

1 **Evaluation of a critical mineral recycling network: A case study on nickel recycling**
2 **from production waste in Korean eco-industrial parks**

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13 **Keywords:** industrial ecology, industrial symbiosis (IS), eco-industrial parks (EIPs), critical
14 mineral, recycling, nickel

15
16 **Abstract**

17 The transformation of industrial paradigms towards global carbon neutrality and the
18 enhancement of national security may initially appear unrelated, yet both necessitate a vital
19 intermediary: critical minerals. Despite global efforts focused on securing critical minerals
20 through supply chains, challenges persist due to geopolitical instability and complex inter-
21 country dynamics. The recycling of embedded resources in products emerges as a crucial and
22 inevitable strategy to build resilient domestic supply chains, especially in countries facing
23 resource shortages. This study introduces a closed-loop system utilizing public and open-
24 source data to recover nickel, a pivotal critical mineral, with South Korea serving as a
25 representative mineral-deficient nation. The methodology targets the manufacturing industry
26 and various industrial complexes, assessing the potential for resource recycling by fostering
27 networks among related companies within each complex. The findings underscore that these
28 networks within industrial complexes encompass 86% of the manufacturing industry, forming
29 a cohesive framework for developing a nickel integration network. Implementation of such
30 networks in concentrated industrial complexes with diverse manufacturing sectors is
31 anticipated to significantly enhance critical mineral self-sufficiency in high-demand countries.

33 **1. Introduction**

34 Global carbon neutrality target and a shift in industrial paradigms are driving up demand
35 for critical minerals to meet the accelerated transformation of mineral-intensive industrial
36 sectors such as electric vehicles and renewable energy (MOTIE, 2023). The international
37 community acknowledges critical minerals as critical raw materials for reaching net-zero
38 goals through a transition to clean technologies, and inextricably tied to national
39 competitiveness (Dou et al., 2023). Furthermore, achieving net-zero goals is believed to be
40 closely connected to the availability of critical minerals (Wang et al., 2023; Bobba et al.,
41 2020, Carrara et al., 2020, Elshkaki and Shen, 2019; Frenzel et al., 2017; Blagoeva et al.,
42 2016). According to SNE Research (SNE, 2023), the global electric vehicle market and
43 battery market are expected to grow ten-fold and thirteen-fold, respectively, by 2030
44 compared to 2021, and a typical electric car requires six times the mineral input of a
45 conventional vehicle, and an onshore wind power plant requires nine times the mineral
46 resources of a natural gas plant (IEA, 2022; Kirsten et al., 2020). Furthermore, the
47 International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that demand for critical minerals such as lithium
48 (42 times), cobalt (21 times), nickel (19 times), and rare earths (7 times) will increase from
49 2020 to 2040 as clean energy, including electric vehicles and renewable energy, expands in
50 the process of achieving carbon neutrality (IEA, 2022). According to a World Bank
51 assessment, the output of minerals and metals required for clean energy transition would
52 expand significantly by 2050, with estimates ranging from 108% to 964% (Hund et al., 2020;
53 Jiskani et al., 2022).

54 However, critical minerals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, and graphite are concentrated in
55 specific nations, particularly with China controlling the processing supply chain (IEA, 2022;
56 Ballinger et al., 2019). Recent geopolitical crises, such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the
57 Israel-Hamas war, and supply restriction policies by key supplier countries such as China and
58 Indonesia, have increased rivalry for critical minerals among major importing nations. As a
59 consequence, a series of policies that restrict the export of critical minerals from supplier
60 countries is causing supply instability and price fluctuations (Nidhi, S., 2023).

61 In the current global landscape, countries such as China and Indonesia in Asia, alongside
62 nations in Central and South America and Africa, exert control over critical mineral resources
63 through resource nationalization policies, which include export controls (OECD, 2023;
64 Agusdinata and Liu, 2023). Demand countries are responding by internalizing their supply

65 chains, promoting Mineral Security Partnerships (MSP), and expanding collaboration with
66 ally-centric initiatives such as the IEA's Critical Minerals Task Force (**Vivoda et al., 2023;**
67 **MOTIE, 2023**). Meanwhile, countries such as South Korea, which imports 95% of its
68 minerals, face the key challenge of securing critical minerals to maintain long-term industrial
69 competitiveness. Despite efforts such as long-term supply contracts, overseas resource
70 development, domestic production, recycling, and stockpiling, South Korea is constrained in
71 meeting the increasing demand for critical minerals. The vulnerability of its supply chain is
72 exacerbated by the absence of domestic manufacturing facilities for these critical minerals
73 (**MOTIE, 2023; UNEP, 2013**).

