be enhanced, as many experts pointed out. In order for this, the U.S. Forces Korea needs to go through sufficient prior consultations with the Korean counterpart when drafting a plan. For instance, if the plan for military facilities is reviewed in advance, it would be much easier for South Korea to help the USFK expedite the process. In addition, this will encourage efficient use of South Korea's in-kind construction contribution.

Fourth, it requires extra effort to convince the U.S. concerning South Korea's indirect financial support. Korea provides a lot of indirect support, including the KATUSA and utility charges exemption. Putting this on the negotiation table will help Korea gain future bargaining power.

Fifth, it is necessary to be cautious about creating a new cost category. As the US-China competition has intensified, the U.S. can demand a new cost category in the future. Considering the primary mission of the USFK and the purpose of defense cost-sharing, it is challenging to create new cost categories.

For South Korea, the defense cost-sharing system is a complicated issue to deal with. Many factors influence the negotiations: international security environment, US national security strategy, Korea-US combined defense posture, and South Korean people's attention. In other words, it is a military issue, but at the same time, it is a politically sensitive issue. Given the security and national interests, an innovative and wise policy approach is required to develop the defense cost-sharing system.

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