74

75 **2. National Critical Mineral Strategy Implications**

76 An analysis of major national strategies on critical minerals, including those of the US,
77 Canada, EU, Australia and South Korea, reveals variations in the lists of critical minerals
78 based on each country's economic, environmental, and social considerations. However, 16
79 critical minerals (Aluminum, Antimony, Bismuth, Cobalt, Gallium, Rare Earth Elements,
80 Lithium, Magnesium, Vanadium) are universally designated as critical across these nations,
81 with slight differences Manganese, Graphite, Niobium, Platinum Group Metals, Tantalum,
82 Titanium, Tungsten, and in designation between supply and demand countries. Notably, these
83 16 minerals are crucial for advancing industries such as semiconductors, batteries, and
84 electric vehicles, as well as for national security sectors like aerospace and defense.
85 Recognizing their importance, nations are expected to intensify efforts to secure these critical
86 minerals to promote advanced industries and bolster domestic security. Furthermore, the
87 strategies for securing these critical minerals show clear similarities. Major countries are
88 pursuing three primary initiatives to enhance mineral security.

89 First, there is a strong emphasis on domestic resource development. Resource-rich nations
90 such as the US, Canada, and Australia aim to obtain critical minerals by extracting virgin
91 materials, often through partnerships with indigenous communities to foster mutual
92 understanding. This approach is part of broader efforts to address resource nationalism in
93 mineral-rich states amidst escalating demand for critical minerals. Conversely, the EU and
94 South Korea, both substantial importers of critical minerals, are focusing on exploring and
95 developing their domestic resources with an emphasis on safety and environmental
96 considerations. For instance, the EU's Critical Raw Materials Initiative targets extracting 10%

97 of its demand within the EU, while South Korea plans to map its critical minerals through
98 comprehensive exploration techniques, including geological surveys, drilling, modeling, and
99 mine design, to enhance development potential.

100 Second, there is a strong emphasis on enhancing international cooperation. Both supply
101 and demand countries recognize the challenges of relying solely on domestic sources for
102 stable critical mineral supplies. Supply countries often assert control over supply chains to
103 ensure access to critical minerals, while demand countries prioritize mobilizing international
104 cooperation, especially among nations sharing similar values. The Mineral Security
105 Partnership (MSP), comprising Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy,
106 Japan, South Korea, Norway, Sweden, the UK, the US, and the EU, exemplifies a significant
107 alliance for critical mineral cooperation. Participating countries collaborate on projects of
108 mutual interest, establish working groups to assess investment opportunities, and foster closer
109 collaboration. **(MOTIE, 2023)**

110 Third, there is a strong emphasis on proactive recycling, a concept increasingly prioritized
111 in demand countries like the EU and South Korea compared to resource-supply nations. The
112 EU mandates the incorporation of recycled materials in new battery production under its
113 Battery Regulation, setting targets such as 16% cobalt, 85% lead, 6% lithium, and 6% nickel
114 from recycled sources within eight years of the law's enactment. These percentages are set to
115 increase to 26%, 85%, 12%, and 15%, respectively, thirteen years after implementation
116 **(Regulation (EU), 2023)**. Similarly, South Korea aims to recycle 20% of critical minerals by
117 2030, establishing a crucial Mineral Recycling Verification Center and creating clusters for
118 centralized procurement and recovery of raw materials. The government plans to actively
119 support recycling programs and related research through financial aid and tax incentives.

120 The aim of this study is to assess the economic viability of recycling networks, a policy
121 gaining traction among demand countries. Recycling locally generated waste products or
122 unused critical minerals in manufacturing processes is crucial for achieving sustainable long-
123 term growth. In South Korea, recycling is integral to the country's strategy for critical mineral
124 security. With projections indicating a significant increase in waste by around 2040,
125 particularly from permanent magnets and electric vehicle batteries **(SNE, 2023)**, recycling is
126 poised to play a pivotal role in securing future critical minerals. South Korea has committed
127 to enhancing recycling efficiency through the formation of industrial clusters. Rather than
128 continually introducing new policies, it is essential to revisit and identify successful elements

129 from previous initiatives. A reassessment of the Eco-Industrial Parks (EIP) program, which
130 has been successfully implementing eco-friendly recycling technologies and fostering inter-
131 company collaboration since 2005 (Jung et al., 2013), is therefore warranted. By studying
132 cases of recycling technologies in the context of the EIP policy, South Korea's potential to
133 achieve critical mineral security through recycling can be better understood.

134

135 **3. South Korea's Policy on Eco-Industrial Parks (EIPs) and Technological** 136 **Advancements**

137

138 3.1. EIP Policy Overview and Achievements

139 While major countries worldwide advocate recycling legislation as a fundamental strategy
140 for securing critical minerals, specific implementation strategies remain underdeveloped.
141 Countries need to thoroughly assess the potential to build upon existing recycling programs
142 before introducing new policies. As a prominent demand country for critical minerals, South
143 Korea needs to actively reuse or recycle waste in production to ensure a stable supply chain.
144 Evaluating the applicability and scalability of technologies developed through previous Eco-
145 Industrial Park (EIP) initiatives can be seen as the initial step towards implementing a
146 sustainable recycling policy. EIP plays a pivotal role in industrial ecology, which aims to
147 mimic natural ecosystems by designing closed-loop systems or circular resource utilization
148 structures to maximize resource efficiency and minimize environmental impact. The concept
149 aims for zero waste discharge through industrial symbiosis, where businesses collaborate to
150 share economic and environmental benefits. Since the late 1990s, various countries including
151 the EU, US, Canada, Japan, China, and South Korea have embraced this approach to
152 transform industrial complexes into eco-friendly hubs known as Eco-Industrial Parks (Son et
153 al., 2023; Liu et al., 2018; Chertow, 2007).

154 Since 2005, South Korea has implemented an EIP policy aimed at converting industrial
155 complexes into sustainable, eco-friendly environments within a 12-year period, establishing a
156 circular system that reuses waste generated within industrial zones. The policy emphasizes
157 resource and energy efficiency through direct inter-company recycling of waste. Targeting
158 105 industrial complexes, the initiative has successfully implemented 235 projects with a
159 government investment of 81 billion KRW (approximately 62 million USD). These projects
160 have generated economic profits amounting to 2.4 trillion KRW (around 1.8 billion USD)

161 through cost savings and increased revenue. Environmentally, achievements include reducing
162 waste 6.8 million metric tonnes, saving 1.7 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in energy
163 consumption, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 8.5 million metric tonnes of CO₂-
164 equivalent (MOTIE, 2014). Since 2019, the focus has shifted from individual company
165 environmental initiatives towards transforming industrial complexes into smart ecosystems
166 where companies within the same industry and value chain can autonomously collaborate
167 through data connectivity and sharing (MOTIE, 2019).

168 In this study, we analyze the economic potential of key technologies for recovering critical
169 minerals (Table 1), developed over the past 12 years through EIP programs. Our focus is on
170 assessing the economic viability of a nickel recovery network crucial for electric vehicle
171 battery production. Nickel, historically used in stainless steel, is now in high demand for
172 batteries, leading suppliers to redirect resources from stainless steel production. Recent trends
173 indicate constraints in nickel supply, particularly from major reserves in Indonesia, due to
174 export levies and limited new manufacturing facilities, resulting in an unstable supply chain
175 (Guru, 2023). Recovering nickel from waste generated in domestic industrial processes is
176 crucial for evaluating economic performance, especially in countries like South Korea
177 heavily reliant on imported critical minerals. Moreover, amid an unstable nickel supply chain
178 exacerbated by increasing battery demand, such initiatives not only stabilize the supply chain
179 but also foster collaborative networks among firms towards an eco-friendly economy. While
180 the quantitative impact of nickel recovery from process effluents may currently be modest
181 relative to total demand, the potential for nickel recovery from expanding battery production
182 and a growing volume of waste batteries lays the groundwork for a circular economy.
183 Understanding the economic potential of recycling critical minerals and expanding these
184 efforts within regional industrial complexes and across national industries contributes
185 significantly to the economic aspect of a circular economy. This study first addresses the
186 expansion potential of such networks in Korean regional industrial complexes, evaluating
187 economic impact of nickel recovery from process waste. Subsequently, we estimate the
188 theoretically recoverable amount of nickel, extending our analysis to all national enterprises.
189 Furthermore, by demonstrating tangible environmental benefits such as waste reduction and
190 greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation, it supports the strengthening of government policies.

191


192 TABLE 1 The most important technologies for recovering critical minerals (MOTIE, 2014).

EIP Technology	Applications	Industry
Recovery of valuable metals from waste materials	1. Copper recovery from the PCB manufacturing process 2. Gallium and Indium recovery from transparent electrode waste scrap 3. Recovery of silver from silver coating scrap	Semiconductor, Printed Circuit Board (PCB), Photovoltaic industry, display, machinery and metal processing
Recovery of valuable metals from wastewater	Recovery of copper, nickel and indium from wastewater	Semiconductor, Printed Circuit Board (PCB), display, photovoltaic industry, LED industry
Recovery of valuable metals from industrial sludge	1. CeO ₂ recovery from slurry 2. Copper extraction from sludge 3. Extraction of aluminum oxide from waste artificial marble	Printed Circuit Board (PCB), the refinery industry, construction and building materials
Recovery of valuable metals from waste oil	Molybdenum recovery from used lubricant	Photovoltaic industry, LCD and materials industries

193

194 3.2. Nickel Recovery Technology in the Supply Chain Network

195 The technology implemented within the EIPs commercially involves recovering high-
196 purity nickel raw materials from nickel electroplating effluents and establishing a resource
197 circulation network. Previously, nickel electroplating effluents were typically outsourced for
198 treatment, incurring expenses and resulting in the loss of valuable nickel metal. However, a
199 resource circulation network was established by selectively removing contaminants from
200 nickel-containing waste through pH adjustments and ion exchange resins. Through
201 electrolytic extraction, 99.8% high-purity electrolytic nickel was successfully recovered and
202 reintegrated into the resource circulation network, returning it to the waste suppliers and
203 demand partners - nickel electroplating enterprises (KITECH, 2016).



204

205 FIGURE 1 Treatment and recycling networks for nickel recovery (KITECH, 2016).

206 Four nickel plating enterprises (H, I, D, In) participated in the pilot project, validating a
207 total annual economic gain of 450 thousand USD through savings in raw material acquisition
208 costs. Additionally, they achieved an environmental benefit by eliminating the generation of
209 500 tonnes of wastewater (Figure 1).

211 **4. The methodology**

212 To effectively disseminate and utilize commercialized technology for recycling critical
213 minerals, it is essential to develop a mechanism for identifying potential demand companies
214 and assessing the feasibility of commercialization. In this study, a system was established to
215 integrate company information, EIP project details, and target technologies by aggregating
216 data from public and open sources. This approach was used to identify prospective demand
217 companies and evaluate the feasibility of commercialization. Globally, various platforms
218 have been developed to share information on industrial symbiosis, but actual utilization cases
219 are scarce due to insufficient quantity and quality of information needed to develop these
220 networks (Chen and Liu, 2021). Furthermore, encouraging platform user participation is
221 challenging when there are inconsistencies in data formats and quality related to industrial
222 classification, waste, and resources, or when data are lacking.

223 In this study, to address these challenges, dispersed corporate information from
224 government departments and public institutes has been consolidated into integrated resources
225 encompassing energy and emission data. Moreover, reliability has been bolstered by
226 incorporating successful industrial symbiosis case data from existing business
227 implementations. However, future improvements are necessary, such as introducing
228 indicators like a similarity index, to mitigate challenges related to data updates and variations
229 in applied processes even for similar products.

231 **4.1. Data Set**


232 The manufacturing facility data used in this study are sourced from public and open-access
233 datasets. They include information from 196,640 target companies, encompassing factory
234 registration details (Factory ON) provided by the Korea Industrial Complex Corporation
235 (KICOX), energy usage and greenhouse gas emission data categorized by industrial sectors
236 from the Korea Energy Agency (KEA), waste disposal information from the Allbaro system,
237 water environment information from the WEMS, and waste recycling data from the Ministry

238 of Environment (MOE).

239

240 4.2. Network Construction Algorithm

241 The algorithm used to assess the economic feasibility of recycling generated waste consists
242 of five phases (Figure 2 and Figure 3). Initially, EIP technologies and business models are
243 categorized. The second phase involves classifying the types of waste. Thirdly, industries are
244 categorized by linking them with industry codes. In the subsequent phase, potential resource
245 quantities are estimated based on the ratio of recyclable nickel content. Finally, economic
246 feasibility is analyzed considering processing costs, recovery costs, and transportation
247 expenses at specified discount rates. The nickel metal content in wastewater is determined
248 using market transaction prices and the specified rate for each electroplating company.
249 Recycling costs are calculated based on expenditure differences between companies that have
250 implemented recycling programs and those that have not.



251

252 FIGURE 2 Algorithms of the flow of recycled materials.

4.3. Criteria for Evaluation

The economic, environmental, and social evaluations of critical mineral recovery are pivotal for project advancement. Particularly, economic evaluation holds significant importance as the primary driver for eco-industrial parks, despite their intended basis in environmental and social agendas (Roberts, 2004). Therefore, for this initiative to succeed, member organizations within the supply, recycling, and demand sectors must demonstrate economic feasibility compared to traditional processing methods. Figure 3 illustrates the proposed economic evaluation criteria for participating companies categorized as suppliers, facilitators, and demanders. Key economic evaluation indicators for each target to support commercialization are outlined below.




FIGURE 3 Flow sheet of evaluation process.

The pre-feasibility can be expressed as:

$$S_e = \sum_{i=1}^n PR_i \times W_c \quad (1)$$

$$R_e = \sum_{i=1}^n PR_i \times (S_c - R_c) \quad (2)$$

$$D_e = \sum_{i=1}^n PR_i \times M_p \times D_f \quad (3)$$

where i represents the number of companies. S_e denotes the waste disposal cost for supply companies, with PR indicating the potential recycling quantity and W_c representing waste

272 disposal costs. R_e signifies the economic profit for recycling companies, where S_c denotes the
273 sale price and R_c denotes the recycling cost. D_e denotes the purchasing cost for demand
274 companies, with M_p indicating the market price of nickel and D_f representing the discount
275 rate.

276

277 **5. Results and Discussion**


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279 5.1. Economic Implications of Nickel Recovery Networks in Regional Industrial Complexes

280 Using a standardized algorithm to assess the profitability of nickel recycling within densely
281 concentrated industrial complexes led to the identification of 190 potential supply companies
282 capable of recycling 1,176 tonnes of nickel. The comprehensive examination of the network
283 economy involving supply firms, facilitators, and demand entities revealed an annual
284 economic advantage of 14.8 billion KRW (11.4 million USD) through cost savings and new
285 revenues. This result focuses on supply companies due to their potential roles as facilitators
286 or demand participants within the network, enabling collaboration with other businesses or
287 independent operation. For instance, Company A in the Kumi industrial complex, specializing
288 in electronic component materials, annually discharges approximately 30,352 tonnes of
289 wastewater and 1,689 tonnes of waste sludge containing 0.35% nickel. Utilizing nickel
290 recovery technology on these waste streams could potentially recover 112 tonnes of nickel,
291 saving company A around 35 million KRW (27 thousand USD) in current outsourced waste
292 disposal costs. Considering recycling revenues, the intermediary firm could potentially earn
293 approximately 1.2 billion KRW (898 thousand USD) as a nickel recovery entity. Moreover,
294 demand companies could procure recycled nickel at a lower cost than imported nickel,
295 potentially saving about 210 million KRW (162 thousand USD) in procurement expenses.

296 Furthermore, conducting an economic analysis of an integrated nickel recovery and
297 recycling program within these industrial complexes allows firms to establish closed-loop
298 processes. This approach involves recovering nickel from company waste for reintroduction
299 into the manufacturing cycle. Facilitator companies may collect nickel-containing effluent
300 from neighboring firms engaged in similar activities, thereby promoting onsite recycling.
301 Evaluation of intermediary companies managing waste generated by company A identified
302 approximately 30 facilitator companies in the Kumi national industrial complex involved in
303 recycling and transportation, suggesting potential network alignment to support economically

304 advantageous onsite recycling initiatives. To develop a new business model focused on
 305 economic feasibility through the recovery and reuse of critical minerals from discarded
 306 materials, waste streams across different regions of Korea were evaluated. Analysis of
 307 regional industrial complexes indicated that 207,205 tonnes of nickel-containing waste is
 308 generated annually in the Kyunggi region, particularly in the Banwol and Sihwa industrial
 309 complexes, which are hubs for electronic and electrical product manufacturing and plating-
 310 related industries. From these streams, an estimated 728 tonnes of nickel could be salvaged,
 311 adding value amounting to 9.2 billion KRW (7 million USD). Similarly, in the Kyungbuk
 312 region, where concentrations of electrical, electronic, and mechanical sectors are found, about
 313 220 tonnes of nickel could be recycled annually at the Kumi national industrial complex,
 314 resulting in an annual added value of 2.8 billion KRW (2.2 million USD). (Figure 4)



315 FIGURE 4 Regional industrial complex waste generation in 2022, (left), and regional
 316 industrial complex network economic feasibility (right). See Supporting Information S3 for
 317 the detailed calculation used for data analysis and comparison.

318 A distinctive finding from this industrial survey is the substantial waste emissions and
 319 extensive resource recycling observed in industrial complexes, particularly those with
 320 significant nickel content, highlighting robust economic efficiency. Notably, three companies
 321 situated in different industrial complexes contribute 75% to the total economic viability of
 322 nickel recycling among the 190 surveyed firms. Therefore, in the initial stages of constructing
 323 a nickel recycling network, focusing on those three major waste suppliers offers significant
 324 economic advantages (Table 2).

325

326 Table 2 Economic feasibility of a nickel recycling network among the three major
 327 companies. See Supporting Information S3 for the values.

	A (Kyunggi)	B (Ulsan)	C (Kyungbuk)	Total industrial complex
Wastes (t/y)	188,175	32,059	30,352	330,648
Recycling (t/y)	660	112	112	1,176
Supply F/S (1,000 USD)	157	27	27	281
Recycling F/S (1,000 USD)	5,281	898	898	9,415
Demand F/S (1,000 USD)	952	162	162	1,697
Network F/S (1,000 USD)	6,389(56.1%)	1,087(9.5%)	1,086(9.5%)	11,392(100%)


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329 5.2. Potential economic benefit of the nickel recovery network on the manufacturing industry
330 as a whole

331 After validating the economic viability of recycling waste nickel within industrial
332 complexes, a comprehensive assessment covering all manufacturing enterprises revealed an
333 annual generation of approximately 384,255 tonnes of nickel-containing waste streams (see
334 **Figure 5**, 382,890+1,365 tonnes). An additional recovery potential of about 189 tonnes of
335 nickel was identified, as the difference in recyclable amounts between the country and
336 industrial complex. The total economic potential was estimated at 17 billion KRW (13
337 million USD), with 2.3 billion KRW (1.8 million USD) contributed by companies outside
338 industrial complexes. This underscores the importance of establishing recycling networks
339 centered around industrial complexes. Notably, 82% of the economic contribution from
340 companies outside industrial parks stemmed from a single enterprise engaged in nickel and
341 zinc refining, which generated 1.9 billion KRW (1.5 million USD). However, due to the
342 absence of surrounding firms, this company can only operate independently as a waste
343 supplier, facilitator, and demander, facing significant economic challenges.

344 Moreover, while not classified as an industrial complex, the cooperative association
345 complex for electroplating activities in the Busan region demonstrated economic
346 sustainability due to its concentrated similar electroplating-related firms. Recovering 8 tonnes
347 of nickel from 2,344 tonnes of wastewater is feasible within this cooperative association
348 complex, comprising mainly small and medium-sized enterprises, with an anticipated
349 economic viability of approximately 103 million KRW (79 thousand USD). Given the
350 collective ability of these small and medium-sized businesses to manage wastewater on a

351 smaller scale, the construction of a network with the involvement of intermediary companies
 352 facilitating centralized wastewater treatment appears feasible. (Figure 5)




353 FIGURE 5 Volume of waste streams generated by national and industrial complexes (left),
 354 and the economic outcomes achieved by national and industrial complexes (right). See
 355 Supporting Information S5 for the detailed calculation used for data analysis and comparison.

356

357 5.3. Sensitivity analysis on the impact of the outcomes

358 In this study, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to examine the key parameters affecting
 359 the economic feasibility of recycling networks for nickel. The analysis aimed to identify
 360 which parameters within the recycling system exert the greatest influence on economic
 361 outcomes. Both internal and external factors were considered: internal factors included
 362 recycling costs for technologies, while external factors encompassed waste disposal costs for
 363 supply companies and the price of nickel for demand companies.

364 For the sensitivity analysis, each parameter was individually varied while keeping others
 365 constant. The baseline (0%) economic value was set based on a nickel price of 17,250 USD
 366 per tonne, using the prevailing rate at the establishment of the nickel recycling network in
 367 2018, alongside waste disposal costs of 403 USD per tonne and recycling costs of 300 USD
 368 per tonne. The reference nickel price of 17,250 USD per tonne aligns closely with the six-
 369 year average from 2018 to 2023, which was 17,759 USD per tonne. Results indicate that
 370 variations in nickel price exert the most significant impact. Economic values of recovered
 371 nickel networks fluctuated from 10,565 thousand USD to 11,214 thousand USD. In contrast,
 372 variations in waste disposal and recycling costs had a comparatively smaller impact,
 373 influencing economic values by approximately 1%. (Figure 6)



374
 375 **FIGURE 6** Sensitivity analysis on key parameters. See Supporting Information S6 for the
 376 detailed calculation used for data analysis and comparison.

377
 378 The results of sensitivity analysis indicate that the profitability of recycling networks is
 379 significantly influenced by external factors, particularly the market price of nickel. As a result,
 380 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) engaged in nickel recycling from waste within
 381 industrial parks face challenges in maintaining business sustainability.

382 Ultimately, it can be concluded that stable and continuous government support, both direct
 383 and indirect, is essential until the market stabilizes. Many companies involved in critical
 384 mineral resources secure nickel through long-term contracts with resource-rich countries or
 385 invest in mining development to support environmentally friendly industries such as electric
 386 vehicles, batteries, and solar power. However, this strategy is vulnerable to external factors,
 387 particularly the political environment of the resource-rich countries. For resource-poor
 388 countries, diversifying supply options becomes imperative.

389
 390 **5.4. Discussion**

391 According to the framework developed in this study, the recoverable nickel from waste
 392 generated across all manufacturing industries in South Korea represents approximately 1.6%
 393 of total imports. However, companies are hesitant to invest actively, citing concerns over
 394 economic feasibility and operational sustainability. To enhance supply chain stability and
 395 promote environmentally sustainable industries, government intervention is essential through

396 policies that allocate a portion of strategic stockpiles to recycled materials. Drawing on the
397 successful implementation of the feed-in tariff (FIT) system, initially utilized to bolster the
398 solar industry in various nations, governments can ensure profitability for recycling
399 enterprises and catalyze the emergence of critical mineral extraction ventures across diverse
400 sectors. The FIT system was pivotal in transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy
401 sources, supporting renewable energy suppliers by compensating for higher generation costs
402 compared to fossil fuels and thus fostering the sector's early growth. Similarly, for critical
403 minerals, South Korea, rich in manufacturing capabilities but lack in natural resources, holds
404 significant potential to secure these minerals from various waste streams. However, sustained
405 governmental support is crucial during the sector's nascent stages. Establishing robust support
406 mechanisms akin to the FIT system can enable governments to integrate recycled materials
407 into strategic stockpile, creating synergies that stabilize critical mineral supplies and cultivate
408 new market opportunities. In addition, the waste reduction and greenhouse gas (GHG)
409 mitigation effects confirmed through the recycling network could serve as a catalyst for
410 bolstering government support. Although the recoverable amount of nickel in Korea's
411 manufacturing sector represents just 1.6% of total imports, viewed conversely, this figure
412 implies a reduction of 1.6%, equivalent to 1,365 tonnes of waste. Furthermore, recycled
413 nickel can be utilized in new product manufacturing, reducing fresh nickel consumption and
414 concurrently achieving greenhouse gas benefits. The GHG reduction effect identified in this
415 study amounts to 17,745 tCO₂-eq (Global Warming Potential 13 kgCO₂-eq/kg Class 1 Ni,
416 **Nickel Institute 2023**). Although the greenhouse gas reduction potential achieved through
417 nickel recycling may not be as significant as large-scale measures like fuel conversion, a
418 global mandate on the use of recycled critical minerals in product manufacturing will address
419 the government's concerns on secured supply of critical minerals and waste management of
420 waste products.

421

422 **6. Conclusions**

423 The global shift towards a low-carbon and sustainable economy, coupled with the critical
424 imperative to secure the supply of critical minerals for enhanced national security, is
425 increasingly recognized as urgent and pivotal across industrialized nations. Governments
426 worldwide are pooling resources to ensure the availability of those minerals, highlighted by
427 ambitious commitments such as the installation of 100 million electric vehicles by 2030,

428 underscoring a steadfast commitment to achieving a net-zero carbon economy (Ballinger et
429 al., 2019). Nations acknowledge the crucial role of securing critical minerals in supporting
430 the transition towards achieving the 2050 net-zero targets. However, due to the scarcity of
431 those minerals, consistent procurement efforts require significant investment, especially for
432 countries lack domestic sources.

433 This study focuses on South Korea as an example, evaluating a network aimed at securing
434 critical minerals present in primary waste streams generated during manufacturing processes.
435 Specifically, this study applied and categorized clean technologies previously developed for
436 EIPs within the manufacturing sector, reflecting regional characteristics. The Kyunggi region,
437 which is prominent in the electronics and equipment sectors, exhibited the greatest potential
438 for nickel recovery. This potential translated into economic benefits amounting to 9.2 billion
439 KRW (7 million USD). Following closely, the Kumi industrial complex in the Kyungbuk
440 region yielded an economic benefit of 2.8 billion KRW (2.2 million USD).

441 In the South Korean context, industrial complexes have been identified as key hubs
442 harboring 86% of the potential for overall economic benefits, making them viable locations
443 for recovering nickel. The rising significance of critical minerals, notably in secondary
444 batteries for electric vehicles, predicts a significant surge in end-of-life batteries by 2040,
445 prompting current initiatives for their recycling. While immediate economic gains from
446 strategies securing critical minerals in manufacturing processes may be modest, their future
447 value is anticipated to rise. Despite the technology applied in this study yielding only 1,365
448 tonnes of nickel - equivalent to 1.6% of Korea's annual nickel metal imports - the current
449 resource strategy targeting a 20% increase in recycling does not encompass the waste
450 analyzed here. Further exploration of various waste materials containing nickel, guided by the
451 developed platform, has the potential to significantly advance Korea's governmental
452 objectives. Over the past 12 years, Korea has introduced 37 eco-friendly technologies through
453 eco-industrial development programs, including seven relevant to critical minerals such as
454 indium, gallium, copper, and molybdenum. The potential for recovering those critical
455 minerals using such technologies warrants deeper investigation. Recycling is poised to
456 become a cornerstone policy ensuring future critical mineral supplies, particularly when
457 integrated with industries generating substantial quantities of waste critical minerals, such as
458 those involved in electric vehicles, secondary batteries, and renewable energy facilities.

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463 **Conflict of Interest Statement**

464 The authors declare no conflict of interest

465

466 **Data Availability Statement**

467 The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the
468 corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.

469

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580 **Supporting Information**

581 Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section
582 at the end of this article.

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